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Abstract 
 The electric power industry is very complex, dangerous, and challenging. The number of 
workplace accidents declined over the last decade, but worker injuries and fatalities 
continue to occur. The purpose of this Delphi study was to gain consensus regarding the 
most feasible and desirable methods to prevent accidents and deaths. The research 
question focused on gaining consensus from a panel of experts regarding the most 
desirable and feasible solutions to fatal and serious workplace accidents in the United 
States. The Bolman and Deal 4-frame model proved useful for understanding challenges 
within the electric industry and how workers and leaders can work together to best 
prevent accidents. Twenty-seven managers, trainers, supervisors, and workers, each with 
more than 10 years of experience in the United States electric power industry, responded 
to 30 items in the first round. The responses from the first round, where 70% or more of 
participants agreed, were analyzed using the NVivo 12 Plus software. Consensus 
occurred after each round: In the first round   through the solutions participants provided. 
In the second round and later rounds, consensus occurred through acceptance of items 
with scores of 3 or higher on a 5-point Likert-type scale endorsed by 70% or more 
respondents. Participants decided if the solutions were desirable and feasible in the 
second round, and important and credible in rounds third and fourth. Participants 
concurred that organizational leadership, managers, supervisors, and workers were in 
different ways responsible for accident prevention. Supervisors and managers who 
communicated organizational priorities, and demanded strict compliance with policies, 
rules, and procedures, promote social change in a highly specialized industry.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
In 2017, five electricity industry employees, including a manager, died in a single 
workplace accident in Florida (Bedi, Capriel, Dawson, & McGrory, 2017).  That same year, a 
lineman in Minnesota was seriously injured when the boom arm of his bucket truck fell off when 
it became detached from the vehicle (Staff, 2017), and in Fairmont, North Carolina, a lineman 
died while moving a fallen power line from across a roadway (Sinclair, 2017).  Although 
infrequent, accidents have a high impact and were dangerous in the electric power industry.  In 
this study, I focused on determining how to mitigate accidents in the electric power industry and 
the prevention of severe injuries and death to workers.  This workplace experience was necessary 
to research since the electricity industry is one where sophisticated safety workplace 
arrangements are employed, yet accidents still occur.  Manuele (2014) highlighted the increased 
emphasis on workplace safety while indicating that the worst accidents continued to happen.  
These were the ones where workers became severely injured or killed.  Chapter 1 contains the 
background for this research, a problem statement, a purpose statement, the research question, 
the conceptual framework chosen for this exercise, and a section on the nature of the study.  
Sections on the assumptions I made, the scope and delimitations, limitations, and significance of 
the study also form part of this chapter. 
Background of the Study 
White et al. (2016) considered worker beliefs about the effectiveness of workplace safety 
arrangements that Australian electrical workers experienced.  That study was similar, in ways, to 
this current research to determine ways to prevent accidents which were happening in the U.S. 
electric power industry.  The prevailing impression was that electric power industry workers 
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were proficient at recognizing hazards, capable of evaluating the risks, and of mitigating them.  
Aboagye-Nimo, Raiden, King, and Tietze (2015) studied on-site workplace training and accident 
prevention at construction worksites in the United Kingdom and considered how tacit knowledge 
resulted in improved safety performance.  Aboagye-Nimo et al. reported that knowledge is 
essential to successful business organizations.  Active learning, team building, interpersonal 
communications, self-learning, and critical thinking were all bolstered by tacit knowledge 
(Aboagye-Nimo et al., 2015).  Fordyce et al  posited that with an understanding the learning 
techniques, trainers could better prepare workers to appreciate the dangers of electrical work and 
how to mitigate hazards. These hazards were either unrecognized or misunderstood by trained 
and untrained workers in electric utilities (Fordyce et al., 2016).  Worker knowledge about the 
dangers of working on electrical systems grew from working arrangements and situations, and 
social reality and exposure.  Explicit knowledge come from organizational procedures, 
equipment manuals, manufacturers instructions, classroom exercises, and books.  Tacit 
knowledge is a mixing of explicit knowledge and on-site experience gained from actual work 
exposure; the individual’s skill, expertise, and personal trait.  Aboagye-Nimo et al. found that 
construction workers relied more on tacit knowledge than explicit knowledge as they were 
trained on-site more often than in classroom settings.  This experience led to better appreciation, 
understanding, attitudes, and behavior and improved workplace safety performance (Aboagye-
Nimo et al., 2015).  Laberge, MacEachen, and Calvet (2014) studied how young workers and 
inexperienced persons were frequently injured at work and found that ineffective safety 
programs were linked to workplace accidents.  Safety training was more focused on teaching 
strategies and objectives and not concentrated on learning activities and plans.   
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Laberge et al. (2014) found that learning strategies allowed participants to strengthen 
their abilities and competence.  They also found that dangerous situations and inconsistent 
application of workplace rules occurred when there was an absence of learning initiatives.  These 
included inconsistent use of safety rules and in some cases absolute disregard to getting work 
done (Laberge et al., 2014).  Nye, Brummel, and Drasgow (2010) posited that employees found 
organizational change, when built on a platform of validity and reasonableness, was tolerable 
and doable.  The instances where workers recognized organizational change as valid and 
acceptable, however, were unlike other cases where the change was introduced by top-
management without worker involvement, even if these were superior (Nye et al., 2010).  
Aboagye-Nimo et al. (2015), Laberge et al. (2014), as well as Bordia, Restubog, Jimmieson, and 
Irmer (2011) supported this finding. 
Volberg et al. (2017) estimated that there were over 200 investor-owned electric power 
industry companies in the United States.  Recorded instances of electric industry workplace 
deaths in the United States declined over the 10 years prior to the Volberg et al. (2017) study.  
Despite a decline in worker fatalities, accidents still occurred as there were 63 fatalities including 
21 line workers from 1995 to 2013 in 18 power companies that contributed to the database used 
by Volberg et al. (2017).  Individuals working around energized power systems were particularly 
vulnerable since they were exposed to other dangerous and hazardous conditions which ranged 
from working at heights, working in confined spaces, to working in remote locations (Fordyce et 
al., 2016).  Volberg et al. indicated that the risk of falling was highest in winter when working 
conditions deteriorated.  
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Research studies into workplace accidents were focused mainly on the identification of 
causal factors that primarily addressed human errors and worker performance (Dekker, 2006; 
Manuele, 2014).  None of these have explained how accidents occurred and how to prevent 
them.  The researchers assumed that better worker performance, supported by workplace 
training, promoted a safer working arrangement and a reduction of accidents.  With on-the-job 
and workplace training, workers were better informed and more likely to assess workplace 
situations and to remain safe (Drupsteen, Groeneweg, & Zwetsloot, 2013). 
Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) suggested that workers were motivated by managers, at 
both the individual and the group levels, to work safely and to adopt attitudes that synergized 
with prescribed safe work arrangements.  The top management of an organization was therefore 
mainly responsible for existing safety arrangements and performance (Tucker, Ogunfowora, & 
Ehr, 2016).  Manuele (2014) found that accident investigations focused more on identifying 
individuals as accountable for breaches than on the deeply embedded issues that required in-
depth problem-solving knowledge.  Incident investigators looked for causes that were consistent 
with their own beliefs about how the accident happened (Dekker, 2006; Manuele, 2014).  That 
focus was akin to investigators applying accident modeling consistent with their understanding 
and analysis of failure.  That perspective often resulted in confusion and other negatives which 
prevented correction of the real cause of the accident (Dekker, 2006; Manuele, 2014).  Failure to 
identify all of the pertinent and relevant factors that contributed to an accident may explain why 
accidents continued to happen.  
Mathieu, Neumann, Hare, and Babiak (2014) posited that workplace job satisfaction 
influences performance outcomes.  Hayek, Thomas, Milorad, Novicevic, and Montalvo (2016) 
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explained that worker job satisfaction and work commitment linked to how leadership impacted 
organizational culture and social norms.  Volberg et al. (2017) found that workplace training 
enhanced worker commitment, job satisfaction, and safe work.  White et al. (2016) suggested 
that worker beliefs were advantageous in bolstering individual and group–level safety.  White et 
al. also indicated that these beliefs were tested when customer outages and outage durations 
increased; directly due to workplace safety measures, taken to minimize errors and accidents..  
Wong and Laschinger (2013) and Volberg et al. (2017) suggested that organizational leadership 
should focus on addressing fundamental problems and encourage meaningful worker 
involvement, change in organizational resilience, preventative measures, and monitoring 
arrangements that could be employed to prevent accidents.  Volberg et al. (2017) and Fordyce, 
Kelsh, Lu, Sahl, and Yager (2007) conducted similar studies on electric industry worker injuries 
and concluded that insufficient data was available to effectively analyze accidents in the electric 
power industry across the United States.  Understanding the lessons from previous workplace 
accidents and existing workplace conditions, and ensuring the placement of useful measures to 
prevent employee-injuries are critically dependent on proactive management (Dekker, 2006; 
Manuele, 2014).  I conducted this study to determine how to prevent workplace accidents, 
serious, and fatal employee injuries in the North American electric power industry.   
Problem Statement 
No More Must Die. Let him be the last was the first line of a newspaper article that 
highlighted the death of an electric utility lineman; this heart rendering plea seemingly a never-
ending note (Patterson, 2012, para 1).  The general problem that I addressed in this study was an 
increase in electric power industry related fatalities across the United States.  In 2015 there were 
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800 fall victims and 22 electric utility related fatalities in 4,836 fatal work injuries across the 
United States (OSHA, 2017).  
The specific problem was that although management in the electric power industry in the 
United States has placed heavy emphasis on workplace safety, fatal and serious accidents 
continue to happen and there are no clear solutions to prevent these accidents (Fordyce et al., 
2016; Schwarz & Drudi, 2018).  Manuele (2014) believed that workplace accidents are 
symptoms of significant safety management system problems and that accident investigations 
presented opportunities for the identification of system deficiencies that could be corrected to 
prevent future accidents.  Fox (2014) reported on two linemen being killed in a lift truck accident 
on an electric power line roadway in Bourne, Massachusetts, USA.  I conducted this research to 
identify and understand issues that may guide on how to prevent future accidents.    
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this normative Delphi research was to prevent workplace accidents 
resulting in serious and fatal worker injuries by gaining consensus on the reasons why these 
occur and desirable and feasible solutions from a select group of experienced U.S. electric power 
industry experts including trainers, employees, supervisors, and managers.  Participants I 
selected for this study possessed technical knowledge and electric power industry work 
experience.  The results from this study may help guide actions to prevent future accidents.  The 
focus of this study was two-fold. First, I sought to determine what trainers, employees, 
supervisors, and managers experienced with electric power industry accidents, attributed as the 
real causes of workplace accidents, worker fatalities, and serious injuries.  Second, with an 
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understanding of the real causes, my focus was on identifying ways to prevent future accidents, 
worker fatalities, and serious injuries. 
Research Question  
What is the consensus of opinion of a panel of experts in the electrical power industry 
regarding desirable and feasible solutions to fatal and serious workplace accidents occurring in 
the United States? 
Conceptual Framework 
Manuele (2014) suggested that workplace accidents usually are due to a combination of 
different work factors.  Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) reported that managers and supervisors 
influence actual work procedures and arrangements.  The belief was that an understanding of the 
structural functions, authority, and planning arrangements in any organization revealed how 
workplace accidents occurred (Manuele, 2014).  Bolman and Deal (2013) described a framework 
to look at social interactions, cultural dynamics, ethical consideration, and organizational 
resilience from four different lenses; Structural, Human Resource, Political, and Symbolic.  
Bolman and Deal’s four frameworks were used to facilitate a holistic method for examining 
organizations from the perspectives of knowledgeable participants with electric power industry 
experience, and to view how the organization was and what the organization could become 
(Bolman & Deal, 2013).  The Bolman and Deal model provided a better understanding of the 
underlying deep-seated reasons for fatal and serious electric power industry accidents in the 
United States. 
The four-frame model allowed me to  better understand  work challenges and how 
workers mitigate and prevent errors and accidents.  Each of the frames provided me with 
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opportunities to view problems through lenses that promoted particular visions and voices from 
that perspective.  Bolman and Deal (2013) indicated that no single frame was superior to the 
other, but they were complementary and allowed for an individual to gain knowledge and to 
understand how to best address complex organizational problems. 
It is common for leaders and managers to worry about flagging organizational 
performance, which may increase worker insecurity and fears about job stability and tenure 
(Dekker, 2003; Probst, 2015).  Managers had first to know that a gap existed between the 
expected performance-level and the actual outcome: A better realization covered the closing of 
that gap.  Discipline was a crucially relevant factor if the gap closure were to happen.  This 
discipline extended into data identification and analysis and a linking of the results of the data 
examination to the desired outcomes, especially in regards to details of what was to be done, by 
whom, and how that could happen (Albert & Hallowell, 2013).  In this situation, data was a 
representation of micro aspects of the activities, and systems that needed to be improved or even 
entirely revamped if performance outcomes were to develop.  Trust was a necessary ingredient in 
this process as individuals had to be confident that other individuals who work together towards 
targeted results were able to synchronize on the belief that they all contributed with the same 
enthusiasm (Tucker, Ogunfowora, & Ehr, 2016).  Gladwell (2007) indicated that speed must 
augment trust.  In a high-trust environment, communication errors never deliberately became 
misinterpreted (Bolman & Deal, 2013; Moffatt-Bruce et al., 2017).  The opposite is true as well.  
In a low-trust environment, even good communication is, at times, interpreted as weak and 
untrustworthy (Bolman & Deal, 2013).   
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Trust among individuals in a work environment promotes influence.  Influence grows 
into power.  Any individual who influences others in the workplace by encouraging and 
supporting trust eventually develops a powerful impact on the other individuals in that 
environment (White et al., 2016).  This influence can then elevate into the organization at 
different levels.  The broader influence carries symbolic significance akin to the Symbolic Frame 
purported by Bolman and Deal (2013).  When the influence brings authority, either formal or 
through respect, that signified individual political strength within the organization; akin to the 
Political Frame suggested by Bolman and Deal (2013).  The formal authority that an individual 
exercised at work come from the Structural Frame, as positional strength gives the office holder 
organizational jurisdiction for directing functions sanctioned by the organization (Bolman & 
Deal, 2013). 
The structural frame provided me with opportunities to understand teams and individuals 
within organizations from the depiction of individual and group roles, working arrangements, 
formal manager-supervisor-worker relationships, and work coordination.  From these manager-
supervisor-worker relationships, the work rules, procedures, regulatory systems, were managed 
through the representation of influence from the Structural Frame.  Working problems were very 
often due to structural issues that went unaddressed: It was important that organizational 
structures remained current and relevant to the demands made, for superior organizational 
outcomes.  Organization charts were set to cover the working environment, systems, and 
technology.  When problems occurred, it usually surrounded a mismatch of the organization 
structure with the existing circumstances (Bolman & Deal, 2013). 
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The Bolman and Deal (2013) human resources frame is rooted in the relationships that 
exist among individuals who work together.  These relationships become almost family-type, 
especially when individuals work together for long periods and develop lasting trust and 
togetherness.  Researchers can develop a better understanding of individual feelings, issues of 
trust, skills development, prejudices, and other human type challenges by considering this 
perspective. In effect, the human resources frame provides insight into how people conduct 
work, their feelings about the work itself, and all of the influences that impact the activity (Uehli 
et al., 2014).  A natural form of interpersonal contest exists even if it remained silent and almost 
invisible.  Different departments, judged on their outputs and efficiencies, compete with other 
teams for supreme recognition as the best outfit in the organization.  Individuals in the same 
group often attempt to climb to the top to become recognized as the leader of the pack (Bolman 
& Deal, 2013).  Individuals in these circumstances employ many different techniques as they 
negotiate, coerce, convince, and even outsmart others in organizational politics (Scott, Fleming, 
& Kelloway, 2014).  Conflicts and other negatives reflect the real downside of the political 
frame. The Symbolic Frame deals with organization culture, the spirit of success, and social 
stories about the organization as caring, ethical, and supportive.  Problems from this perspective 
arise when there is a disconnection between social reality and the picture of a caring 
organization.   
Nature of the Study 
The Delphi technique originated in the 1950s at RAND Corporation (Dalkey & Helmer, 
1963; Linstone & Turoff, 1975).  Research conducted with the Delphi technique is any 
qualitative, quantitative, or mixed approach formulated on group interaction where the 
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participants are not known to each other and communications are limited to each of the 
participant and I.  The Delphi technique is a useful research design when there is participant 
disagreement on the research subject or when there is a lack of knowledge regarding the research 
subject or problem.  Dalkey and Helmer (1963) contended that research success depends on 
participant ability, opinion, experience, and speculation.  A distinct and significant benefit of the 
Delphi technique was the anonymous nature of the exercises which removed the need for face-
to-face meetings.  The Delphi design, as in this study, also promotes the inclusion of individuals 
whose participation in traditional research is, at best, remote and limited.  The electric power 
industry participants in this study were an example group of individuals not usually selected in 
studies and analyses of this kind.  The Delphi technique enabled me to study research 
participants in a wide-geographic space, and allowed for removal or filtering of issues usually 
associated with face-to-face human influence and interaction (Brady, 2015; Cegielski, Bourrie, & 
Hazen, 2013; Habibi, Sarafrazi, & Izadyar, 2014; Kerr, Schultz, & Lings, 2015; Lai, Flower, 
Moore, & Lewith, 2015; Merlin et al., 2016). 
Linstone and Turoff (1975) indicated that there was no single best or unique basis to 
examine any scientific procedure or theory.  Researchers can, therefore, draw from many 
different research methodologies to conduct a study.  A phenomenological approach was 
possible, but that was not suitable for this research because my focus was on reasons for 
accidents that happened and potential solutions rather than lived experiences of people who 
experienced a workplace accident.  A case study was also possible, but my focus was not on a 
specific phenomenon bounded by time and space (Yin, 2017).  A quantitative study was also 
possible.  However, the data for this study was not quantitative because my focus was on expert 
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opinions rather than on numeric data.  Hsu and Sandford (2007) indicated that the Delphi 
technique is suitable for research participants who are knowledgeable in their expert domain.  
The normative Delphi technique and approach allowed for possible consensus on why fatal and 
serious accidents were happening in the electric industry from a group of industry experts 
selected from experienced and knowledgeable electric power industry trainers, employees, 
supervisors, and managers and who had experience with workplace accidents in the United 
States.  Using the Delphi technique, I systematically honed the expert input by use of a series of 
questionnaires with controlled participant feedback (see Linstone & Turoff, 2011).  Novakowski 
and Wellar (2008) and Yousuf (2007) described a normative Delphi as a consensus Delphi that 
focused on establishing desirable goals and priorities and not on what was probable.  The 
normative Delphi technique and approach aligned with the specific problem that workplace 
accidents continued to occur in spite of management's heavy emphasis on safety.  The Delphi 
technique allowed for the generation of consensus about situations which were not entirely 
understood (see Heitner, Kahn, & Sherman, 2013; Linstone & Turoff, 1975).   
Linstone and Turoff (1975) indicated that three rounds could prove sufficient for result 
stability and consensus from participant responses.  Linstone and Turoff further suggested that 
additional rounds would likely not be beneficial and might only serve to delay completion of the 
study with no measurable change when compared to stopping the process at the end of three 
rounds.  Hsu and Sandford (2007) espoused a different view by indicating that a fourth round 
was at times necessary for consensus.  Delbecq, Van de Ven, and Gustafson (1975) concurred 
with Hsu and Sandford and even suggested a fifth-round if that became necessary to achieve 
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consensus.  Without consensus, they contended that the entire study effort could become wasted.  
I aimed to reach consensus in four rounds.    
For the first round, I forwarded a list of reasons why accidents happen and invited the 
research participants to add to the list and to provide solutions to those reasons.  The participants 
each had two weeks to respond.  This information and feedback from the research participants, 
were summarized into themes, coded, and used to generate questionnaires for the second and 
subsequent rounds in the research exercise.  Items that were mentioned by the respondents 
moved to Round 2.  These items, incorporated into 5-point Likert-type statements, formed the 
basis for Round 2.  In Round 2, participants responded to two different and distinct 5-point 
Likert-type scales; one for responses that they considered as desirable and another they 
considered as feasible. Where 70% or more of the participant responses selected a score of 3 or 
more on both Likert-type scale for the same item, that item remained for inclusion in the Round 
3 questionnaire.  I used these responses to determine the degree to which the respondent agreed 
or disagreed with a particular item (see Novakowski & Wellar, 2008).  Responses from Round 3 
where 70% or more of the participant responses selected a score of 3 or more on the 5-point 
Likert-type scale were treated as important and extracted for Round 4.  In Round 4, participants 
rated their confidence in the overall findings of consensus-based solutions emergent from Round 
3.  Information provided by knowledgeable individuals, about how to prevent accidents 
followed.  My goal in this study was to explain how to prevent accidents that happen in spite of 
safety precautions employed in the electric power industry in the United States. 
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Definitions 
Approved practice: Work procedures employed when no isolation of energy 
sources occur before performing skilled work.  This practice is to provide safe work 
measures for individuals completing the task (ISHA, 2014; OSHA, 2017). 
Authorized worker: A person formally recognized, sanctioned, and competent to 
perform work listed on the company recognized list (OSHA, 2017). 
Competent person: (a) An individual trained, possessing knowledge, and 
experienced in arranging and performing work; (b) an individual who was aware of and 
knowledgeable on the safety regulations, rules, and procedures regarding work; and (c) 
an individual capable of recognizing and mitigating hazards and dangers in the work 
environment (ISHA, 2014; OSHA, 2017). 
Competent worker: A skilled individual who performed specific work and 
satisfied the conditions listed for a competent person.  The company determines the 
particular task which is known to the skilled worker (ISHA, 2014; OSHA, 2017). 
Delphi expert/panelist: A knowledgeable and experienced individual who is 
familiar with the study topic and willingly participates in the exercise (Skulmoski, 
Hartman, & Krahn, 2007).  
Expert panelist: An individual who satisfied three criteria: (a) was a manager, 
supervisor, trainer, or worker in the electric power industry; (b) had more than 10 years 
of industry practice and experience; and (c) had knowledge about accidents in the electric 
power industry in the United States.  
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Hazard: A condition where a potential for uncontrolled interaction with energy 
sources could cause injury or death to individuals (Capelli-Schellpfeffer, Floyd, 
Eastwood, & Liggett, 1999). 
Incident: An event, situation, or condition, which has the potential to cause an 
injury or illness (OSHA, 2017). 
Isolated: Device or equipment that is separated or removed from energy sources 
(ISHA, 2014; OSHA, 2017). 
Job plan: A work arrangement that is known to and agreed by all individuals at 
the worksite.  It identified hazards that are known and mechanisms to abate hazards or 
control them when elimination is not possible.  The responsibilities of each workgroup 
member are itemized and individually identified (ISHA, 2014). 
Personal protective equipment: Approved safety equipment used by individuals 
for reducing the risk of becoming injured while performing work (ISHA, 2014; 
Mitropoulos, Howell, & Abdelhamid, 2005). 
Proximity: The limits of approach to an apparatus that is not safe to touch. It does 
not apply to in-service equipment that is intrinsically safe for human touch (ISHA, 2014; 
OSHA, 2017). 
Safe work area: A specifically identified and designated area for work where all 
known hazards or danger are removed or controlled (ISHA, 2014; OSHA, 2017). 
Safety interlock. A device or system which is designed to operate in a particular 
manner and where the non-designed sequence of operations is prohibited (ISHA, 2014; 
OSHA, 2017). 
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Sociotechnical system: A grouping of interacting social and technical processes 
and subsystems that impact one-another and evolve into a complex overarching system 
(Kroes, 2015). 
Supervisor: A person designated by the employer as the individual who is in 
charge over a workplace and has authority over a worker (ISHA, 2014). 
Work procedure: A detailed, step-by-step description of how to perform the task 
approved by the company (ISHA, 2014). 
Worker: A person who performs work for monetary compensation (ISHA, 2014). 
Workplace: Any premises or location upon, in or near which a worker worked 
(ISHA, 2014). 
Assumptions 
In this study, I assumed the participants where knowledgeable of workplace conditions 
and systems.  These participants were U.S. electric power industry managers, supervisors, 
trainers, and workers: They may not have possessed the training as workplace safety 
professionals, but their experiences with working arrangements and procedures proved crucially 
relevant to this study.  Manuele (2014) suggested that workplace accidents usually occur when 
several different workplace factors contributed to breached barriers and safeguards.  That 
information could have been vital and sufficient to prevent injuries and deaths while at the same 
time, made the workplace safer (Weber & Wasieleski, 2013). 
Second, I assumed that research participants, as Delphi panelists, provided honest and 
truthful answers in the different rounds of questionnaires I distributed.  Kim and Kim (2016) 
indicated that panelist bias sometimes leads them to misrepresent the information that they 
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provide by exaggerating the importance of issues and also understating the effect of the other 
problems. 
Third, I communicated with research participants through consistently formatted 
questionnaires in language that was unambiguous, not misleading, and simple to understand (see 
Novakowski & Wellar, 2008).  The main aim of a Delphi technique was to gain consensus 
among the Delphi experts.  It would be difficult to achieve this if the expert panelists were 
unsure about the meaning of questions I asked as the researcher.  
Scope and Delimitations 
The research scope of this exercise was delimited to the electric power industry and how 
to prevent accidents that were occurring in the United States.  The primary focus was to 
understand the contributing factors for situations where electricity industry workers became 
severely injured or even killed while performing work.  The strategy was to employ a four-frame 
model espoused by Bolman and Deal (2013) to understand the electric power industry and to use 
this to promote working arrangements where employees were not injured or killed while 
performing work.  It proved a helpful model for further studies in the electric power industry as 
well as other industrial sectors. 
Understanding how accidents occurred was preliminary to the deliberate taking of steps 
toward the prevention of future electric industry workplace accidents and to keep workers safe 
and uninjured.  For this study, a specific delimitation surrounded the intention to use the Bolman 
and Deal four-frame model.  The different perspectives described in the four-frames allowed for 
a better review of organizational and people issues and dynamics that contributed to workplace 
accidents. No previous study of this kind, using this model, was conducted in the electric power 
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industry.  Study-success depended on a heavy reliance was on the research participants from the 
electric power industry and the detailed data that they provided during the Delphi rounds.  That 
placed significant researcher responsibility on the strategies used to select the participants 
(Brady, 2015).  Individuals with little or limited knowledge and experience might have caused 
the research not to be meaningful, even if there was a consensus. 
Another specific delimitation was the decision on the normative Delphi technique, what a 
Delphi expert was, and how that aligned with the actual selection of participants.  It was possible 
that overlooking of suitable and relevant experts occurred in spite of best efforts to choose from 
the best potential candidates.  Participant identification, on the LinkedIn social medium, was be 
done through experts in the electric power industry in the United States (Brady, 2015).  It was 
not expected but possible that the selected participants, even over the vast geographical space, 
may have proven unhelpful because they were personally-linked to the sequence of activities in 
the electric power industry and which led to accidents.  
A delimitation condition surrounded the research question being too pointed and possibly 
contentious for experts to admit to issues in the electric power industry freely.  That could have 
resulted in worker participants blaming managers and supervisors.  The reverse may also have 
happened. Without genuine interaction and contribution from the participants, actions, systems, 
group politics, structural inadequacies, technologies, and techniques that factored in the accidents 
occurring in the electric power industry could have remained unidentified.  The period for 
conducting the study was a delimitation because accidents that likely occurred during this 
timeframe might have influenced participant responses.  If there were no accidents, participant 
response might be different from situations where serious and fatal accidents happened. There 
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was no evidence of this, and none of the participants indicated that accidents were occurring 
during the Delphi rounds. 
A delimitation condition involved the geographical area from which research participants 
came, the scales selected, and the choice of measurements for consensus.  The research 
methodology was another delimitation as this was deemed suitable by me as the researcher.  This 
research methodology provided opportunities for me to delimit the scope of the questions for 
Round 1 and for the themes and codes that I used as the researcher. The scales and measurements 
chosen worked well in previous research, and I anticipated a similar result in this study. 
Limitations 
The first limitation was that the study results proved useful in the electrical power 
industry only, because of the uniqueness that existed in this industry.  The use of the Bolman and 
Deal four-frame approach to analyzing data and participant feedback provided for an 
appreciation and real understanding of the issues that contributed to serious and fatal accidents in 
the electrical power industry may be advantageous.  This advantage might be a limitation as it 
can prove challenging to extend the lessons beyond the realm where the participants were experts 
and to extend the findings to other industries and workplaces: that was not an expectation 
(Moore, 2016).  
The second limitation was that the Delphi panelists as research participants could have 
brought very pointed views prevalent only where the individual worked.  Researcher tact and 
skill to ensure that the research remained on-course was essential because, in the end, the 
electrical power industry might become much safer than it is (Clibbens, Walters, & Baird, 2012; 
San Su, Wardell, & Thorkildsen, 2013). 
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The third limitation could have been that the best candidates declined participation even 
though the selectees possessed the necessary experience and knowledge to satisfy the research 
requirements and criteria.  This selection included experienced and knowledgeable electric 
power industry managers, supervisors, trainers, selected from the across the United States and 
who knew about serious and fatal accidents that occurred in the industry (Volberg et al., 2017).  
Participants were able to describe work arrangements, procedures, environments, and issues that 
were pertinent and vitally connected to workplace safety management in the electrical power 
industry.  The participants were willing to share information that contributed to new learning and 
for an opportunity to understand what went wrong.  The participant identification process on 
public social media provided more significant opportunities for suitable panelists as experienced 
and respected industry practitioners for this study.  That way, each participant were interested as 
contributors to accident prevention efforts and to make the electric power industry safer than it is 
(Volberg et al., 2017). 
A fourth limitation was the my personal and professional bias, as the researcher, which 
influenced the strategy used to conduct the literature search, data collection, and analysis in this 
study.  The Delphi technique preference in this study allowed me to include one question in the 
Round 1 questionnaire to encourage the Delphi panelists to suggest other information they 
considered as pertinent for this study and which was not covered by the questions set by me.  
The identification of relevant issues represented a significant effort to improve the research 
trustworthiness as well as the data derived from the process (Yin, 2013).  Inclusion to the Delphi 
panelists as research participants for confirmation of the information they provided enhanced the 
likelihood that the data was correct (Patton, 2015). 
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The fifth involved my management of the Delphi study.  The iterative process that the 
Delphi technique required was a possible disadvantage as research participants could have 
chosen to drop out before the end of the study.  Attrition by participants may have affected the 
research and highlighted credibility issues in the overall findings (Annear et al., 2015; Willems, 
Sutton, & Maybery, 2015).  Twenty-five (25) participants was felt to be acceptable but only if 
the attrition rate remained less than 25 % over the entire study; to this end, the intention was to 
use more than 25 Delphi panelists as research participants (Brody et al., 2014; Sinclair, Oyebode, 
& Owens, 2016).  I remained meticulous and exercised all available opportunities to keep the 
research exercise free of administrative delays and inefficiencies (De Loë, Melnychuk, Murray, 
& Plummer, 2016; Patton, 2015). 
A sixth limitation involved a possible social desirability bias that could have resulted 
when Delphi panelists responded in ways that misrepresented their real position because they 
preferred to behave in ways considered as socially acceptable (Heitner et al., 2013; Kim & Kim, 
2016).  Removal of bias due to individual social desirability bias, the questions did not require 
Delphi panelists to reveal or recount their behavior, contribution, or influence on any particular 
accident or workplace issue directly related to the study.  I also ensured the strictest controls on 
participant anonymity and research confidentiality  (Heitner et al., 2013). 
Significance of the Study  
 The first consideration of individuals at work should be the avoidance of accidents, the 
prevention of personal injuries, and the safeguarding of life.  Workplace safety arrangements 
were regulated, and organizations included safety as among the highest values, sufficient for its 
inclusion in the mission, vision, and policy statements.  Employers set safety procedures and 
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rules that managers were to implement and monitor for compliance.  Workers were expected to 
follow set work procedures and to do all that could be expected to prevent errors, workplace 
accidents and injuries to themselves and others at work. OSHA (2017) stipulated specific duties, 
roles, and responsibilities for employers, employees, and workplace safety committee members. 
OSHA also had the power to conduct random checks in different workplaces and to instruct 
employers to initiate mandatory compliance orders when substandard safety conditions existed.  
Despite these arrangements and safeguards, accidents still occurred, sometimes with fatal 
consequences. 
Individuals went to work each day with the intent of returning home after contributing to 
organizational outcomes and success.  Sadly, that did not happen every day for each person at 
work. Each year more than 4000 individuals in the United States did not ever return home at the 
end of the workday (OSHA, 2017).  In the electric power industry, where significant emphasis 
and resources are committed to safety at work, and safety management systems, worker injuries 
and deaths were occurring (Fordyce et al., 2007; Volberg et al., 2017).  This study was about the 
search for deep underlying causal factors that evaded the safety barriers in the electric power 
industry and contributed to workplace accidents where workers became severely injured or killed 
while doing work.  The Bolman and Deal (2013) conceptual framework chosen for this study 
allowed for consideration of organizational issues from leadership, to internal politics and group 
dynamics which spanned across technical challenges, professional boundaries, and social 
dimensions (Moffatt-Bruce et al., 2017; Vassiliou & Alberts, 2013).  
Electricity was dangerous, but it was not the only danger that electric power workers 
faced. There were electrical, fall, and other hazards in the working environment.  Individuals 
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who worked in these conditions must maintain an awareness of hazards.  These workers must 
understand the dangers and be competent at initiating actions to mitigate the associated risks.  
Individual and personal safety was only as effective as the protective measures employed to keep 
the workplace safe.  Death or severe injury was a frequent reminder of breached workplace 
safety barriers.  Volberg et al. (2017) indicated that an average human could die with a current 
flow of less than one (1) ampere.  Power lines can carry up to 2000 amperes (Fordyce et al., 
2016).  In one organization where a fatal accident occurred in which four employees died, the 
organization approved and set safety rules indicated that safety rules were mandatory and 
required full compliance at all times (Cameron, 2017).  The safety rules covered situations where 
employees were to involve their supervisors if circumstances existed where the work instruction 
was not specific or not fully understood: consistent with the leadership view espoused by Tucker 
et al. (2016).  There was another fatal workplace accident in this company despite organizational 
prevention efforts (Vanmeer, 2019). This study was significant as it represented a real 
opportunity to determine why electric power industry workers became injured or killed at work 
and what could be done to prevent future accidents. 
Significance to Practice  
 Understanding issues that contributed to workplace accidents might provide opportunities 
for organizations to revise work procedures, to update working systems, and to adopt more 
suitable arrangements to mitigate accidents.  This understanding might also allow for better 
monitoring and enforcement of safe work arrangements developed from the lessons learned from 
previous accidents.  The study may be sufficient to extend current knowledge and strategies for 
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optimal work designing, planning, and execution while meaningfully contributing to accident-
free electric power operations in the United States. 
Significance to Theory 
Understanding the causes of accidents that occurred in the electric power industry was 
important because of the dangers and hazards associated with working near or on electric 
systems and because of how often workers were required to work in dangerous and hazardous 
conditions.  This study was significant as it could contribute towards theory by pinpointing areas 
of focus and extending current knowledge about risk mitigation efforts on how to curb and to 
prevent workplace accidents.  This study might provide information for a better understanding of 
the issues that contributed to electrical power industry accidents. 
Significance to Social Change   
Promoting social change from this study might come from the identification of 
operational, organizational, regulatory, and contributing factors to supplement the already known 
causal factors of workplace accidents.  Understanding the reasons that preventable accidents 
occurred might result in the implementation of new strategies to overcome these issues, help to 
prevent injuries to workers, and to help industry practitioners better understand what can be done 
to remain safe while conducting work.  Surviving victims of workplace accidents and other 
workers who were on-site when accidents occurred undergo prolonged periods of doubt and 
apprehension (Beus, Dhanani, & McCord, 2015; Manuele, 2014).  A possible social benefit from 
this study could be the sharing of experiences from individuals with knowledge and 
understanding of previous workplace accidents: This could be used to remind workers, 
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supervisors, and managers that safe work was better for long-term organizational success where 
workers were not killed or injured. 
Summary and Transition 
A Delphi approach was the preferred research methodology, with experienced and 
knowledgeable electrical power industry managers, supervisors, trainers, and workers as the 
research participants; this was an opportunity to explore the working arrangements in the focus 
industry and to get feedback from individuals who knew this business from a first-hand 
perspective.  The conceptual framework choice in this study, based on a Four-Frame model 
(Bolman & Deal, 2013), allowed for analysis of safety practices in the electrical power industry 
from a logical strategy that was easy to understand.  That way, questions about how accidents 
occurred and whether the causal influencing factors were isolated and addressed to answer how 
to prevent future accidents and worker injuries and deaths.  The Delphi technique supported the 
conditions where group consensus could be realized among experts as research participants 
especially when there was no well-established history of previous studies (Afshari, 2015; Wester 
& Borders, 2014).  The possible research limitations, assumptions, and delimitations were 
included in Chapter 1 together with a definition section for terms relevant to this study: This was 
in addition to a section on the purpose of this research and another on the significance of this 
effort. 
In Chapter 2, there is an in-depth exploration and review compilation of the pertinent and 
current literature on workplace accidents where workers become severely injured and killed at 
work.  These are synthesized and compared for similarities in accidents where the lessons can be 
applied to provide opportunities to prevent future accidents.  Preventing workplace accidents in 
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the electric power industry and pre-empting situations that can result in severe worker injuries 
and deaths is an attempt to promote social change in a highly specialized and complex industry. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The general problem was that there is an increasing problem of electric power industry 
related fatalities across the United States.  The specific problem was that although management 
in the U.S. electric power industry has placed heavy emphasis on workplace safety, fatal and 
serious accidents continue to happen and there are no clear solutions to prevent these accidents 
(Fordyce et al., 2016; Schwarz & Drudi, 2018).  Workplace safety challenges range from 
physical hazards that are always difficult to recognize and to mitigate, interpersonal interactions 
that complicate hazard abatement, and organizational factors driven by technology aided 
business horizons and stakeholder demands (Andel, Hutchingson, & Spector, 2015).  The electric 
power industry, in this regard, is no different from many other business realms.  The reach and 
impact of the electric power utility might match and even surpass other critical sectors such as 
water, communication, and energy. The general arrangements for managing in these industries 
are aligned in many ways, even if each sector has unique priorities.  In these sectors, complex 
dynamics give rise to surprising results and organizational flexibility (Osborn, 2008).  Managing 
workplace safety is, therefore, a complex responsibility that mirrors other business activities that 
impact the success of the organizations (Andel et al., 2015).  
Chapter 2 contains a description of the literature search strategy, the conceptual 
framework I adopted for this study, a review of previous studies, a discussion of literature 
relevant to this research, and a summary and conclusion.  The previous studies on the electric 
power industry were few and not exhaustive.  Data were difficult to source, and where available, 
the information was incomplete (see Fordyce et al., 2016; Volberg et al., 2017). 
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Literature Search Strategy 
The strategy I used for this literature review involved exhaustive searches of EBSCOhost, 
Emerald Management Journals, SAGE Premier, Thoreau Multi-Database, and ProQuest 
databases that I accessed via Walden University’s library.   
Table 1 
Outline Strategy of Literature Search 
Vital search terms leadership, workplace accidents, worker injury and fatality. 
Safety management, accident investigation, electrical power, 
electric power line safety, safety training, behavior, attitudes, safety 
culture, safety climate, safety theory and models, worker 
performance, supervisor safety, and management safety roles. 
Strategy for Literature 
search 
 
Walden University databases EBSCOhost, Emerald Management 
Journals, SAGE Premier, Thoreau Multi-Database, and ProQuest. 
Google Scholar, relevant industry, regulator, and professional 
organization websites, peer-reviewed journals, magazines, news 
media and books. 
 
Emphasis on literature from 2013 and on crucially relevant papers before that. 
Source of information Since 2013 Before 2012 Total 
books 0 2 2 
Non-peer-reviewed  1 3 4 
Dissertations 18 0 18 
Peer-reviewed articles 275 35 310 
Other Reliable Sources 4 0 4 
Total 298 40 338 
%(peer-reviewed/total) 88 12 100 
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This strategy extended to Google Scholar, relevant industry, regulator, and professional 
organization websites, peer-reviewed journals, magazines, and books. My primary intent and 
focus was on sourcing literature published inside a 6-year window that began in 2013.  I also 
included older articles that included vital information.  Key search terms and phrases included: 
leadership, workplace accidents, worker injury, and fatality.  Other search words and phrases 
were safety management, accident investigation, electrical power, electric power line safety, 
safety training, behavior, attitudes, safety culture, safety climate, safety theory and models, 
worker performance, supervisor safety, and management safety roles.  From the selected articles, 
I developed a comprehensive understanding of different approaches to workplace safety and 
accidents, the methods of determining how best to find the underlying and direct causal factors, 
and other compelling and relevant reasons for use as part of this particular study. 
Conceptual Framework 
Bolman and Deal (2013) indicated that individuals used first hand knowledge to guide 
them in addressing challenges. They termed this tribal knowledge.  Workplace success grows on 
long-lasting traditions referred to as the culture of the organization.  Problems are, at times, 
introduced into the workplace even when individuals focus on making or causing change with 
positive intent.  Bolman and Deal described different well-known cases where leaders and 
managers introduced change only to see failing results.  Described by Bolman and Deal as the 
curse of cluelessness, it was akin to not seeing the entire picture when handling problems and 
issues.  Cluelessness also aligns with an endemic problem that many individuals experience in 
situations where they have the right picture but incorrectly chose the solution option.   
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Sometimes these problems are new, not very well understood, and even require skills that 
individuals do not possess or have not mastered.  As an example, if an individual who is not an 
expert swimmer is caught in a situation that required them to survive in water, situation would be 
very challenging, but not impossible.  There may be a flotation device that the individual uses 
until help arrives.  In those situations, the individual may survive despite not being able to swim 
well or not at all.   
Table 2 
Overview of the Four Frame Model 
 FRAME 
 STRUCTURAL HUMAN 
RESOURCE 
POLITICAL SYMBOLIC 
Metaphor 
for 
organization 
Factory or 
machine 
Family Jungle Carnival, 
temple, 
theater 
Central 
concepts 
Rules, roles, 
goals, policies, 
technology, 
environment 
Needs, skills, 
relationships 
Power, 
conflict, 
competition, 
organizational 
politics 
Culture, 
meaning, 
metaphor, 
ritual, 
ceremony, 
stories, heroes 
Image of 
leadership 
Social 
architecture 
Empowerment Advocacy 
and political 
savvy 
Inspiration 
Basic 
leadership 
challenge 
Attune structure 
to task, 
technology, 
environment 
Align organizational 
and 
human needs 
Develop 
agenda and 
power base 
Create faith, 
beauty, 
meaning 
Note. Adapted from L. G. Bolman, & T. E. Deal (2013), Reframing organizations: Artistry, 
choice, and leadership (5th ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Reprinted with permission. 
 
If, on the other hand, the individual attempts swimming to a safe location, that decision could be 
fatal.  Making decisions in such situations is complicated.  The individual may be unaccustomed 
and there would not be a long time for the individual to contemplate their response however 
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careful they believed they were.  Even for smart people, cluelessness is a fact of life (Moffatt-
Bruce et al., 2017).  Bolman and Deal (2013) suggested reframing as a concept that individuals 
and teams employ to understand problems better and to decide on possible ways of addressing 
the issues or situations that required correction or fixing.  Bolman and Deal described four 
frames for analyzing different conditions: the Structural, Human Resource, Political, and 
Symbolic frames. 
Table 2 offers an overview of the Bolman and Deal four-frame model I used for this 
study.  Bolman and Deal (2013) indicated that managers and leaders must focus on multiple 
frames to effectively manage in complex working environments.  Table 3 shows their key claims 
about managerial thinking. 
Table 3 
Expanding Managerial Thinking. 
 
HOW MANAGERS THINK HOW MANAGERS MIGHT THINK 
They often have a limited view of 
organizations (for example, attributing almost 
all problems to individuals’ flaws and errors). 
They need a holistic framework that 
encourages inquiry into a range of significant 
issues: people, power, structure, and symbols. 
Regardless of a problem’s source, managers 
often choose rational and structural solutions: 
facts, logic, restructuring. 
They need a palette that offers an array of 
options: bargaining as well as training, 
celebration as well as 
reorganization. 
Managers often value certainty, rationality, 
and control while fearing ambiguity, paradox, 
and “going with the flow.” 
They need to develop creativity, risk taking, 
and playfulness in responses to life’s 
dilemmas and paradoxes, focusing as much 
on finding the 
right question as the right answer, on finding 
meaning and faith amid clutter and confusion. 
Leaders often rely on the “one right answer” 
and the “one best way”; they are stunned at 
the turmoil and resistance they generate. 
Leaders need passionate, unwavering 
commitment to principle, combined with 
flexibility in understanding 
and responding to events 
Note. Adapted from L. G. Bolman, & T. E. Deal (2013), Reframing organizations: Artistry, 
choice, and leadership (5th ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Reprinted with permission. 
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In successful organizations, leaders use sophisticated systems and technically skilled and 
competent employees to negotiate these new demands.  A pertinent feature of these systems is an 
increasingly challenging demand for superior outcomes.  These demands are usually associated 
with less time to pre-plan, contemplate alternatives and other possible solutions, and stressful 
working arrangements and conditions.  Operations in some organizations involve 24-hour 
processes each day with regular schedules—something that was not very common before.  
Working different shifts, the use of changing technologies, and increased work demands could 
make interpersonal interactions at work difficult and may contribute to workplace errors (Griffin 
& Curcuruto, 2016).  Bolman and Deal (2013) likened this to smart individuals committing 
stupid acts and attributed these to sense-making that failed.  Such failure is likely to occur in 
cases where the individuals sometimes do not know or realize that the way they viewed issues 
may be incorrect (Salguero-Caparros, Suarez-Cebador, & Rubio-Romero, 2015).  In these cases, 
individuals do not fully understand why the results are not what they hoped for (Bolman & Deal, 
2013, p.8).  That, according to Bolman and Deal is locking onto a single frame and not 
appreciating the other frames as valid and which could allow for the individual to understand 
issues from a different perspective.  These are mental models used by individuals as maps or 
labels that allow for cognitive thinking or referencing in such a way that makes sense to the 
individual.   
Gladwell (2007) described decision making as non-conscious, fast, and holistic.  That 
idea extends to a fast-paced sporting decision where the player would scan the environment, 
calculate the possible moves, and make the selection in time to prevent another player from 
intervening or blocking the progress.  The combination of the different components, non-
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conscious, fast, and holistic actions, result in skilled judgments even though the individual might 
at times be incorrect.  Bolman and Deal (2013) extended this type of decision making to doctors 
who were required to diagnose patients--many times without having a full diagnostic 
understanding of symptoms--only relying on skilled judgments based on training and their 
practical experience.  In these situations, judgment errors may occur.  These could be 
investigated from the different frames to understand what the doctor considered when identifying 
all possible factors equally relevant and not treated in a particular instance.  Bolman and Deal 
(2013) suggested that mental maps that did not allow individuals to look at problems from more 
than one perspective were very often the reasons why errors in judgments occurred.  An ability 
to view the same problem from different angles and to make quick and correct decisions 
afterward is a fluid-expertise that requires sufficient time for its development, exposure by 
experience, and the continued ability of the individual to learn and apply the teachings (Bolman 
& Deal, 2013).  
Framing involves the development of mental models that allow individuals to consider 
issues from particular perspectives (Manuele, 2014; Weber & Wasieleski, 2013).  Equally 
important is for that individual to examine different perspectives and to amalgamate the best 
options from different views and positions that allow for holistic management of a challenge and 
for the best opportunities to remain error free.  Reframing is the ability to move seamlessly from 
one perspective or frame to the next without losing the ability to keep the best options for 
problem resolution or results.  
Frames and maps are similar as they represent windows to view different perspectives 
and tools to navigate that territory (Bolman & Deal, 2013).  Each frame is distinct from another 
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and provides strengths and limitations to the individuals who use it as a mental model to decipher 
any issue.  Just as the right tool makes any job more straightforward and simple to accomplish, 
the proper perspective on a topic allows for the best appreciation of the problem and to provide 
successful solutions.  Tools can make completing a job more manageable, but if they are the 
wrong ones, the task becomes much more difficult (Labib, 2015; Murata, 2017).  Individuals 
using the wrong tools are more likely to make errors.  These tools are not only the high precision 
and well-engineered devices; it includes the different perspectives that individuals use to 
understand fully and to address challenging problems. 
Solving simple problems with a single tool or from only one perspective is common, but 
more complex issues require the use of different tools for success.  Solving problems and 
handling challenges in the complicated business place is unlike any other experience.  The 
electric power industry is an excellent example of a complicated business where technological 
systems and devices are managed together with different demands from the various stakeholders 
requiring maximum returns on their investments (Bedi et al., 2017).  It means, therefore, that 
individuals who work in the electric power industry are ideal candidates for viewing problems 
and challenges from different perspectives and frames before opting for suitable means of 
addressing them (Bolman & Deal, 2013; Fordyce et al., 2016).  When decisions are incorrect, 
errors occur (Dekker, 2015).  In the electric power industry, if that error occurs on a power line, 
the result is usually a fatality or serious injuries suffered by the victim. 
Managers and other individuals, as experts, usually focus on these expert strengths in a 
myopic manner without exploring the different ways of addressing problems (Brody et al., 2014; 
Capelli-Schellpfeffer, Floyd, Eastwood, & Liggett, 1999).  The result is that many of these 
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individuals assume that a one-size-fits-all approach always has the best results.  However, 
individuals who critically assess problems from different frames are better equipped to 
understand, appreciate, and negotiate problems. Using them allows for successful outcomes, 
individual experience, confidence, and wisdom (Bolman & Deal, 2013). 
Regulating Electric Power in the United States 
The U.S. electric power regulatory set-up is a layered one where there are federal, 
regional, state, and industry accepted arrangements for operating and managing the electricity 
grid and all connected constituent systems (Slayton & Clark‐Ginsberg, 2018).  Volberg et al. 
(2017) suggests that the electricity system has for its entire history broadly consisted of 
Generation, Transmission, and Distribution (G, T, & D).  Significant changes occurring in the 
electric power industry that makes for radically different operating modes, players, business 
arrangements, and competition focused primarily on technical and financial efficiencies and 
customer satisfaction (White et al., 2016; Zohar, 2014).  
At the federal level there are three different regulators; the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC), North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). FERC, NERC, and OSHA primarily 
focussing on technical, operational, and safety capabilities of the electric power companies 
which operates in the G, T, & D aspects of the business (Slayton & Clark‐Ginsberg, 2018).  
State-level regulators set financial operations criteria.  FERC, empowered by the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005, is the regulator for setting NERC arrangements as the reliability regulator of the 
electric grid.  FERC also regulates inter-state bulk power connectivity otherwise called the 
Transmission System, in the same manner as it does oil and natural gas pipelines in the United 
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States.  FERC is vested with the responsibility for licensing hydropower projects throughout the 
United States (FERC Overview, 2018, April).  NERC is the primary regulator of the North 
American Electric Power System with direct authority to mandate reliability and system security 
standards and procedures.  Their area of control covers the entire United States, all of Canada, 
and a section of Baja California (Mexico) for electricity reliability, seasonal and long-term. 
NERC also provides certified training for operators and industry personnel.  NERC is 
empowered through its Rule of Procedure (ROP) to require Transmission Companies, also called 
Transmission Operators or Bulk Power Companies, to comply with operating requirements 
according to the ROP (About NERC, 2018, April).  Organizations not complying with these 
requirements are obligated to provide acceptable reasons or risked being sanctioned and are fined 
by NERC for the non-compliance.  There are instances where the Regional Reliability 
Organization (RTO) assume responsibility for reliability and security oversight in place of 
NERC.  In this event, NERC citing the RTO for violations of operating compliance not met for 
their region of control occur.  Demeritt, Rothstein, Beaussier, and Howard (2015) posits that 
regulation is the common most way to enforce governance and policy for risk management in 
systems that require experts and knowledgeable personnel in particular industries.  One example 
ROP is NERC Blackout and Disturbance Response Procedures which is in effect from July 01, 
2014 and where reactive power and electric load are defined to be consistent with two previously 
existing procedures ( NERC Blackout and Disturbance Response Procedures, 2014, July).  
NERC provided leadership, technical advice and expertise, and coordination in the US and 
Canada when major blackout events occurred (Abraham et al., 2004).  For the efficient, reliable, 
and sound operation of the power system, it is critical to establish a clear delineation of roles and 
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other coordination requirements among industry participants and governments.  Analysis of 
investigative findings from significant system blackouts and other major high-impacting system 
emergencies, just as that which happened in 2003 in the North Eastern United States and Eastern 
Canada, and following-up on recommendations promoted this (Abraham et al., 2004).  
United States Safety Legislation 
Regulating Safety in the workplace happen in a layered manner from the federal level to 
regional regulatory agencies, and State managed systems (OSHA, 2017).  The Federal Agency 
that regulated workplace safety throughout the United States was the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA).  State-managed safety and health regulators oversee safety 
management in 22 different states.  Each of these is OSHA approved for similar or superior 
arrangements than what exist for OSHA.  State-managed safety programs for public and private 
sector workers occur in Michigan, Maryland, Tennessee, and Vermont, for example.  In some 
states like Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and Illinois, state-managed safety programs only 
cover public sector workers through OSHA approved state-managed programs.  Federal OSHA 
regulations cover private sector workplaces and workers.   
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Figure 1. Composite of NERC and OSHA regulatory arrangements. Adapted from OSHA 
(2017), NERC (2017) 
 
OSHA is a legally formed entity originating from the US Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1970 (OSH Act of 1970, 2017, October).  The OSH Act 1970 does not cover workers 
engaged in self-employment or in specific industries which were regulated by other federal 
institutions or agencies like, for example, the American Coast Guard, the Department of Energy, 
and the Mine Safety and Health Administration (OSH Act of 1970, 2017, October).  The prelude 
to the OSH Act 1970 was an average of 14000 worker deaths per year (or 38 worker deaths per 
day) in US workplaces.  Since 2003, more than 4500 worker deaths per year (or > 12 worker 
deaths per day) has been the real workplace experience.  From 2003 to 2009, more than 5200 
workers died at work each year.  In 2016, 5190 fatalities occurred.  For each year from 2009 to 
2015, more than 4500 workers were victims of fatal workplace accidents (National Census, 
2017).  
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Figure 2. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics on Workplace Fatalities. Adapted from NATIONAL 
CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES IN 2016 dated December 19, 2017. 
 
The United States Bureau of Labor (BLS) estimated that in 2016, the workforce was 
double that of 1970 and that severe workplace accidents and illnesses reduced from 11 to 3.6 per 
100 000 workers in the same period.  Worker accidents in the electric power industry are lumped 
in a category called Utilities and amounts to 2.8 in 2016.  OSHA credited the reduction in 
workplace accidents and severe injuries to the enforcement of the OSH Act 1970 and the efforts 
of employers, safety professionals, worker unions, and primarily the workers themselves.  These 
all culminate in a 66% reduction; but not an elimination of workplace mishaps, deaths, and 
injuries.  The BLS estimates that worker compensation for workplace injuries and illnesses in the 
United States directly amounts to approximately $1 billion per week. Indirect costs are 
appreciably higher as that cost include lower productivity outputs and outcomes, worker training, 
replacement costs for damaged equipment, and lost time in delayed start-ups after workplace 
accidents.  OSHA, from the OSH Act 1970, is expected to develop, promulgate, and enforce 
workplace safety standards for which employers are to comply. Example work standards 
includes fall protection, machine guarding, and handling of chemicals in the workplace: these 
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and other safety standards are aimed at ensuring that proper safeguards and safe working 
conditions are sufficient to prevent workers injuries or illnesses.  OSHA assists companies, 
employers and workers' training, and provides information on workplace safety so that workers 
and employers have an understanding of their workplace safety duties, rights, roles, and 
responsibilities.  The 2015-2016 BLS reported worker deaths in the selected (as examples in this 
study) states of the United States as captured in Table 4. 
Employers are required, by the OSH Act 1970, to comply with OSHA safety standards, to 
identify and abate workplace hazards, to provide employees with necessary training and 
information regarding dangers at work, and to notify OSHA of workplace accidents where 
workers are killed or injured.  For safe workplaces, employers are also required to provide 
workers with necessary personal protective equipment (PPE), to keep workplace safety records, 
and to desist from retaliatory actions against workers who reports safety infractions to OSHA. 
OSHA is vested with the power, through the OSH Act 1970, to conduct workplace 
inspections, even without advanced notification.  These inspections happen when there are risks 
of worker deaths or severe injuries.  Citations for workplace safety violations as well as financial 
penalties for these violations and failure to curb further violations usually resulted from OSHA 
inspections and investigations.  The OSH Act of 1970 make employers responsible for 
maintaining safe workplaces so that workers are not injured or even killed.  To this end, workers 
are required to support employers in ensuring the maintenance of workplace safety measures and 
that individuals do not misuse safety equipment, tools, and systems.  Workers aere, therefore, to 
be trained to understand and to handle dangers that might be present in the workplace.  For 
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denial of this right or any other safety provisions permitted by the OSH Act 1970, workers have 
recourse in whistle-blowing to OSHA. 
 
Table 4 
State Counts (Fatalities) Rates (Fatalities/100 000 Workers 
2015 2016 2015 2016 
Connecticut 44 28 2.6 1.6 
Delaware 8 12 1.9 2.6 
District of 
Columbia 
8 5 2.4 1.4 
Indiana 115 137 3.9 4.5 
Kentucky 99 92 5.5 5.0 
Maine 15 18 2.5 2.4 
Maryland 69 92 2.4 3.2 
Massachusetts 69 109 2.1 3.3 
Michigan 134 162 3.1 3.5 
New Hampshire 18 22 2.7 3.2 
New Jersey 97 101 2.3 2.4 
New York 236 272 2.7 3.1 
Ohio 202 164 3.9 3.1 
Pennsylvania 173 163 3.0 2.8 
Rhode Island 6 9 1.2 1.8 
Vermont 9 10 2.9 3.2 
Virginia 106 153 2.8 4.0 
West Virginia 35 47 5.0 6.6 
Wisconsin 104 105 3.6 3.6 
Note. Adapted from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Release NATIONAL CENSUS OF FATAL 
OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES IN 2016 dated December 19, 2017 (p.10). 
 
Worker Safety Beliefs 
White et al. (2016) considered a framework based on the theory of planned behavior, to 
explore underlying worker beliefs about workplace safety among electrical workers in Australia. 
White et al. treats beliefs as advantages, disadvantages, referents, barriers, and facilitators of 
workplace safety compliance.  Individual and co-worker personal safety are the advantages of 
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safety compliance; disadvantages involve workload and customer inconvenience; referents 
represents customers, supervisors, and worker-teams; cost and time constitute the barriers and, 
equipment availability, worker knowledge, and training are the facilitators.  White et al. (2016) 
believe that identified worker beliefs could are an essential catalyst to initiate safer workplaces 
and better electrical safety decisions. 
Albert and Hallowell (2013) describes the working environment that electrical workers 
negotiated as high risk and where live power systems sometimes lead to serious workplace 
accidents, worker injuries and even death.  White et al. (2016) captures that when electrical 
worker injuries occurred, the calculated hospitalization rate is 4 cases in every 100 000 
individuals cared for in these facilities.  That is serious enough to cause a renewal of  focus on 
electrical work and how workers use work systems, procedures, and personal protective 
equipment to ensure that they remain safe throughout work exercises (White et al., 2016). 
Comparing workplace electrical data on accidental deaths, White et al. indicates that annually 
there are approximately 350 electricity-related deaths in the United States and that almost 34% of 
these victims would be electrical workers.  In Australia, electrocution is third on the list of 
leading causes of workplace deaths.  Nearly 50% of electrocutions occur on live power lines or 
from contact with these lines.   Contact with energized transformers, electrical wires or other 
circuit components by electricians are also a leading cause of electrical worker injuries and 
deaths. 
White et al. (2016) identifies that within Australia, just as in many other countries 
worldwide, there are regulatory frameworks and policies for managing safety in the workplace. 
These are intentional and developed so that workplace safety can build upon a framework where 
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worker rights, roles, and responsibilities are in line with the employer’s roles and responsibilities.  
White et al. (2016) are unconvinced that regulatory control alone, is sufficient to provide a 
positive safety response from individuals at work.  Probst and Graso (2013) and Probst, Graso, 
Estrada, and Greer (2013) examined worker attitudes and workplace safety barriers and posit that 
many times, managers and supervisors are the catalyst for a failing safety management system 
and not the facilitators of successful safety outcomes.  Tucker et al. (2016) felt that 
organizational leaders and top management influence positive safety outcomes by convincing 
managers and supervisors that it is necessary to endorse safety in the workplace positively.   
Vaughan (1997) showed that normalization of deviance happen by compliance, proactive 
safety behavior, and that management failure leads to significant safety negatives.  Lievens and 
Vlerick (2014) showed that consistent management demand for safety compliance results in 
positive safety participation from workers with a lessened likelihood of workplace accidents and 
injuries; Probst et al. (2013) likened this as an exhibition of citizenship behavior by workers 
towards the organization.   
White et al. (2016) believes that this citizenship behavior informs workplace training, 
worker engagement, and a positive working environment where worker attitudes and behavior 
are conducive to safe and accident-free work.  That, according to White et al. (2016), is the 
opportunity to understand better how worker behavior impacted on safety outcomes and the 
identification of possible ways to eliminate conditions and situations that encouraged a diversion 
from that course. 
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Safety Theory 
Planned behavior.   
Worker choice involves a process of decision-making that individuals are intrinsically 
motivated by and adopt.  The 1991 Ajzen Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) is such a decision-
making model (Ajzen, 1991).  White et al. (2016) used this model to examine safety behavior 
and the direct and indirect determinants of decision making among electricity workers.  White et 
al. (2016) described that intentional influences are deliberate plans that describe actual individual 
behavior while indirect influence align with the individual’s beliefs.  From TPB, there is support 
for thinking that intentions are a direct and proximal catalyst for personal behavior.  White et al. 
believe this to be true and extend the logic to the willingness of an individual to exhibit a given 
behavioral response or subjective norms.  Antecedents or background of intentions have roots in 
individual attitudes whether positive or otherwise (White et al., 2016).  Social pressure from 
working groups and co-workers lead individuals to either perform and sometimes to desist from 
performing tasks that can be dangerous or risky.  White et al. believe that this risky behavior can 
be a subjective norm that is catalyzed by social group pressure at work.  TPB crucially link the 
predictors of behavior and belief with attitudes, perceptions, and subjective norms such as 
thinking and response.  Attitudes result from beliefs - as ideas and assumptions - about the 
advantages or disadvantages of the desired behavior.  Attitudes, therefore, likely make a 
difference in whether an individual takes undue risks or believe that safety rules are cosmetic and 
not relevant to the tasks at hand (White et al., 2016).  Subjective norms, such as individual action 
and response, are dependent on normative beliefs or merely the individual’s expectations of 
approval or disapproval from particular groups or individuals.  It implies that a worker’s 
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response  links to ideas of acceptance or criticism from supervisors, managers, or coworkers and 
work-groups (White et al., 2016).     
White et al., also feel that behavioral perception of control is influenced by controlling 
beliefs linked to individual motivators such as recognition and rewards.  That logic extends to 
negative motivators such as barriers, restrictions, prohibition, and rules which inhibits positive 
performance outcomes and behavior.  White et al. (2016) concur with Ajzen (1991) that 
information about beliefs can shape interventions designed to encourage positive behavioral 
performance.  That happen if the altering of existing beliefs become possible.  White et al. feels 
that exposure to new beliefs is a reasonable way of changing attitudes.  With an understanding of 
TPB, researchers can explain variability in behavior and intentions especially when applied to 
predict workers’ safety behaviors towards workplace safety practices (Ponnet, Reniers, & 
Kempeneers, 2015).  White et al. (2016) investigated these variabilities among electrical workers 
in Australia to better understand underlying beliefs about safety decisions in the workplace and 
to identify the full range of different safety beliefs that resulted.  That included behavioral 
advantages and disadvantages, individual and group-level normative behavior, and barriers and 
motivators as control beliefs.  These were to identify the different effects of individuals who 
influence others at work, the hurdles that can prevent optimal workplace safety and the impact of 
an individual thinking about other individuals in the workplace.  White et al. (2016) indicates 
that they aimed to understand how electrical workers beliefs and approaches to workplace safety 
lead to the prevention of injuries and fatalities.  The feeling is that with the identification of 
underlying beliefs that influenced safety behavior; strategies could be adopted to teach and to 
encourage safe behavior and therefore better outcomes.  White et al. postulates that consolidating 
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proactive-safety beliefs and a working environment which facilitates open-challenges to unsafe-
beliefs lead to the development of better safety attitudes and normative behavior as well as 
improve control perceptions.  White et al. found that in some cases, there is concern about legal 
and work consequences of reporting workplace incidents, near-misses, and accidents and that 
this negatively influence safety because of vulnerabilities induced by the uncertainty about 
liabilities. 
 
Figure 3: From “The Theory of Planned Behavior “Adapted from Ajzen, 
https://people.umass.edu/aizen/tpb.background.html and as captured by White et al. (2016, 
Section 1.2.2). Reprinted with permission. 
 
White et al. (2016) found that there are cases where supervisors and managers discourage 
the reporting of accidents, but these were a minimal number when measured against the overall 
response from managers and supervisors.  Worker knowledge and training are critical to 
individuals being able to identify hazardous conditions and to mitigate the associated risks.  Most 
participants acknowledge that the training and experience gained are relevant but expressed 
concern about insufficient and infrequent follow-ups, especially regarding younger electrical 
workers.  Participants also indicated that at times, there was inadequate time to conduct full work 
pre-planning and that added safety challenges and compromise (White et al., 2016). 
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Self-determination theory.  Scott, Fleming, and Kelloway (2014) indicated that self-
determination theory provides a good indication of individual work motivation.  Scott et al. 
(2014) described the human problems frequently associated with personal protective equipment 
use.  These devices, are uncomfortable, slows work processes, and therefore conflicts with 
productivity levels (p.281).  Intrinsic motivation is an internalization done by an individual.  If 
personal protective equipment use is irritating and cumbersome, then individuals internalize that 
safety is not designed to be enjoyable.  As a result, safety is not an excellent intrinsic motivator 
since it is in place to ensure that errors do not occur more than to keep the employee 
comfortable.  Scott et al. (2014) suggests that for the best safety outcomes, managers shall 
reward individuals for safe behavior and deal with situations in cases where undue risks are 
taken to get tasks done as that constitute unsafe behaviors.  
Social learning theory.  Social Learning theory describe how people learn by observing 
the behavior of high-status and significant individuals and how that behavior is reinforced and 
recollected in the future (Tucker et al., 2016).  Social learning can be an individual experience or 
a collective experience for a group of individuals.  Tucker et al. (2016) suggests that a CEO who 
engages executive management through shared intent and observations to facilitate a positive 
safety culture at work is involved in a collective social learning process.  The executive team that 
follows the CEO in espousing a safety climate encouraged by the CEO is itself vicariously 
learning from the CEO and explained in the social learning theory.  The learning process 
continues through the managers and supervisors to the front-line workers.  It implies that the 
safety focus of the leader percolates through the organization to the front-line workers; a safety 
conscious leader can impact a safe organization (Tucker et al., 2016).  Also, the supervisor can 
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impact workplace safety outcomes by ensuring that work procedures and safety rules are fully 
integrated to influence individual worker learning, collective learning among groups of workers, 
and actions to ultimately prevent errors and accidents by the maintenance of safety margins 
(Tucker et al., 2016).   Conchie, Moon, and Duncan (2013) indicates that work demands can 
positively engage worker safety behaviors and involvement depending on the context of the 
instruction.  This context can be set by the leadership of the organization especially if a strong 
safety climate is supported by the leadership if there is a traceable record of meaningful 
employee engagement and supervisor support for safety.  Conchie et al. (2013) explains that 
workplace demands are the combination of physical and other aspects of the job which result in a 
worker’s physical and mental engagement and which can result in exhaustion.  Conchie et al. 
(2013) further describe exhaustion as physical, emotional, and psychological.  
Heinrich theory.  Figure 4 is a depiction of Heinrich’s theory (Capelli-Schellpfeffer, 
Floyd, Eastwood, & Liggett, 1999).  From the depiction, there is a significant amount of at-risk 
behaviors usually interpreted as unsafe acts by individuals at work (Dekker, 2006).  These 
generally are undetected until a near miss, or first aid event occur.  Assuming that this model is 
correct, even if unsubstantiated, there is a ten-fold situation of undue risks taken before an 
opportunity to learn from these become available through a recorded near-miss event.  Capelli-
Schellpfeffer et al. (1999) found that near misses are generally not investigated and if they are, 
the findings and other pertinent information is not available from an accident and near-miss 
events repository that organizations and workers could benefit.   
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Figure 4: How we can better learn from electrical accidents. Adapted from M. Capelli-
Schellpfeffer, H. L. Floyd, K. Eastwood, & D.P. Liggett(1999). Reprinted with permission . 
 
Fordyce, Kelsh, Lu, Sahl, and Yager (2007), Salguero-Caparros, Suarez-Cebador, and 
Rubio-Romero (2015), and Volberg et al. (2017) echoed the same opinion about the non-
availability of near-miss data in the EPRI OHSD and other databases.  According to Capelli-
Schellpfeffer et al., interpretation of Heinrich’s theory, a workplace injury occur after more than 
30 000 near misses.  If correct, it means that conditions where the likelihood of equipment 
damage or injury to individuals exist and are not investigated for each of the 30 000 incidents.  
Understanding the real causal factors that contribute to near-misses are as relevant and essential 
opportunities to learn from and to prevent accidents which can result in worker injuries or deaths. 
Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al. (1999) indicated that once the conditions necessary for an 
incident event exist, whether an accident or a near-miss, the eventual outcome is determined only 
by chance.  That chance outcome is equivalent to an injury, fatality or a near-miss.  When near-
misses occur, false understanding that there is no real danger is common.  Work arrangements 
that contribute to the incident can become accepted as good practice.  That is akin to deviance 
described by Albright (2017); normalization of deviance would require a real understanding of 
the causal factors of near-misses, just as those for accidents (Price & Williams, 2018; Vaughan, 
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1997).  The analysis of causal factors can be opportunities to identify the underlying latent and 
systemic reasons for near-misses and accidents. 
The self-regulatory resource theory.  Kao, Spitzmueller, Cigularov, and Wu (2016) 
used the self-regulatory resource theory of individual self-regulation to show that insomnia 
lessens safe-behavior and this lead to an increased risk of injuries in the workplace.  Insomnia is 
an issue that individuals regulate on their own: supported by self-control and personal behavior 
(Uehli et al., 2014).  Kao et al. (2016) believe that safety behavior is a self-regulatory act 
specifically aimed to prevent injuries and the avoidance of unsafe actions.  Safety behavior, 
therefore, can be a complex sequence of behavioral activities which requires volition, 
determined, and deliberate individual control.  The results of this investigation substantiates that 
insomnia causes unsafe behaviors in cases where the individual suffer from the condition. Also 
confirmed is that behavior describes the relationship with workplace injuries.  Kao et al. (2016) 
extended understanding of insomnia and its impact to how supervisors can recognize workers 
inflicted with this condition, and still encourage safe work operations by setting up work 
arrangements and barriers that will prevent any possible unsafe behavior.  Kao et al. (2016) 
found that when supervisors are safety proactive and aware of particular individuals inflicted 
with insomnia, the likelihood of workplace injuries lessens: This study links workplace safety 
outcomes with individual behavior and organizational factors such as the quality of supervision, 
and supervisor safety consciousness.  It describes how organizational-factors can align to 
mitigate safety outcomes; in this case, the effects of insomnia on safety errors and worker 
injuries.  It also raises the possibility of other conditions, medical or otherwise, that would affect 
a worker to the extent were behavior can be impacted and how that impact would influence work 
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outcomes, safety, and worker injuries.  Clarke (2013) supported the thinking that supervisor-
behavior can result in improved worker safety performance and posited that supervisor safety 
training is critical to individual-level supervisor appreciation of their effect on safety at work.  
Kao et al. (2016) extends this logic to introduce a concept of worker engagement by supervisors 
and suggests that a lack of this is more an explanation of why insomnia results in accidents and 
worker injuries; supervisor effect is more significant than the impact of hazardous work 
conditions leading to worker errors, inattentiveness, and fatigue. Kao et al. (2016) described 
sleep as a process whereby an individual restores cognitive or attentive capability, and 
rejuvenates physical strength, with the result as the individual becoming alert and energetic.  A 
lack of sleep, insomnia, is the leading cause of a person growing fatigued and restless; and a 
diminished individual capacity to maintain safe behavior. 
Safety models.  Labib (2015) suggested a modeled approach to analyzing accident events 
and used it to explain what happened in Bhopal; Figure 5 – The second model of FT below is the 
reproduced model.  In this Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Labib introduced accident-causing factors 
as a system and plant design, workforce training and performance, inadequate and unsatisfactory 
maintenance, and management decisions.  Any combination of these is logically analyzed and 
deemed as crucial to the accident event. 
Labib (2015) indicates that the concept of learning is a prominent research posit, but the 
idea of un-learning is particularly important; the fact that un-learning went unnoticed is likely the 
main reason for repeat accidents.  Labib describe disasters and significant industrial accidents as 
low frequency and high impact events.  Two inferences come from this perspective.  First, 
disaster events are usually infrequent but severe, and second, the likelihood of un-learning is 
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high.  It means that for prevention of recurring accidents, organizations would be best served by 
arrangements where individuals are often remind about the accident experience. 
 
Figure 5: Learning (and unlearning) from failures: 30 years on from Bhopal to Fukushima an 
analysis through reliability engineering techniques. Adapted from Labib, A. (2015).   Reprinted 
with permission. 
 Labib noted that NASA experienced two accidents that are similar in many ways; the 
Columbia and Challenger.  The nuclear power industry disasters at Chernobyl and Fukushima 
Daiichi and the Piper Alpha, Deepwater Horizon and Bhopal are comparable experiences from 
the oil, gas, and chemical processing industries.  The similarities identified by Labib (2015) 
supports earlier comparisons done by NASA (2013) and Singh, Jukes, Wittkower, and Poblete 
(2010).  There are cases identified where, just like NASA, the same organization experienced 
more than one significant accidents; Air Malaysia and British Petroleum (Allen & D’Elia, 2015; 
Huber, 2013; Sienkiewicz, 2015; Lee & Han, 2016).  The MH370 flight on March 08, 2014 
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disappeared from radar and was never found, and all 227 persons on the aircraft are presumed 
dead.  This aviation disaster is unlike the 1989 Dryden crash where Moshansky (1992) found a 
compounding of problems because of issues that rested with the regulators, airline industry, the 
organization, and individuals who worked on that particular aircraft on the day of the accident.  
Lee and Han (2016) describes many different challenges that stems from transnational 
cooperation, the technological capability to track an aircraft that lost communication with air 
traffic control, and possible individual actions that went unsubstantiated but factored and 
promote skepticism. 
Malaysia Airlines in 2014 experienced another incredible event: On July 17, MH17 with 
298 persons on board was downed in Ukraine by a Russian-made missile (Sienkiewicz, 2015). 
From this disaster other considerations are brought into focus: Was MH17 a coincidental victim 
of an unrelated tragedy, either orchestrated or by chance?  That, however, does not explain 
whether the aircraft was on its scheduled flight path and whether that path was one traversed by 
other airlines.  The lessons from that experience can be used to prevent future aviation disasters.  
The two incidents that Malaysia Airlines experienced in 2014 left significant doubt about what 
went wrong. 
Huber (2013) indicates that the 2005 explosion at the BP Oil Refinery in Texas City is a 
major indication of inadequate safety management.  It is well-known that safety arrangements at 
the refinery were outdated and required re-engineering and upgrades (Huber, 2013).  In this 
accident, 15 individuals died, and another 170 were injured (Huber, 2013).  In 2010 the 
Deepwater Horizon oil rig disaster, in the Gulf of Mexico, there were 11 fatalities and 17 injured 
victims.  BP managed the Deepwater oil rig.  Huber (2013) recounted another accident in Alaska 
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where an explosion in 2002 resulted in multiple subsequent oil spills; one in 2006 was the largest 
in the history of operations in that area in Alaska. 
Allen and D’Elia (2015) describes the oil spill that resulted from Deepwater Horizon as 
the worst in maritime history and that the biological ecosystem after-effects are still not 
conclusively known.  The social negatives, mental anguish, and the fallout that resulted are 
apparent and understood.  The social impact of the Deepwater Horizon accident very likely is 
compounded because of hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the devastation that these 
meteorological phenomena superimposed on the population in the Gulf Coast of the United 
States.  Allen and D’Elia (2015) calls attention to the regulatory ability to effect appropriate 
compensation in light of the apparent shortcomings of the existing legislation that governed the 
management of this disaster and compensation for the affected third parties.  It is a point 
emphasized by their feelings of disenfranchisement by the legal system and its apparent 
shortcomings in addressing this issue (p.587).  The point about regulatory ability is consistent 
with the views of Moshansky after the Dryden accident (Lecture, 2007). 
Allen and D’Elia (2015) posits that the disaster management main aim from the BP 
Deepwater oil-spill seems to be on remedial attention such as containment and saving fauna 
rather than the long-term consideration for the severe human and emotional consequences. 
Affected parties received small financial settlements to claims against the Responsible Party, BP 
(p.588).  Human issues of neglected communities, mental health problems, anxiety, Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), suicide, drug, and substance misuse directly attributed to this 
oil spill are of particular interests (Allen & D’Elia, 2015).  Mac Sheoin (2015) and Singh, Jukes, 
Poblete, and Wittkower, (2010) shows how different this was in Bhopal and Piper Alpha.  That 
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difference referred to the more than twenty years that surviving victims of Bhopal had to wait for 
compensation adjudicated by the legal system in India:  The different ways that the human issues 
are handled in the Bhopal case when compared to the Piper Alpha case makes a referencing of 
the non-attention of human and emotional consequences of accidents.  Allen and D’Elia (2015) 
went further to identify the effects that industrial accidents have on responders; especially those 
who are injured or suffers long-term health effects afterward.  Allen and D’Elia also examined 
the impact on families and friends of responders and victims killed in industrial accidents.  
Family members of a Flight Attendant who died at Dryden in 1989, had to petition the Canadian 
courts for relief against the two deceased pilots, the airline, and the regulator.  These are among 
the corporate secrets that remain untold from industrial accidents (Lecture, 2007).  Allen and 
D’Elia (2015) suggests that legal constraints add to the challenge and that government and 
regulator intervention are required for appropriate relief to affected individuals and communities 
after industrial accidents. 
Sociotechnical and safety management models.  Manuele (2014) developed a 
sociotechnical model which caters to the human element consideration and interaction as well as 
the other system elements for assessing safety management systems, especially when 
investigating accidents in the workplace.  Manuele believes that workplace accidents are 
symptoms of significant safety management system problems and that accident investigations 
presents opportunities for the identification of system deficiencies that when corrected can 
prevent future accidents.  Manuele called this an opportunity to employ root-cause analysis to 
determine the system weaknesses.  Manuele reviewed reports from about 2000 accident 
investigations and indicates that there are definite gaps between how to do accident 
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investigations and what the procedures for these investigations require.  Manuele suggests that 
the average report would receive a grade of 5.7 out of a possible 10 representing significant 
missed opportunities to learn from accidents and to mitigate against similar future accidents.  
The accident investigation procedures come from the ANSI/AIHA/ASSE Z10-2012, Standard 
for Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems and from specific organization and 
industry developed arrangements.  Labib (2015) and Murata (2017) suggests that a similar Safety 
Management Systems (SMS) existed in the Piper Alpha accident and the Lord Cullen Report 
from that investigation was instrumental to the development of SMS in other industries. 
Manuele (2014) highlights two very critical issues; these surround the bias by 
investigators.  First, Manuele suggests that supervisors are more than often required to 
investigate accidents and this is usually not adequately done, and second, there is an 
overwhelming focus on finding the unsafe acts committed by the employee or employees 
involved in the accident.  By focusing on the unsafe act committed by individuals just before the 
accident event is a shortcoming and a blind-eye turn on the other systemic problems that 
contribute to the single or “last” error before the actual event.  Manuele’s view is supported in 
other studies such as Dechy et al. (2012), Singh, Jukes, Wittkower, and Poblete (2010), Labib 
(2015), and Murata (2017).  
Swiss cheese model.  The Swiss Cheese model is a simple model built to analyze the 
reasons for accidents (Singh, Jukes, Poblete, & Wittkower, 2010; Wahlström & Rollenhagen, 
2014; Murata, 2017).  The Swiss Cheese shown in Fig 6 below is a popular linear accident 
causation model developed by James Reason (1970 – 1977).  For an accident event to occur, 
several breaches of different organizational barriers occurs.  The last gate before the accident is 
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usually one that likely involves the individual or individuals at the accident site or breach when 
the accident happen.  This barrier can include worker training deficiencies or workers’ failure to 
follow work procedures correctly (Hosseinian & Torghabeh, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 6:  Human error: Models and management. Adapted From Reason, J. (2000).   
 
  Workers not following procedures or not applying training on the frontline is what 
Manuele (2014) feels are the significant predominant investigative findings from accidents.  
Stopping at this point or accepting these as the real cause for appropriating responsibilities 
usually, lead to deficiencies and lost opportunities to identify the deeper organizational problems 
that are breached up to the final barrier.  The barriers reflect breakdown and breaches on warning 
and alarm systems, issues on other automatic technical systems and devices, unsafe design, poor 
work planning and permit to work violations, unsafe conditions, inadequate supervision or 
supervisory failure, organizational failures at the management level (Hosseinian & Torghabeh, 
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2012, p.58).  Manuele (2014) believes that frontline workers and operators inherit work problems 
compounded in different ways.  These include poor design, incorrect installation, inadequate and 
reduced maintenance.  
Manuele (2014) suggests that accident investigations conducted by supervisors are sub-
standard and at times only focused on the human error on the frontline just before that accident 
event occur.  The barriers as in the Swiss Cheese model include supervisors as deep and latent 
barriers to prevent accidents (Hosseinian & Torghabeh, 2012).  When supervisors are untrained, 
incapable of lending assistance, or tardy in not following up on active supervision of workers, 
the occurrence of accidents in these situations can be due to breakdowns initiated by the 
supervisor (Manuele, 2014; Dekker, 2006).  It is, therefore, difficult for the supervisor to focus 
elsewhere but on the frontline breaches and to associate these breaches with workers not 
following procedures or not applying the knowledge gained through training (Lee & Dalal, 
2016).  
Accident causation and prevention.  Mitropoulos, Howell, and Abdelhamid (2005) 
described an accident causation model that offers a better understanding of the different 
influences that can impact a workplace accident.  Figure 7 shows how work processes can 
become complicated and difficult to manage, even if it remains simple at each stage in the 
workflow.  Individuals in the different stages of the work process will be skilled and technically 
proficient to function at that stage in the process (Miller, Raysich, & Kirkland, 2016).  
Supervision remains a critically important glue for the effective and efficient management of 
work processes (Mills & Koliba, 2015).  Mitropoulos et al. (2005) focusses on the work 
considerations from technical skills of individuals to work arrangements that can be influenced 
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from the very top of the organization and impacted at the frontline where the work activity 
occurs.  There are definite advantages with this model as it is sufficiently generic for application 
in different workplaces, working environments, industries, and complex conditions while not 
removing or lessening the requirements of any safety management system, work procedures, 
work design, or working arrangements.  That is an advantage when compared to the Swiss 
Cheese model. 
 
Figure 7: Accident prevention strategies: Causation model and research directions . Adapted 
from P. Mitropoulos, G. A. Howell, & T. S. Abdelhamid (2005). Reprinted with permission. 
   
The impression from the Swiss Cheese is that it is a linear profile of breached barriers 
before an accident will occur.  These barriers can spatially exist over long time-periods, and 
therefore it can become complicated to manage effectively and to appreciate (Dekker, 2006; 
Manuele, 2014).  An example of how difficult the Swiss Cheese model can become is in an 
accident where design occurred in year A, construction occurred in year B, and an accident 
occurred in year C.  This become difficult to track if the difference in years increases.  If a power 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
- - 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
UNPREDICTABILITY 
Task                    
Context                  
Errors 
HAZARDOUS 
SITUATIONS 
Predictable 
Unpredictable 
No Exposure 
Exposure to 
Hazards 
Incident 
No Incident 
NO INJURY         
“Near Miss” 
INJURY 
Injury/Fatality 
TASK 
Technology 
Context 
Efforts to 
control 
conditions 
Efforts to 
control 
behaviors 
Efficient 
behaviors 
Production 
Workload & 
Production 
pressures 
Errors 
Change in 
conditions 
Trap/recover 
errors 
Protective 
measures 
Causal Link 
Figure 1 Accident Causation Model 
Source: Mitropoulos, P., Howell, G. A., & Abdelhamid, T. S. (2005). Accident prevention 
strategies: Causation model and research directions. In Construction Research Congress 2005: 
Broadening Perspectives (pp. 1-10). doi: 10.1061/40754(183)8 
 
+ 
60 
 
transformer is designed in 1990 and installed at a substation on the electric grid in 2005, this 
transformer can realistically remain in service until 2055.  It implies that if an accident occurs in 
2035, then the accident can be because of a design flaw that went undetected until the event in 
2035.  If the design flaw is recognized earlier, a decision can be taken to keep the unit in service 
but to operate it within limits set by the organization (Mills & Koliba, 2015).  These procedures 
can be detailed but not adequately archived.  The point is; it could become a tough challenge to 
trace the failure of the transformer back to the original design flaw problem.  It, therefore, 
lessens the usefulness of but it did not remove the apparent validity of the Swiss Cheese model.  
The Mitropoulos et al. (2005) model provides opportunities for tasks to be less unpredictable by 
impacting the importance of individual awareness; it promotes safe production behavior by 
supporting hazard identification while mitigating safety risks due to these hazards.  It also allows 
for feedback systems to initiate control of new safety challenges that can develop as work ensued 
(Merlin et al., 2016; Miller et al., 2016).   This feedback system is analogous to the feedback 
control of closed-loop systems.  It represents the opportunity to manage errors and to prevent 
unplanned events from developing into unmanageable situations (Moffatt-Bruce et al., 2017). 
Mitropoulos et al. (2005) suggests the focusing on compliance to reduce hazard 
exposures.  That is consistent with Vaughan (1997), Albright (2017); Price and Williams (2018), 
and Murata (2017).  Mitropoulos et al. (2005) further suggests that compliance promotes a 
limited view of accident causality.  It leads to unnecessary attention to and on individuals at 
fault, not on system factors that fails to address hazards, and eventually encourages unacceptable 
worker behaviors.  Price and Williams (2018) counters this thinking, just like Vaughan (1997) 
and Albright (2017) do, in positing that compliance promotes normalization of deviance and 
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focuses on safety margins instead of risks that lead to system reliability, service continuity, and 
product availability.  Mitropoulos et al. (2005) acknowledges that safety compliance conflicts 
with production and operating cost factors and that the resolution of the conflict is usually in 
favor of productive activities.  Murata (2017) suggests that the KLM4805/Pan Am 1736 crash at 
Tenerife may have been due to production conflicts with safety and where safety margins 
became sacrificed.  Singh et al. (2010) suggests that production schedules led to the Piper Alpha 
accident as the permit to work system, safety arrangements for blanking critical pipes and other 
safety systems became breached to allow for production activities; it promoted a series of 
assumptions before confirmation.  Murata (2017) discusses the production approach at NASA in 
favor of safety margins despite the issues with the O-rings.  Labib (2015) notes that in Bhopal, 
numerous safety breaches by operators such as the shutting down of refrigeration contributed to 
the accident.  None of these example studies explains why the safety breach happened; the 
emphasis, instead, was on confirming that it happened. 
Mitropoulos et al. (2005) explains that work production factors and pressures influence 
workers to take shortcuts, disregard safety procedures and apparatus to get jobs done faster. A 
fallout of this is a safety climate where the attitude that supports risky-behavior is acceptable.  It 
encourages individuals to become overconfident and to become complacent.  Murata (2017) 
describes this as the worst possible consequence; a cultural difference or even a groupthink bias.  
Murata confirms that cultural difference is a crucial consideration if accident prevention are 
possible and for a real alignment of cognitive bias with optimal safety performance.  None of the 
studies examined led to a belief that making work arrangements more efficient and reducing 
times taken for tasks were specific indicators that safety requirements are bypassed or ignored.  
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The skill levels and expertise of individuals who conduct work cannot be undervalued or 
disregarded in favor of work arrangements that do not allow for their genuine involvement and 
input.  Therefore from the perspective that workers are skilled, technically proficient, and 
knowledgeable, reducing the time taken to do tasks cannot automatically be equated to risk-
taking and irresponsible behavior (Mitropoulos et al., 2005).  It may be understood though, that 
skills and knowledge are excuses for the deliberate reduction of safety margins where errors, 
accidents, and failures are possible and likely outcomes.  Instead, it will very likely be acceptable 
if workers can recognize hazards and initiate appropriate mitigating responses.  If errors or 
underestimation occur, then workers shall be sufficiently competent and capable to avoid further 
problems and to recover from the error conditions while trapping and containing the problem or 
exposure to the problem.  None of this will be acceptable when the outcome can result in 
significant danger and possible injury or loss of life.  In these situations, reasonable safety 
margins should be maintained (Mitropoulos et al., 2005). 
Complex linear model.  Toft, Dell, Klockner, and Hutton (2012) suggests that a 
successful approach to accident prevention hinges on an accurate understanding of accident 
causation.  The early causation models allows for the identification of a single cause of the 
accident.  This single-cause is the result of a linear and almost regimental sequencing of 
activities and actions until the accident event occurs.  This causation methodology was accepted 
until the 1980s when a series of serious industrial accidents such as the Piper Alpha, Bhopal, and 
the Challenger caused a major rethinking about the appropriateness of the simple linear accident 
causation model in the era of complex technological, industrial operations.  The complex linear 
accident causation models started from the 1980s up to the 2000s when the next generation of 
63 
 
super technology made previously tricky operations possible.  Business conducted in the 21st 
century is different; this difference is possible because of advanced communication ability 
especially in the online arena.  That became the age of emergent technology where the workplace 
requirement is for individuals with different skill sets that in times before were unavailable.  
Technologies that previously were only available in the advanced workplaces like in NASA, for 
example, are now commercially available and within reach of smaller organizations and different 
industries.  The accident causation models, suitable for previous eras, are replaced by complex 
emergent non-linear models more ideal for the changing workplace.  Complex emergent non-
linear models are considered suitable for multiple influencing factors that interact and evolve to 
lead to the accident event. 
Manuele (2014) indicates that accident investigators shall be trained to develop the 
necessary skill and for the real causes of accidents to be determined.  Dekker (2006) feels that 
investigations are entirely the result of investigator focus as it is individual bias that guide 
investigators more than procedures and standards; this is likened to an invisible accident model 
imagined by the investigator and which supported the investigator’s pre-conceived belief of the 
accident and events surrounding the accident. 
Dekker (2006) describes three different accident causation models: sequence-of-events, 
epidemiological, and systemic sequence-of-events which treats accidents as the failure outcome 
of chain-events of events.  Dekker believes that this is equivalent to one domino causing the next 
in a chain to fall.  Hosseinian and Torghabeh (2012) equates this domino chain to the Domino 
theory developed by Heinrich.  
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Heinrich.  Heinrich developed his thinking on the relationship, as understood in the early 
1950s, between human and machine.  This model was used to determine some of the most 
widely used safety statistics, accident severity rate, frequency rate, and reasons for unsafe acts by 
individuals at work.  Heinrich’s theory was and still is popular; especially by individuals who 
believe that accidents due to human error are caused mainly by frontline workers.  Heinrich 
suggests an 88:10:2 causal relationship to workplace accidents: 88% of all accidents caused by 
workers, 10% were due to equipment failure while 2% were unexplained and considered as acts 
of god  (Hosseinian & Torghabeh, 2012).  Manuele (2014) and Dekker (2006) counters this 
thinking as outdated and not in line with the current reality in the workplace.  Manuele used the 
Deepwater Horizon accident to explain why the teachings of Heinrich are outdated.  The 
investigation team did not identify one party or reason for the Deepwater Horizon accident: They 
found complex situations that evolved from an interlinking of poor designs, operational 
inefficiencies, mechanical failures, and human judgments (Manuele, 2014).  Manuele conducted 
a survey in 2014 among safety professionals and found that more than 73% of safety 
practitioners searched for unsafe acts committed by workers which they treated as the latent or 
real cause of the accident.  
Human error.  Reason (2000) suggests that the human error accident causation view 
supports two distinct problems, one as an individual issue and another as a system problem.  
Reason further indicates that each perspective presented different views which results in 
diverged resolution philosophies and methodologies.  The impact of these different directions are 
that opportunities to prevent accidents go unaddressed and similar accidents follow when the 
conditions reoccur (Holland, 2018; Miller et al., 2016).  
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The focus on the individual perspective to find human error problems is prevalent and 
concentrated attention on the individual responsible for the last-act before the accident event 
occur.  The last-act usually equates to an unsafe act, error and even violation, sometimes willful, 
of work procedures with individuals tagged as being forgetful, inattentive, careless, reckless, 
negligent, and poorly motivated (Reason, 2000).  Corrective actions are, as well, aligned to 
suppression of negative behavior through the adoption of disciplinary actions against the 
involved employee, instituting revised work procedures, and retraining of employees who 
perform similar tasks (O’Donnell, & MacIntosh, 2016).  Reason (2000) associates this focus on 
an intent by management to blame deviant workers for the failure and loss as if the worker is 
morally obligated to be error-free and that the failure is only due to the untrustworthiness and 
negligence of the worker (Paludi, 2015).  It does not factor that the problem can be an error in 
judgment despite the worker taking the steps that were believed to be sufficient to prevent injury 
or even death.  It also places a moral barrier between the involved worker or workers and the 
remainder of the organization; as if separating the bad from the remaining good. 
Reason (2000) indicates that it is more satisfying for some managers to blame workers 
for accidents than to focus on fixing the organizational problems and issues.  The prevailing 
impression is that individuals are capable of making decisions and therefore should have chosen 
a safe work approach rather than the method they adopt before the accident event.  That runs 
contrary to the thinking that the accident event can happen in a quick time and the individual 
may not have sufficient time to reconsider any decision that contribute to the event (Dekker, 
2006; Manuele, 2014).  Reason (2000) suggests that it is in the manager’s interest to de-link 
responsibility for any accident from the organization.  Probst (2015) aligns this impression to 
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managers’ bonuses and supervisors encouraging workers to underreport accidents.  Manuele 
(2014) explains how this thinking influence the conduct of accident investigations and what 
findings result from these exercises.  Reason (2000) reveals that in medical incidents individual 
doctors or other healthcare professionals are blamed for and held personally liable for medical 
accident events.  Whereas, in the aviation industry, it is common to interpret maintenance-worker 
errors as linked to systemic problems connected with an events chain and which culminate with 
the final act as the accident happen.  Judgment errors and lapses in concentration in the aviation 
industry are treated differently for the same issues in the medical industry.  Reason (2000), just 
like Salguero-Caparros et al. (2015), Dekker (2006), and Manuele (2014) consider the analysis of 
accidents and near misses as critical to averting recurrent accidents and opportunities to 
recognize situations and conditions when these can happen. 
Human error thinking.  McCall and Pruchnicki (2017) notes the prevalence of holding 
individuals accountable for accidents happening is significant in industries where outcomes are 
high-consequence, and that remains a significant barrier to a favorable safety climate at work.  
McCall and Pruchnicki further posits that other pressing organizational requirements such as 
production find favor over safety behavior.  Workers in these settings are required to recognize 
and observe different accountability boundaries as part of the regular working arrangements.  
McCall and Pruchnicki (2017) indicates that these accountabilities are: political, hierarchical, 
professional, and legal.  These can explain why it is common to misinterpret accountability 
boundaries.  The difference between political and professional may become blurred if the issue is 
one where human influence is more significant than other system components.   
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On the other hand, in cases where organizational games, such as departmental or 
divisional rivalry, are prevalent, legal accountabilities can be shrouded in professional and even 
political machinations.  These blended well with the complex evolving workplace that was 
common today.  McCall and Pruchnicki (2017) describes these challenges while explaining the 
events that contributed to the 1998 Swiss Air Flight 111 Airline crash in Nova Scotia, Canada 
and how these led to different and shifted employee response versions and behavior.  McCall and 
Pruchnicki (2017) indicates that operator conflicts occurs as individual priorities directly impact 
accountability boundaries which result in safety breaches that cause the accident.  McCall and 
Pruchnicki (2017) also notes that operators are negotiating across accountability boundaries to 
the extent where errors are reported on a timely basis and contributes to mitigation efforts which 
add to positive safety performance and organizational success.  In effect, McCall and Pruchnicki 
describes a new culture, which they called just culture that can aid safety management in 
abnormal situations.  
Epistemological model of accident causation.  Dekker (2006) describes the 
epistemological model of accident causation as one where a search for the cause of the accident 
is possible from a management decision-making perspective, an equipment design criteria, and 
consideration of work procedures.  Dekker (2006) also suggests that the systemic accident 
causation model incorporate the view that accidents are caused by an interaction that occurs 
when different components of the system are designed to coordinate activities and processes that 
links different working units and elements of the system.  Dekker believes that these interactions 
overshadow the internal-to-individual component or segmental failures.  Manuele (2014) 
supports this Dekker perspective of systemic accident causation and suggests that this was an 
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opportunity to view workplace errors that lead to accidents as the consequence of a mismatch 
between worker-demands and their capabilities, and the existence of a less than appropriate 
safety culture within the organization.  These, Manuele stresses, were the responsibility of and 
could be managed by the leaders of the organization.  The safety culture in an organization can 
explain the underlying conditions due to design problems, unrecognized material and equipment 
flaws when purchased, inadequate or inefficient supervision, and work procedures that 
complicated working requirements without adding to safety margins.   Maintenance failures 
including non-maintenance and automation make it difficult for operators to manage processes 
and devices that are otherwise functioning properly; training that do not prepare workers for the 
challenges they face at the workplace but links to organizational safety culture.  Each of these 
factors influence worker attitudes and opinions and encourage a safety culture where suppressing 
of cognitive bias occur in favor of heuristic bias (Labib, 2015; Manuele, 2014; Murata, 2017; 
Dekker, 2006).  Manuele extends the original Heinrich thinking about humans and machines by 
adding that these relationships are integrated, inseparable, interdependent, and shapes a 
sociotechnical arrangement that provides for organizational success and the facilitating of worker 
needs. 
Multi-cause models, ferrel, and arctm.  The Multiple Cause Model is a simple 
arrangement where several different factors are deemed to influence either an unsafe act or 
produced an unsafe condition.  The accident, in which injury or death, equipment damage or 
process loss occurred, or even a near miss incident, is the result of an unattended unsafe 
condition and unchecked unsafe act (Hosseinian & Torghabeh, 2012).  The Multiple Cause 
Model, just like the Domino theory and Reason’s Swiss Cheese, were not sufficiently versatile to 
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cover for accidents like Piper Alpha, Fukushima, and the other significant accidents identified in 
my study.  
Ferrel’s Theory of accident causation is one that focuses on human errors.  The logic 
applied to this model is a good one to understand the principle of how to pinpoint the individual 
or individuals who have direct and indirect impact on an accident event (Hosseinian & 
Torghabeh, 2012).  Despite this, the model offers an opportunity for investigators to only focus 
on the last error and to treat that as the underlying cause of an accident.  Manuele (2014) and 
Geller (2014) shows how this thinking likens to safety bullies and for the deep causing problems 
to go unnoticed. 
There were other accident causation models: One example is the Accident Root Causes 
Tracing Model (ARCTM).  The ARCTM model is a hybrid built from the Swiss Cheese.  
ARCTM grew upon the following underlying assumptions; unsafe condition, worker reaction to 
a dangerous situation, and unsafe act by the worker (Hosseinian & Torghabeh, 2012).  The base 
assumptions are the same as for the theory of multiple causes except for a definite focus on the 
reaction of employees to an unsafe condition.  Fundamentally, this accident causation model can 
be critically analyzed and deemed to have the same flaws as the other models that formed the 
basis for this hybrid.  The main weakness, however, is the opportunity to still focus only on the 
frontline worker and the actions of the frontline worker. 
Behavior-based safety.  Behavior-based safety (BBS) techniques can enhance safety 
management but only if implemented in a supportive environment.  Management will hold 
significant responsibility for setting the right safety climate for worker behavior to positively 
reflect the tenets of BBS.  If leaders resort to error- finding and to attribute blame to frontline 
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workers only, the result of a BBS system will not be as desired.  In many workplace settings, 
production and operational challenges and demands easily escalate into a blame game and tit for 
tat sequence of finger-pointing that reduce the BBS to reflect the Multiple Cause Model even 
though not envisaged (Albright, 2017; Geller, 2014; Hosseinian & Torghabeh, 2012; Manuele, 
2014).  Albright (2017) notes that deviance must not become treated as the usual.  Deviations, 
however, are a fact of life as people are prone to making mistakes.  Procedures, if not tightly 
enforced can be easy to breach.  Management must afford appropriate supervision and change 
deficient work procedures when these become known.  Safeguards design must be so that it 
would not be simple to infringe or violate.  No single individual at work should possess the 
autonomy to singularly divert from set procedures and not be found wanting; even if an accident 
did not happen.  This desire to enforce compliance might be the real test to the normalization of 
deviance. 
Behavior based safety management.  Jerie and Baldwin (2017) shows that behavioral-
based approach to safety management (BBM) is a successful approach if an organization’s 
management will actively encourage this initiative.  It is possible to influence worker attitudes 
and behavior when managers and supervisors show support for meaningful worker involvement 
in safety arrangements at work and a resultant reduction in the number of workplace accidents 
(Jerie & Baldwin, 2017; Miller et al., 2016).  In each case, the success superimpose on 
developing a working environment where workers are able to intervene and mitigate accidents 
by causing the removal of risks posed by hazards that previously went unidentified and 
unaddressed.  Jerie and Baldwin (2017) further highlighted the procedural support that workers 
have; if the task was unsafe, the worker had a right to refuse to do it.  Miller et al. (2016) stressed 
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not being another statistic.  Both studies promoted working arrangements where workers were 
allowed to be the eyes and ears of the organization and were expected to help in the removal of 
dangerous conditions that could result in injuries and even death.  Jerie and Baldwin (2017) 
describe BBM as focused on worker behavior link to or as causal factors in safety-related 
problems including near misses and accidents.  Miller et al. (2016) describes this as an 
opportunity to move from an employer-centric to an employer-employee-centric mode of safety 
management where workers can impact on work arrangements especially when the risk of injury 
or death is high.  BBM is different from a familiar model for behavior-based safety (BBS) 
management.  BBM is integral to the involvement of all individuals at work in the safety 
management arrangements at work; BBS is about the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) 
and the range of available PPE for the job (Jerie & Baldwin, 2017).  BBM results in meaningful 
involvement, worker buy-in as keepers of the system and employees caring for one another while 
BBS is more aligned to compliance and non-compliance with set procedures and job 
requirements (Jerie & Baldwin, 2017).  BBM is, therefore, transformational while BBS is 
transactional.  Transformational as postulated by Jerie and Baldwin and Miller et al. is superior 
and preferred; both studies show that a significant number of workplace accidents and injuries 
occur because of causal factors link to human factors and individual behavior, hence their focus 
on behavior modeling.  Worker training and reorientation are integral to successful outcomes in 
both studies.  Jerie and Baldwin (2017) promotes worker incentive for correct behavior.  Miller 
et al. (2016) raises the issue of preventing worker distractions and conditioning by the Balance 
Incentive; this is not financial, but the medical and social benefits are evident.  An adverse effect 
of BBM is underreporting of accidents and near misses.  Miller et al. (2016) allude to this by 
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describing cases where the causal factors of injuries are unknown when the victim can be 
distracted by the use of cell phones.  Jerie and Baldwin (2017) recognizes that accidents go 
underreported because of the financial incentives offered to workers for safe behaviors.  Probst 
(2015) also indicates that accident underreporting can occur when management and supervision 
bonus are affected and negatively impacted.  Another critical aspect of BBM is the availability of 
an appropriate database of accidents and near misses (Jerie & Baldwin, 2017; Miller et al., 
2016).  
Safe is safe – right.  Price and Williams (2018) notes the difficulty experienced in 
organizations when deviance occur; once entrenched, it was almost impossible to turnaround and 
to revert to the normal.  Price and Williams (2018), unlike Manuele (2014), Huber (2013), Singh 
et al. (2010), Dekker (2006), and others feel that high-reliability organizations automatically 
infer that these organizations were safe.  Labib (2015) shows that unless un-learning occur, these 
high-reliability organizations are prone to repeat accidents and disasters. 
Murata (2017) describes two crashes where cognitive bias factored; the 1977 KLM Flight 
4805 crash and the 1986 Challenger explosion.  Neither of these is due to or attributed to cultural 
difference.  The contributing factor is loss aversion.   A terrorist bomb at the scheduled 
destination airport on the Canary Islands influenced a diversion of the aircraft to the Tenerife 
airport.  The KLM airline landed at Tenerife.  The accident occurred on its take-off from 
Tenerife.  The terrorist action led to air traffic congestion at Tenerife Airport. KLM 4805 and 
Pan Am 1736 collided on the single runway killing 583 people.  There were 61 survivors.  Pan 
Am aircraft.  It did not have sufficient time to move off the runway when the KLM 4805 
commenced its takeoff.  Murata (2017) believes that a combination of possible factors may have 
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influenced the KLM crew to begin the takeoff.  These include reasonable costs due to delays, 
passenger accommodation, and other factors that started a chain reaction similar to what 
Moshansky (1992) found at Dryden.  In both cases, it is possible that these factors caused the 
flight crews to lose a reference to safety and were more focused on operating cost.  Murata 
(2017) attributes the Challenger explosion to groupthink that prevented confirmation but 
encouraged a consensus type thinking based on an illusion of unanimity. 
Workplace culture, new influences, and bias.  Murata (2017) describes a cultural 
difference between individual and group behavior and how that influence cognitive reasoning, 
judgments, and decisions that contribute to inadequate safety margins and the occurrence of 
accidents.  Murata is cognizant that most times, there exists time-constraints that cause artificial 
needs to factor quickly and seamlessly; this requires a form of intuition and almost automatic 
thinking that generally do not always align with diagnostics and technical verifications necessary 
to confirm maintenance of safe work arrangements.  A heuristic approach to decision making 
almost always suffers in preference to a cognitively biased decision.  Murata supports similar 
arguments as posited by Vaughan (1997), Singh et al. (2010) about group-think and how that 
contributed to the Challenger explosion.  Murata also highlights a hindsight bias which explains 
how after a series of accidents, individuals cognitively overestimate the likelihood of accidents 
and the future possibility of the event reoccurring.  Hindsight bias is a form of cultural 
difference; just as social loafing, a fallacy of plan, an illusion of control, and groupthink bias 
(Murata, 2017).  Dekker (2006) and Manuele (2014) in a different way suggest that hindsight 
thinking do not allow investigators to appreciate the real experience or for a correct diagnosis of 
an accident event.  Lee and Han (2016) independently conclude, just like Murata (2017), that 
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passengers tend to shy away from airlines that were involved in accidents: A direct inference to 
an overestimation of the possibility of future accidents.   
Murata (2017) believes that cognitive bias lead to poor judgments, intentional violations, 
and unsafe conditions.  Heuristic bias grows on a confirmation and verification process that is 
generally slower than cognitive bias.  Overconfidence tendency become ripe in cognitive 
arrangements; this usually escalates to an illusion of control and that plans are adequate when 
that was not so.  Gladwell (2007) indicates that this is not always negative and many times quick 
thinking is spot on correct; this is acceptable as a form of adaptive thinking that lead the brain to 
make conclusions quickly, like a super-computer.  Gladwell describes the possible action of an 
individual seeing an approaching truck and jumping out of the way.  This action is the correct 
one, quick, and made cognitively.  Gladwell believes that quick decision making can be as good 
as cautious and deliberately made decisions.  It does not mean that errors will not occur.  It also 
does not infer that slowly made decisions, based on diagnostics and elaborate calculations are 
always correct. 
Safety culture and safety climate.  Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) differentiates the terms 
safety climate and safety culture; Safety climate involves a sharing of perceptions whereas safety 
culture depends on values and resultant behavior.  Safety culture is, therefore, more implicit and 
process related while safety climate is about the interpretation of people reactions and attitudes.  
Safety climate is more likely to be situational and time-stamped while safety culture can be a 
more long-term and deeply rooted in the mission and vision of the organization.  Therefore 
safety climate is akin to an immediate view of organizational safety culture.  From this 
perspective, Lee and Dalal (2016) shows that group interaction is situational and therefore do 
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factor the safety climate as an influence on employee behavior.  Lee and Dalal studied the impact 
of safety climate, on organization construct, employee conscientiousness, employee construct, 
when predicting employee behavior.  Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) indicates that there is no 
generally accepted consensus or theoretical approach to measuring safety climate even though 
there are distinct directions; attitudinal and perceptual; beliefs, risks, and work stressors as 
elements of measurement.  Lee and Dalal (2016) found that safety climate is strongly influenced 
by situations that encourage desirable individual and group behavior albeit without profound 
influence on individual conscientiousness and other personality traits.  A strong safety climate 
weakens the relationship between safety behavior and individual personality traits (Lee & Dalal, 
2016).  It is imperative to understand how personality traits become motivational and lead to 
individual and group behavior.  Lee and Dalal postulates that for a condition where the 
widespread belief among workers was that the management is more focused on production than 
on employee safety, safety behavior will almost uniformly be unacceptably low.  That condition, 
for example, will remove the likelihood of employee conscientiousness affecting safety 
outcomes or behavior.  If, for example, the reverse is true and management show definite signs 
of treating with safety as necessary as other organizational outcomes, conscientious and other 
workers will operate safely; if only because of management attention.  In both scenarios, safety 
climate attenuate personality trait and its influence on behavior.  It is unclear whether this result 
will hold if the study is repeated to reflect supervisor to worker interactions and relationships and 
how that impact on worker safety behavior.  Lee and Dalal (2016) indicate that strong 
organizational safety climate can be used to maintain compliant employee safe behavior. 
76 
 
Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) indicate that in testing a multi-dimensional safety climate 
model to determine safety outcomes, management values, safety communication, and safety 
training are necessary to operate safety systems for optimal safe work performance. Management 
values are indicative of the importance of safety in the workplace.  There is a preference for open 
exchange safety communication arrangements.  Safety training is necessary, expected, relevant, 
and adaptive to meet the working needs of employees and in the conditions that they operate. 
Safety climate.  Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) describe safety climate as an 
organizational phenomenon that comprise of perceptual, collective and multidimensional 
influences that impact individual and group behavior.  The influence is a subjective-normative 
sense-making one superimposed on individual differences, level of understanding, appreciation, 
feelings as well as group dynamics.  Work team members share similar perceptions concerning 
safety in the workplace.  Murata (2017) indicates that safety behavior commensurate with 
performance and safety outcomes.  It, therefore, means that if Murata is correct, that the 
organizational safety climate is a critical catalyst to organizational success, safety in the 
workplace, and productivity.  The idea of enhanced productivity in an excellent safety climate is 
not one that was universally accepted; productivity is negatively affected by enhanced safety 
arrangements is popular.  Lee and Dalal (2016) posited that organizational climate, meaning 
safety climate, is a situational factor in organizational performance.  This Lee and Dalal posit 
aligned with Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) in the thinking that safety climate can impact on 
organizational performance in a bi-directional manner.  Lee and Dalal (2016) further suggest that 
safety climate influence individual consciousness and moderate safety behavior of individuals in 
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a positive safety climate.  Lee and Dalal accept that in organizations where work is usually in 
hazardous conditions, there is an interest in employee safe-behavior.   
Measuring safety climate and new norms.  Zohar (2014) highlights two ways to 
measure safety climate.  One approach is general, and for use, in different organizational 
contexts.  It involves the development of general safety climate considerations.  The next 
approach is organization-specific and make it possible to examine safety climate history and 
concerns across diverse settings.  Zohar (2014) indicates that industry-specific management 
practices, structures, operational arrangements, and business make the safety climate 
significantly unique.  There exists cultural differences occurring from country to country as well 
as in diverse workplaces.  Differences influence personal perception and perception of risk can 
change despite the recognition of hazards.  Zohar (2014) notes that there is limited research 
information on how diversity could impact safety in high-risk environments. 
Organizations conduct business with foreign organizations in areas of specialized 
technologies which impact safety at work primarily in the cases where energy sources exist.  It is 
essential that safety management commitment, safety-specific arrangements, and safeguards are 
in place to prevent accidents and injuries to personnel.  Different social and cultural orientation 
can have significant implications for the understanding of and compliance with safety 
procedures, safety training, risk mitigation strategies, and safety behaviors as these can vary in 
diverse settings or across national contexts (Reader, Noort, Shorrock, & Kirwan, 2015).  Some 
national cultural traits promote the highlighting of mistakes and providing feedback. In this 
environment, supporting others at critical times can be misinterpreted by individuals from other 
cultural backgrounds.  Reader et al. (2015) examined the aviation industry safety culture in 
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diverse cultures and environments by employing multigroup analysis.  Reader et al. (2015) found 
that specific industry safety culture can successfully support different workgroups in different 
countries.  Reader et al. (2015) also found that cultural traits from different nations can influence 
organizational safety culture even if the organization is multi-national. 
Workplace bullying.  Rockett, Fan, Dwyer, and Foy (2017) describe bullying as 
composing of three different elements.  These are repeated incidents that involve the same 
individuals; the episodes occur over long periods that extend into months, and where there exist a 
power imbalance between the individuals involved.  The implication is that the individual with 
significant power is the person with authority to instruct and to direct the other individual who 
had less or no workplace authority.  Salin (2015) indicates that the victims of bullying in the 
workplace are more prone to be less committed and to experience lowered productivity levels 
and outcomes.  Paludi (2015) identifies that supervisors and managers are three times more 
likely to instigate workplace bullying of individual workers than their coworkers.  It implies that 
coworkers are the catalysts for workplace bullying episodes in one out of every four situations 
where this occurred (Paludi, 2015).  The effect of bullying on individuals who witness incidents 
against other workers is also a significant problem (Hansen, Hogh, Garde, & Persson, 2014).  
O’Donnell and MacIntosh (2016) examined workplace bullying, how organizational culture 
promote it and the resultant behavioral challenges among the workforce and actual work 
outcomes. 
Safety bullies.  Geller (2014) describe safety bullies as individuals who only search for 
employee behavior issues and unsafe acts in accident investigations.  Geller further indicates that 
safety bullying inhibits worker engagement and negates the best opportunities for injury 
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prevention.  Geller (2014) notes that placing blame on worker behavior which contribute towards 
and result in injuries, deaths, and equipment damage remove focus on supervisors and 
management: In fact, workers behave in ways that reflect the work culture of the organization, 
the system as well as societal, individual, environmental, and engineering or technological 
factors.  Manuele (2014) added that if individuals and teams performing accident investigations 
and safety practitioners within the organizations are not up-to-date on the current philosophy 
regarding the systemic approach to investigations, these individuals are unfit to perform such.  
Manuele suggests that these individuals are not allowing for the best opportunities to prevent 
similar future accidents.  Manuele further indicates that errors committed at the management 
level present particularly tricky challenges for safety professionals within the organization.  
Manuele (2014) describes different instances when accidents are likely to occur.  These include 
situations where work activities are non-routine or unusual and if the operation is not job-related.  
Workplace accidents are frequent when significant modifications are necessary or if critical units 
or systems are being shut down or re-started after work activities.  Manuele also suggests that 
when doing work in hazardous conditions or when energy sources are present, accidents can 
occur.   One critical type of accident situation involve work arrangements where a routine change 
occur.  This change, considered as an upset or a work arrangement, move from a regular and 
normal state to an abnormal state that workers are unaccustomed.  The process of change present 
a significant challenge to workers experiencing the situation (Manuele, 2014). 
Insomnia.  Insomnia is a public health problem described as a condition whereby the 
individual  has difficulty in falling asleep or staying asleep for a long enough time.  It is 
widespread and considered as a causal factor for worker injuries (National Institutes of Health, 
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2014).  Symptoms ranged from or included a struggle to fall asleep, frequent waking up during 
the night, waking earlier than expected and not falling asleep again, and waking up without 
feeling refreshed (National Sleep Foundation, 2014).  Individuals afflicted with sleep problems 
are almost two times more likely to be injured at work than for employees who are not affected; 
this is an increasingly significant workplace safety and worker injury risk factor (Uehli et al., 
2014).  Kao, Spitzmueller, Cigularov, and Wu (2016) accept that insomnia is common among 
workers and that it can be a causal factor in workplace injuries. Cigularov and Wu attempted to 
explain how and why that was happening.  
Other contributing factors.  Mathieu et al. (2014) found that job satisfaction convolute 
on other real but almost invisible factors.  These are the number of hours worked, work-family 
conflicts, psychological distress, and interpersonal influence from leadership to colleagues.  
Mathieu et al. (2014) agree that organizational induced psychological distress can be toxic, 
disruptive, abusive, tyrannical, but at the same time did not find that this resulted in lower levels 
of organizational commitment and job satisfaction.  
Work-family conflict was a more significant influence on job satisfaction while leader-
worker and worker-colleagues relationship influence individual attitudes and behavior at work 
and organizational commitment.  Long work hours lead to work-family conflicts.  Organizational 
culture impact leader-individual and individual-colleagues interpersonal influence and 
relationships. 
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Figure 8: Factors that influence the level of job satisfaction and organizational commitment. 
Adapted from Mathieu et al. (2014) 
 
Major accidents and lessons to learn.  Accidents like the Piper Alpha, Bhopal, Dryden, 
and Tenerife disasters are chosen in this review not to exaggerate the message but because of the 
real opportunities that exist to learn from them and for these lessons to be applied for the 
prevention of other and future accidents, worker deaths, and injuries (Kletz, 2007; Labib, 2015; 
Mac Sheoin, 2015; NASA, 2013). 
Dryden.  On March 10, 1989, 24 persons died when a commercial airliner crashed on 
takeoff at Dryden Airport in Canada.  The victims were 21 passengers and three flight staff 
including the pilot, co-pilot, and a flight attendant.  The crash investigation involved a 
comprehensive review of the Canadian aviation system and how that impacted and contributed to 
the actual accident and the events on that day.  Transcripts from interviews from 166 witnesses 
totaled more than 34 000 pages.  Other documentary exhibits and evidence reviewed in this 
investigation amounted to more than 177 000 pages (Moshansky, 1992).  
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Piper alpha.  Nearly one year before, July 06, 1988, on an oil rig in the North Sea, 167 
workers were killed when an explosion and chain reaction occurred on the night shift and which 
also destroyed the oil rig.  That was the deadliest oil industry off-shore disaster.  The findings 
from this accident investigation have been widely reviewed and found applicable even beyond 
the oil industry (NASA, 2013). 
Dechy et al. (2012) suggest that there are repeated accidents and that lessons from none 
of these accidents are being learned and applied to other instances to prevent other accidents.  
Singh et al. (2010) examined the piper alpha accident from a new paradigm; a safe design 
concept and second-tier interest into corrosion and other technical problems that were not 
adequately addressed and remain valid.  
Piper alpha, challenger & cherynobyl.  Singh et al. (2010) compared the Piper Alpha 
accident with other major engineering disasters including the Challenger, Chernobyl, and Three 
Mile Island.  Dechy et al. (2012) conducted a similar assessment of previous accidents involving 
the NASA space shuttles, Columbia and Challenger, and believed that possible lessons could 
come from these accidents.  According to Singh et al. the Lord Cullen findings from the Piper 
Alpha resonate in the other widely known accident events; this is in spite of the difficulty that 
encompass the specific knowledge, safety management arrangements, and industry-specific 
terminology and practices that influence particular safety-related attitudes and behavior.  That 
did not lessen the impact of industry or organization specific factors which impact workplace 
accidents.  It more alludes to lessons learned from workplace accidents being used to make other 
workplaces safe and for the prevention of future similar events.  Singh et al. (2010) points to the 
damning reasons for the piper alpha, from the Lord Cullen Report, which are fundamental and 
83 
 
can factor in other organizations, industries and countries where major and epic accidents occur.  
These include plant design, a factor that is also identified by Dechy et al. (2012) and Wahlström 
and Rollenhagen (2014).  Breakdown of work systems, also identified by Moshansky (1992), 
less than adequate management control (described in similar frames by Dechy et al. (2012), 
Wahlström and Rollenhagen (2014) and Moshansky (1992) are also listed.  Poor or less than 
adequate communications, emergency management, regulatory control, legislative relevance, 
management fail-safe systems, training (content and arrangements), and attitudes and behavior 
are shared findings from these accidents.  Swuste, Groeneweg, Van Gulijk, Zwaard, and 
Lemkowitz (2017) stress that human errors are still the dominant focus for investigators of 
workplace accidents and that this prevent the more in-depth assessment and identification of 
other dynamic and socio-technical factors that are more relevant and impacting.  Swuste et al. 
suggests that suboptimal system(s) are more likely to result in workplace accidents than any 
induvial at fault.  To improve knowledge about workplace accidents, promote management 
initiatives, and lessen the likelihood of future problems, a database of relevant information on 
near-misses, incidents, accidents, disasters can be developed and made available for use by 
organizations.  Regardless of the industrial sector or geographical location where operations exist 
(Dechy et al., 2012). 
Deepwater horizon and common accident problems.  In a separate but similar paper 
on the Deepwater asset integrity, Singh et al. (2010) focused on the likelihood of no single cause 
of the accident and that it was more a confluence of several critical factors that evolving into a 
perfect storm (p. 84); and made, comparisons with the Swiss Cheese accident causation model, 
first proffered by Reason (1997).  Wahlström and Rollenhagen (2014) investigated different 
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management systems and models for safety management recognizing that risks exist from old as 
well as new and contemporary technical systems.  Wahlström and Rollenhagen recounted 
lessons from previous large industrial accidents including nuclear power stations, chemical 
facilities, and offshore oil facilities and summarized investigative focus on technological issues, 
human factors, and safety culture.  It is a clear indication in favor of a holistic review of 
accidents rather than a focus on the events that surround any one specific accident event.  
Moshansky (1992) scrutinized the relationship that Transport Canada, Air Ontario and its partner 
organizations, as well as the aircraft handling and management at the Dryden Airport to identify 
failings and safety-related problems in Air Ontario, the aviation industry and the industry 
regulator Transport Canada.   These, according to Moshansky, were the profound and latent 
shortcomings that impacted the events of March 10, 1989.  
Bhopal, fukushima & deepwater.  Labib (2015) describes how accidents like Bhopal in 
December 1984 share similar contributing factors to the Fukushima, and Deepwater Horizon 
industrial accidents; all labeled as human-induced and which did not have to happen.  Labib 
further propose a hybrid reliability technique and fault analysis for the evaluation of the causal 
factors of these events and to inform on how to prevent similar disasters.  Labib (2015) 
compared the Bhopal and Fukushima disasters, even though one was a chemical disaster not a 
naturally occurring event;  the March 11, 2011, 9.0 earthquake off Japan that led to the 
Fukushima nuclear power disaster.  Labib found similar areas where factors contributed to these 
disasters.  These similarities represent areas where learning opportunities exist.  Labib (2015) 
suggested the un-learning opportunities also exist; a pointed reference to what should change. 
Labib attributed un-learning opportunities to the steadfast lock on organizations struggling to 
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derive maximum profit margins and to sub-optimal and compromised arrangements for safety. 
That lock is highlighted by leaders of these organizations initially not admitting to the extent of 
the disaster and a delayed response that could have exacerbated the problem and caused further 
loss of lives in communities and damage to the environment that surrounded these industrial 
plants.  Labib’s view is that pre-empting industrial disasters is a socio-technical problem that 
require the involvement of policymakers, social and natural. 
Bhopal 1984 is a multiplicity of the simultaneous breakdown of safety barriers and 
compounded on the associated dangers not being fully known or appreciated by the victims of 
the disaster.  This situation was a convolution of regulatory, organizational, operational, and 
management issues that were compounded by individual errors on December 02, 1984 (Labib, 
2015; Mac Sheoin, 2015). 
Electric power industry disaster.  The effects of failure in the electric power industry 
are similar to that in aviation.  In 2003, for example, an electricity blackout in the northeast 
United States and Canada resulted from the failure of critical components in the Cleveland-
Akron area in the United States.  The consequences of an un-cleared tree from a power line 
resulted in a cascading series of events that left approximately 50 million customers without 
power for, in some cases, up to two days (Abraham et al., 2004).  In aviation, hundreds of deaths 
can occur in a single aircraft accident.  In both the aviation and the electric power industries, 
there are complex systems and high demand for customer satisfaction.  These compound and 
evolve in ways that are difficult to predict, mainly when there can be other situational factors that 
co-mingle with other existing challenges and which developed into unmanageable situations.  
Technical and human errors in these low probability but high consequence situations can 
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compound and grow into problems that are not simple to address or easy to predict (Atak & 
Kingma, 2011; Abraham et al., 2004; Moshansky, 1992).  Organizational success and corporate 
image are critical for survival, as such; there are almost constant tension and demand for system 
reliability, availability, and production levels to satisfy customer demands. 
Additionally, the public need safe organizations where high-quality products matched an 
equally high level of safe operations are the paradoxical reality (Labib, 2015; Murata, 2017).  
Objectively, it is challenging to exercise safety margins without impacting on an organizations 
production targets and customer demands.  The converse is also valid.  It is equally challenging 
to sacrifice safety and simultaneously to maintain customer satisfaction; Moshansky (1992) 
describes this dilemma during the Dryden investigation.  The result is entirely dependent on the 
organizational values, human resource strengths, its safety arrangements, the technologies 
adopted by these entities, and the prevailing business climate (Atak & Kingma, 2011).   
Further, the sequence of events and connectivity between the point where significant 
problems initiated and the time when the accident event occurred can prove extremely 
challenging to identify and to manage in a fail-safe and high-reliability work setting.  That is 
primarily pertinent since a single human, or mechanical failure will usually not result in a 
catastrophic event, except for the very last occurrence (Abraham et al., 2004; Labib, 2015; 
Manuele, 2014).  The Challenger disaster (Price & Williams, 2018; Vaughan, 1997), the 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster (Reason, 2000), and the Piper Alpha disaster (Labib, 2015; Mac 
Sheoin, 2015) all mirror the chain of events where the real influence for the accident began 
elsewhere and before the actual event.  These all support the focussed change from individual-
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level factors to organization-level factors as the core reasons for accidents (Labib, 2015; 
Manuele, 2014; Moshansky, 1992; Murata; 2017; Price & Williams, 2018; Vaughn, 1997). 
Electric power accident.  Felmine (2012) describe an accident involving the 
electrocution of a lineman which occurred while the individual was conducting hotline work on 
an energized 12000 volts power line.  That is a specialist type of lines work which require that 
the lineman is specially trained to work on energized power lines.  Work on energized power 
lines required specific work arrangements and special permits for work to be done.  It is not the 
same as work conducted on lines which were de-energized, isolated, and grounded before 
workers could perform work.  In this accident, the investigating team found that the victim was 
an appropriately trained worker.  All other individuals on the job site when the accident occurred 
were also appropriately trained.  The technique adopted for the work on that day was one of the 
approved methods for the job.  The victim was, from workplace records of training and 
experience, deemed as competent.  Acceptable and appropriate permit to work and conditions 
were correctly applied.  The worker, despite all of the pre-arrangements, received electrical 
shocks and died.  The investigators were unable to determine a direct cause of the accident 
except that better onsite supervision might have averted the workplace accident.  The underlying 
reason for this accident was that hotline work rules were being reviewed and was not completed 
even after lengthy deliberation by another working team tasked with the review and development 
of the rules.  The Tucker et al., (2016) description of leaders influencing workers safety 
performance through a layered arrangement whereby safety support through managers and 
supervisors is apt.  Work rules development is an organizational responsibility.  Managers set the 
climate where the setting of rules happened and work procedures set.  The absence of appropriate 
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work rules is a negative reflection on management commitment to safety (Conchie et al., 2013; 
Probst, 2015).  Onsite supervision is the last barrier that can be installed between workers and 
accidents or near misses; there is no other defense if onsite supervision control is less than 
adequate (Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al., 1999; Labib, 2015; Murata, 2018; Price & Williams, 
2018). 
Gaps in Current Literature 
Training 
Training cover a multi-level dynamic and workplace need which span from personal and 
professional development, workplace safety, technical skills, and technology, to emerging policy 
issues (Cascio, 2017).  Cascio focuses on micro and macro details and policy issues and how that 
impact effective-learning for superior work outcomes.  A better understanding of and quality of 
training sessions, the use of digital tools and lessons, the optimizing of knowledge for skills 
development, and a continuous reflection of training content are significant training advantages.  
Cascio (2017) also focused on ways to maintain trainee skills after individuals are certified as 
trained. 
Business today require organizations to support new technologies and arrangements that were 
not possible before.  In the electric power industry, technology-induced a similar change and 
caused new demands for worker skills that were previously not required.  Devices with 
communication capabilities are now standard in the 2000s just as poles, transformers, and 
overhead power lines were since the beginning of the 1900s.  Electric power industry workers 
must now possess training and proven skilled at the traditional requirements as well as to safely 
and efficiently operate in a new environment where automatic and remote-operated devices are 
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common-place, and electrical sources are more distributed than ever.  Remote and automated 
operability of the power grid is crucially necessary because of the newer and more sophisticated 
devices that make customer demands stricter than in previous times (Cascio, 2017).  Customers 
interact with electrical company operators via mobile devices and systems.  They even 
proactively request service on electric grid components and systems that employees can be 
actively engaged in work activities.  That can either mean that the worker skills must be such that 
work is possible on energized systems for the duration of the exercise and where customers do 
not experience power outages.   
On the other hand, remote operated devices can allow for the minimization of the number 
of customers who may be affected if work is on systems that were de-energized and isolated 
from the remainder of the power grid.  In each case, the worker skills, training, knowledge, and 
experience are critical and combined with the number and mix of employees to ensure that the 
work activity is safely negotiated (Manuele, 2014).  The technical skills necessary for work on 
de-energized electrical power systems is paramount and to a significant extent, a precursor on the 
skills essential for work on live systems (Fordyce et al., 2007; Volberg et al., 2017).  Training is 
a significant element available to organizations in the current work environment for the best-
suited employees to remain fully cognizant and capable of the existing demands (Friedman, 
2016).  Qi and Tapio (2018) further indicate that keeping skilled workers, especially in areas 
where significant shortages exist, is vital in preventing situations where the shortfall could result 
in unsafe working conditions and contribute to worker injuries and deaths and for organizations 
to remain competitive.  That challenge extends to promotion policies, review of employee 
performance, and worker recognition arrangements.  Abadzi (2016) blends technical skills 
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training with personal development, responsible behavior, critical thinking, with worker ability 
to take initiatives, to be flexible and to support collaborative efforts. Abadzi deems these as 
necessary for workers to cope with workplace stress and customer demands. 
Industry to industry – learning from experiences.  NASA (2013) considered how 
relevant the Piper Alpha Accident was to NASA as an organization.  Organizational secrecy was 
evident after the NASA Apollo 1 fire.  It is a structural shortcoming of the organization that 
prevented the transfer of critical information for decision making.  The non-transferral of crucial 
details lead to safety problems that are not adequately understood and addressed.  Production 
activities overshadow safety concerns and directly impact deliberations which occurred ahead of 
the 1986 Challenger disaster.  NASA leadership preferred to focus on reliability engineering over 
safety concerns; paralleled in the Piper Alpha disaster (NASA, 2013).  Both the Piper Alpha and 
NASA were organizations where a risk-informed approach and methodology guided safety 
response.  The emphasis rested on thinking that systems were safe and that hazards that could 
compromise reliability would improve safety, once abated: A belief was that reliable operations 
would guarantee and maintain operating safety (NASA, 2013).  It is a significant miscalculation 
that support production in favor of safety margins.  That will  require a more conservative 
approach to projects and operations as the premise is unproven.  The Piper Alpha disaster remain 
the beacon example of production overriding safety arrangements with the worst possible 
consequence (NASA, 2013).  The 1984 Bhopal experience concerning production is similar but 
was different in design.  The Bhopal design is a lingering question that is still unanswered as 
other plants installed in the United States at that time were considered as superior designed (Mac 
Sheoin, 2015). 
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Labib (2015) indicates that there are similarities between Bhopal and Fukushima Daiichi, 
in 2011, just as NASA (2013) found between Piper Alpha and NASA.  The Fukushima Daiichi, 
in Japan, and the Bhopal, in India, were organizations where reliability outdid safety (Labib, 
2015).  That is a standard feature of organizations in the oil and gas industry, just as those in 
power, nuclear, aviation, and other industrial sectors where workers are accustomed to hazardous 
working and ecological environments (Labib, 2015).  Labib went further to suggest that, after 
Bhopal, and despite new legislation in different countries worldwide, old habits were seemingly 
impossible to break.  Labib described a form of organizational loss of memory; this had 
significant possibilities for repeat disasters unless an un-learning occur. Labib also highlighted 
the insufficient and under-par handling of safety warnings, listed as accident warnings.  Labib 
stressed that training, improved communication and appropriate handling of issues surrounding 
hazards are crucial to keeping organizations safe. 
Society, legal hurdles, and geography.  Mac Sheoin (2015) laments the lack of action 
on the part of the Indian regulators and the organization responsible for operating the Bhopal 
chemical plant to treat with the surviving victims and the families of persons who died in this 
catastrophe.  Mac Sheoin, further suggests that this response exposed the significant 
shortcomings of the safety management systems employed at the Bhopal chemical plant.  The 
corporate and regulatory deficiencies only amplified their failure regarding appropriate 
compensation for the survivors and to bring relevant regulatory restrictions on the responsible 
parties effectively.  Singh et al. (2010) indicates that the Piper Alpha accident amounted to 
$3.4B(US), with no criminal charges initiated against anyone and legal proceedings taken against 
the company.  That Piper Alpha  experience is in stark contrast to the Bhopal case as more than 
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20 years elapsed before the courts in India delivered a definitive judgment.  By that time twelve 
persons from the company were committed to serving time in prison.  The majority of the 
persons found guilty were either not alive or outside of India at the time of the judgment.  In 
2007, Moshansky suggested that judicial, administrative roles in Canada for safety in aviation 
were to guide on unresolved issues such as oversight, confidential and secrecy issues, and 
accident causality Lecture (2007).  Moshansky reviewed the aviation system as it was before the 
accident, the unique challenges, and the direct actions that impacted on March 10, 1989.  He 
found that the Canadian legislative and regulatory arrangements were deficient and needed 
revamping (Moshansky, 1992; Lecture, 2007).  In the Bhopal case, Mac Sheoin (2015) found 
that there is a deliberate reluctance by legislators and regulators to initiate acceptable and 
responsible actions.  Moshansky recommended a permanent judicial role in accident 
investigations  (Lecture, 2007).  Moshansky also recommended a judicial-role in safety 
management in aviation. 
Legislation, enforcement, triangle, and cocoanut.  Robinson and Robinson (2016) 
describes how the emergency exit at a shirt-making company in New York in 1911, locked from 
the outside, to prevent workers from stealing cloth and other textile material resulted in one of 
the worst fires in history: A locked exit that prevent workers from escaping.  As a result, 146 
workers died.  Robinson and Robinson (2016) recounted the 1942 Cocoanut Grove fire where 
492 military and civilian personnel died because of locked emergency exits.  Robinson and 
Robinson (2016) notes that building safety is problematic and very difficult to fix.  There are 
different U. S, building codes models, for organizations and other workplaces.  These are 
industry-specific and not uniform across regions, industries, or on design criteria for fire 
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prevention and safety.  Lee and Dalal (2016) considers the possibility of hiring individuals with a 
preference and biased disposition for safety consciousness and believe that this might encourage 
safety behavior and enhance organizational safety climate.  Lee and Dalal (2016) further indicate 
that corporate control, practices, and regulatory arrangements are greater influences than 
individual safety consciousness and behavior.  Therefore, safety outcomes are a function of 
organizational work arrangements more than employee influence.  
Lee and Dalal (2016) did not rule out the impact of employees on safety outcomes 
altogether.  They examined individual behavior and explored how these affect safety outcomes in 
cases where these individuals work and apply a measure of control.  An individual’s safety 
behavior, actions, and approach to workplace safety supports compliance with safety procedures 
set by managers and organizational leaders.  Lee and Dalal (2016) further separate this behavior 
into task-related and context and explain how they impact on the maintenance of workplace 
safety requirements set by the organization.  Contextual safety is a safety helping attitude where 
the individual advise others on safety requirements and help by accepting safety responsibilities.  
Safety behavior, however, is built upon the individual’s trait of conscientiousness towards safety 
performance and the safety climate in the organization.  Lee and Dalal (2016) examined how 
these two influences interact and describe the result of that interaction.  Conscientiousness was a 
safety goal and behavior (Lee & Dalal, 2016).  This safety behavior was described further as 
inclusive for the individual following rules and safety requirements. It encourages thinking 
before acting and differing gratification before safely completing an exercise.  
Conscientiousness, emotional stability, openness to experience, agreeableness, and extraversion 
are the big-five personality traits that support safety in the workplace.   
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Lee and Dalal (2016) examined previous research and believe that conscientiousness is 
the most potent when compared to the other traits; it is socially acceptable and allow the 
individual to remain focused on safety goals: conscientious employees are generally more careful 
about how they perform work and exercise self-control when compared to individuals who are 
not as meticulous.  A positive indicator of organizational safety climate is vital since a strong 
climate perspective is a consensus which indicates that the organization is safe and that workers 
may remain unharmed.  Lee and Dalal (2016) questioned about situations where a good safety 
climate exist, but individuals experience bias difference; They describe that  as variation in the 
psychological environment.  This mental variation premise on the thinking that individuals who 
experience a similar stimulus should react or generally respond in the same manner.  This 
variation obviously depend on the stimulus.  If there are a fire in a place where individuals are, 
then evacuation would likely be their general response.  It will be strange for someone, in that 
setting, to remain in the location until instructed to evacuate, for example.  Lee and Dalal (2016) 
describe the act of staying in danger as a psychological variation and further indicate that when 
groups of individuals worked together for lengthy periods, psychological variation tended to 
diminish.  Group dynamics involve not only similar influences but typical behavior.  It meant 
that not all everyday actions of a group are due to internal group dynamics and controls but due 
to natural and social behavior where the responses result from automatic triggers induced by the 
situation or condition (Lee & Dalal, 2016).  
Near-misses and opportunities.  Capelli-Schellpfeffer, Floyd, Eastwood, and Liggett 
(1999) indicated that the benefits of a trustworthy and very comprehensive database on electrical 
safety errors, near misses, and accidents is crucial to the effectiveness of organizational decisions 
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on the choice of equipment, system design, workplace training, and improved work procedures 
and practices.  Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al. recognized that investigation into near-misses are 
opportunities to understand why problems occur.  These opportunities are the prelude to 
preventing accidents where workers become injured.  Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al. believed that 
the findings from investigations into and analysis of accidents and near misses show that 
workplace accidents and near misses impact on business operation, individual behavior, and 
regulatory arrangements and oversight.  The quality of findings from workplace accidents 
investigations is dependent on the available data and the analysis conducted by the investigators 
(Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al., 1999).  Safety problems and accidents can occur if the introduction 
of electrical hazards occur in the engineering design, procurement, installation or operating and 
not recognized for the employment of appropriate protective measures to mitigate the dangers 
(Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al., 1999).  
Beliefs and attitudes.  Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al. posited that incorrect worker beliefs 
and poor attitudes emanate from poorly conducted accident investigations which compound 
situations where hazards are unnoticed and unidentified; and can contribute to future accidents.  
The information derived from an accident investigation and the analysis  can encourage the 
continuance of worker held beliefs and the support of bad attitudes.  The reverse is also valid as a 
well-done investigation can be used to improve worker attitudes and for correctly referencing 
understanding and beliefs among workers.  Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al. further suggest that 
workers’ decisions can be deemed as unsafe when these may be influenced by perceptions and 
opinions which are linked to poorly done investigations of previous workplace accidents; directly 
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due to the poor-quality data sourced in the inquiry. That logic extends to the possible advantages 
derived from a repository of information from previous accidents and investigations.  
Optimal learning.  Optimal Learning, from accident experiences, impact profoundly on 
the likelihood of event recurrence and injury to workers.  Knowledge come from improved 
standards and regulations resulting from identified shortcomings, renewed training for 
individuals involved and others who conduct similar job functions, as well as for all other 
organizational personnel responsible for the design and procurement of related systems and 
equipment.  The most important learning would probably be with workers as an opportunity to 
reflect on what went wrong and what could have contributed to that event; individual behavior, 
attitudes, overwork, and any other human factor that could have contributed to the accident.  
Near misses, according to early accident causation models that support Heinrich’s theory, are at 
least 10-fold more common than accidents where the victims are injured.  Capelli-Schellpfeffer 
et al. (1999) believe that the frequency of near misses over actual events where individuals are 
injured and that near misses are due to the same weaknesses that contribute to accidents, except 
that there are no wounded human victims.  The opportunities to learn from near misses is 
premium in preventing worker injuries and fatalities.  
Safety Culture and Workplace Accidents 
Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al. (1999) describe the undesirable chain of events that lead to 
near misses and accidents as people factors that are explained by behavior and human-equipment 
interface challenges; which are evident at the level of organizational culture, structure, work 
design, safety management, system operations, training and maintenance functions (p.2).  Figure 
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9 is a replica of how Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al. explained how organizational culture contributed 
to accidents and near misses.  
That thinking extends to the possibility of improving organizational culture as a latent 
contributor to the prevention of near misses and accidents.  Probst (2015) believes that safe work 
arrangements and accident prevention are linked to actions by organizational managers and 
supervisors to encourage the reporting of accidents and near misses.  Tucker et al. (2016) posited 
that organizational leaders set the safety agenda from top management level and can influence, 
through managers and supervisors, the frontline workers to adopt a safe approach to conducting 
work. 
 
Figure 9:  How we can better learn from electrical accidents. Adapted from M. Capelli-
Schellpfeffer, H. L. Floyd, K. Eastwood, & D. P. Liggett (1999).  Reprinted with permission. 
 
In 2006, there was an explosion and fire at an electric power station in which two 
employees died (Mohammed, 2006).  This accident occurred when the workers were conducting 
maintenance work.  The investigation into this accident was done by a team which comprised 
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experts, a representative from the workplace safety regulator, worker union representatives, as 
well as management from two companies; the company that the victims worked for, and the 
electric utility company that managed the electrical power system.  This investigation occurred 
over one month, and the team interviewed more than 18 witnesses including the lone survivor of 
the explosion.  Five of the individuals were re-interviewed as the investigation ensued.  The 
approach adopted in this investigation included:  
An inspection of the physical evidence retrieved from the accident site;  
A review of the electrical switchgear and its operating design parameters, using 
schematic diagrams and manufacturer’s information; 
 
A review of the relevant high voltage electric system configuration; 
A review of all relevant documents; 
Conducting interviews with all appropriate personnel; 
A review of the autopsy report of each of the deceased employees; 
Analysis of the electrical system protection scheme and all associated equipment; 
The co-opting expertise or resources that the investigating team deemed necessary; 
A gathering of photographs of all work permits, relevant to the job and other associated 
plant and for instances where similar work activities were involved, for review, 
comparison, and analysis;   
 
An examination of the original equipment manufacturer’s manual for the failed apparatus 
for specific information on the operating conditions necessary for activities of the type 
conducted when the explosion occurred;   
 
A review of employee training records and certification for confirmation that the 
individuals satisfied regulatory and company requirements for the work activity;  
 
A review of the company’s maintenance management system requirement for this work 
activity.  Performing a similar review and examination of other maintenance work orders 
for similar past maintenance on this equipment and other similar units;   
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A review and analysis of audio recordings of all communication between the electric 
utility company and the power company where the accident occurred for specific details 
of the process adopted in making the equipment safe for work were analyzed;  
 
Reviewing all test results sanctioned by the investigating team after the explosion.  
 
Among the interviewees were the power plant manager, senior managers and supervisors 
at the power plant, the work planner, the individual who made the equipment safe for work, and 
the individual who received the permit to work.  Also interviewed were the electric utility 
representatives who managed the equipment safe isolation process.  Of particular importance 
was the permit to work, the procedures for issuing the permit to work, the communication at 
different stages and times when planning the work and when it was being made ready for 
workers on the day.  A comprehensive review of the previous history of work arrangements and 
how these impacted, particularly those that required the electric utility involvement, the 
individuals who planned the activity and those who worked on the day of the accident.  Capelli-
Schellpfeffer et al. (1999) describe how full understanding of the circumstances and contributing 
factors can result in accidents long before the final error event.  
The main conclusions from this investigation are that there were immediate and 
underlying causal factors that contributed to the explosion which resulted in two deaths.  The 
direct factors involved the inserting of a metallic component inside an oil-filled compartment 
with energized conductors, and; where the permit to work issued for this job did not cover the 
work done.  The underlying causal factors were inter-departmental communication especially on 
daily job assignments and supervision, work planning, scheduling, flow, permit to work 
management, job safety briefings, and auditing of work processes and systems.  These causal 
factors are the underlying issues that went unnoticed and unaddressed and eventually became 
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deviance that skewed the standard work requirements to a new norm (Price & Williams, 2018; 
Vaughn 1997).  Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al. (1999) allude to this as a behavioral pattern resulting 
from the culture of the organization. 
Difficulties experienced with permit to work systems.  One way of making work safe 
is the employment of a permit to work system.  It represents a systemic approach; adopting 
organization approved procedures, to make equipment or apparatus safe for workers to perform 
their repair activities and scheduled overhauls.  It involves isolating the device or work-
equipment from hazardous energy sources, described the safety measures and precautions 
adopted for the exercise, and the responsible person who ensured that the energy sources were 
locked off and tagged.  The process of issuing the permit was usually clearly itemized and 
documented in organization-approved procedures; so too the permit cancellation process.  Many 
times, permit to work issues arise when investigating accidents; the 1988 Piper Alpha explosion 
is an excellent example of what happened in breached permit-to-work systems and procedures 
(Dekker, 2006; NASA, 2013).  To get a proper understanding of why workplace accidents 
happened, investigators approach these challenges primarily in two ways.  The first way, which 
is born from the conventional safety management Heinrich-like thinking, was that the causes 
would reside in the last moments and how those activities and the individuals contributed to the 
event.  These constitute the direct causes of the accident as the actual breach that resulted in the 
failure event.  The Swiss Cheese model indicated that the immediate causes of accidents were 
just as significant a problem as the more profound underlying causal factors which reside at 
levels where supervisors, managers, and the management would control (Kletz, 2007; Labib 
2015; Reason, 1997).  
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Kletz (2007) focused on the prevention of and the causes of accidents, not human interest 
or superficial cleaning-up afterward.  The repeat of accidents occurred because of and due to 
insufficient knowledge; not because there was no desire to prevent injuries or death.  Human 
error could be due to a momentary episode of forgetfulness or overconfidence.  If that weren't so 
then, it would likely not be an error, but a deliberate act and injury would not have occurred as a 
result of an accident but from a deliberate act of unsafe behavior.  The problem was, many times, 
the victim, injured or killed, were usually the party found to have committed the error especially 
when only direct causes of accidents factored.  Victims of workplace accidents typically raised 
issues of design and operating methods which were answers to questions about what should be 
done differently rather than pinpointing who did what or what caused the problem Kletz (2007). 
Deviance and normalization challenge.  Vaughan (1997) believe that technological 
failure is not the underlying reason why the NASA space shuttle Challenger exploded on takeoff 
on January 28, 1986.  The brittle O-rings, pinpointed as the component that failed, led to the 
explosion of the spacecraft.  Vaughan felt that NASA, the organization through the leaders of the 
1986 launch, knew about the likelihood of failure and decided it was not sufficient to stall or to 
prevent for the expedition and many other previous expeditions.  Vaughan (1997) indicates that 
the earliest record of possible danger regarding the O-rings was dated back to 1977 and that its 
use on space missions commenced in 1981.  Vaughan (1997) coined a now familiar and common 
term Normalization of Deviance about the production of the O-rings and also in the performance 
after that (p. 78).  These are referenced to work groups that normalize the statistical deviation in 
accepting components, technical difference while forging a culture creation process through 
group interaction.  At the same time, Vaughan (1997) notes that once formed, this new culture of 
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deviance is challenging to stop and it affects later group decisions and processes.  Price and 
Williams (2018) support Vaughan’s view that the repeated decision by NASA officials to 
sanction shuttle flights was the potential latent cause that resulted in the Challenger disaster; 
because of the overwhelming evidence that the O-rings were brittle and unsuitable.  Price and 
Williams (2018) also support Vaughan’s idea of normalization of deviance and suggested that 
this involve feelings among persons in organizations where the impression of wrong is not as 
clear.  Price and Williams felt that this is an insensitivity that develops over time, even in years, 
and with repeated situations where the worst consequence is unrealized.  Price and Williams 
(2018) also felt that the critical factor that align with major accidents and disaster event can 
anchor in activities that are mutually exclusive and time-spaced in years.  As an example, an 
equipment design could result in accident years afterward and under circumstances and 
conditions not anticipated when the model is accepted.  Working conditions in which warning 
and alarm systems become decommissioned, breached or removed from service and not 
envisaged when the plant, equipment, and work procedures are developed, tested, and accepted, 
contribute to dangerous conditions ripe for accidents to occur.  Price and Williams (2018) 
focussed on the health-care and medical profession and suggest that the Swiss Cheese model was 
ideal for showing the effects of failure leading to death and injury; especially when 
normalization of deviance occurs.  Clinical procedures, procedural breaches, and less than 
adequate arrangements for infection control are some of the factors highlighted by Price and 
Williams (2018). Singh et al. (2010) expressed a similar view to other industrial operations.  
Procedures and actual practice.  Dekker (2003) suggested that it would be better for 
individuals in organizations to understand the gaps that exist between procedures and actual 
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practice.  None of the studies examined show that there were deliberate efforts by individuals or 
groups of individuals to act and cause a cascading, unmanageable situation, chaos, or accident 
events.  Price and Williams (2018) suggest that deviation that led to accidents occurred when 
safety margins and barriers to prevent shifting away from procedural requirements were removed 
or changed.  Price and Williams believe that managers justified barrier removal to allow for 
assessment of risk from a reliability perspective and not from a safety margin perspective. 
Murata (2017) conducted case studies on accidents and concluded that cognitive bias, 
mental predisposition,  and cultural difference are trigger factors in severe accidents and crashes.  
Murata attribute group bias and group-validation processes that promote social loafing as integral 
to a cultural gap that contribute to accidents.  Similar claims came from Vaughan (1997) and 
Price and Williams (2018) through normalization of deviance, and from Dekker (2003) through 
gaps between procedures and practice.  Dekker (2003) examined situations where safety 
procedures are accepted as the way to make the workplace safe. Dekker found that in 
organizations, individuals could fail to adapt processes and systems when that became necessary, 
or they implemented changed procedures when that was not necessary.  These are mistiming 
activities and emphasis that lead to an increase in compliance demands, workplace chaos, and 
judgment errors.  Murata (2017) went further to identify overconfidence as a bias which cause an 
illusion that work plans and arrangements were feasible when they were, in fact, risky and 
dangerous. Overconfidence is ubiquitous when factored in critical errors that caused accident 
events studied by Murata.  Murata found that framing and group confirmation bias, such as 
normalization of deviance, distorted decisions to give the impression of maintained safety when 
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production and system reliability were the influential motives.  Murata (2017) then posited that 
by preventing cognitive prejudice in favor of compliance, accidents might not happen.  
Engineering design and confidence.  The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station 
meltdown that occurred after a 2011 tsunami due to a 9.0 earthquake is attributed by Murata 
(2017) as an insufficient design convoluted by cultural difference.  One problem is that the main 
power supply to the cooling pumps and a designed alternative supply were from the same source.  
This design flaw is critical.  The power source became submerged when the tsunami occurred.  
Robust and redundant arrangements are necessary.  Murata (2017) suggests that overconfidence, 
optimism, and normalcy bias all influenced a confirmation bias that the system was safe.  That is 
despite a widespread belief that safety is a top priority in Japan.  Envisaging that a tsunami 
would have breached the safety barriers in place at the Fukushima Daiichi power station never 
occurred. Dekker (2006) stressed that for the prevention of workplace accidents, it is imperative 
to consider and factor lessons from other accidents.  Murata (2017) reviewed the cultural 
difference bias by comparing nuclear power station operations in Japan and the United States and 
found that there are cultural factors that contributed to the disaster.  A Japanese belief that 
nuclear power plant safety was guaranteed is itself one of the critical cultural difference bias:  
Skepticism in the United States caused by the Three Mile Island experience where a radioactive 
leak, due to a loss of coolant, occurred in 1979.  Lessons from this incident, according to Murata 
(2017), are seemingly ineffective for Fukushima Daiichi. 
Murata (2017) suggested that safety values, safety strategies, safety climate, and safety 
activities (performance) should replace the orthodox, conventional safety culture.  This 
traditional thinking relied on underlying values and assumptions which are unquestioned, 
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organizational strategies that are leader driven, and supported individual attitudes, and behavior.  
Behavior was directly related to safety performance.  All of the other parameters, whether 
conventional or contemporary, supported this behavior or performance(Murata, 2017). Figure 10 
shows how mistaken behavior result from cultural difference, distorted judgment, and cognitive 
bias: It shows the standard, conventional arrangement where the apex result is behavior that 
support safe work.  For this to happen, organizational values, including safety, must be actively 
built upon by leaders so that a stable base for supporting safety behavior is assured.  This 
foundation must also help and promote safety climate and attitudes that can evolve into the 
expected behavior.  
 
Figure 10: Cultural Difference and Cognitive Biases as a Trigger of Critical Crashes or 
Disasters—Evidence from Case Studies of Human Factors Analysis. Adapted from A. Murata 
(2017). Reprinted with permission.  
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Positive outcomes and openness.  Favorable outcomes are possible only when social 
workplace relationships are treated in the same light as technical challenges and facilitated by 
non-rigid organizational structures aware of changing demands and situations.  Bobabeau and 
Meyer (2001) show how Southwest Airlines solved bottlenecks and inefficiencies in handling 
freight by examining how ants followed simple rules and found efficient ways of getting 
seemingly complex tasks done.  Southwest found that flexibility allowed for a different form of 
organizational robustness which led to organizational success (Bonabeau & Meyer, 2001).  This 
robustness is built on group performance even when individuals within the group may fail.  That 
happened because of the self-organization among individuals is not restricted by rigid-
organizational arrangements.  McCall and Pruchnicki (2017) describe these as shifting 
boundaries of accountability.  McCall and Pruchnicki (2017) acknowledge that managing safety 
in high-consequence organizations where the work-environments are continually changing and 
evolving is a very challenging task.  That required a form of organizational resilience supported 
by managers with the ability to address the safety challenging demands.  McCall and Pruchnicki 
(2017) believe that promoting openness in the free reporting of errors without reprisal and 
encourage learning from mistakes and a just organizational safety culture can result. McCall and 
Pruchnicki (2017) also believe that this would only happen if the organization support a 
sociotechnical safety management arrangement.  Collective perceptions, suggested by Griffin 
and Curcuruto (2016) is a similar sociotechnical safety management arrangement: Organizations, 
either directly or otherwise, influenced safety outcomes which included near misses, accidents, 
and worker injuries.  Griffin and Curcuruto found that shared personnel perceptions define the 
nature of organizational safety climate, and this was not dependant on or specific to any 
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particular organization or in a given country.  Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) also found that safety 
climate in an organization impact on the cognitive bias of individuals in the organization.  
Murata (2017) found that the reverse was also true: individual motivation and behavior change 
depend on the safety climate and eventually safety performance outcomes.  Griffin and 
Curcuruto (2016) further suggest that cognitive bias influence safety outcomes and productivity 
levels.  Murata (2017) show that cognitive bias is also a safety performance influence and 
indicated that this could be both positive or negative.  What is necessary is for organizational 
values and vision promoted by active leadership support.  Murata (2017) believe that this would 
encourage a favorable safety climate and appropriate work behavior and safety outcomes.  
Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) indicate that safety climate is not static: It is a dynamic 
phenomenon that is always changing. 
Difficult and strained relationships.  Jiang and Probst (2015) posited that safety–
production relationship conflicts are negative influences on high-productivity arrangements and 
that both these considerations reduce the likelihood of reported accidents.  An improved 
probability of accident reporting is possible if there is a reduction in safe working conflicts.  
Probst (2015) found that supervisor-employee(s) relationship bidirectionally influence safety 
compliance, accident reporting, and safety climate.  Probst (2015) investigated three different 
issues.  First, on how organizational safety climate influence employees to report workplace 
accidents.  The second focus was on how transactional supervision encourage reporting of 
workplace accidents and finally, how each of the two influencing factors interact and what that 
impact is on accident reporting.  An integral finding is that the influence of supervisor 
encouraged underreporting is weakened when the organization safety climate is strong and 
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positive.  Probst (2015) suggested that when organizations treated accident reporting as 
opportunities to correct safety-related problems, safety personnel had opportunities to assess 
problems better and to propose corrective actions that could mitigate the occurrence of future 
accidents.  Fordyce et al. (2007) suggest that accident underreporting is supported by 
management, especially with management bonus tagged to workplace accidents.  Probst (2015) 
linked accident underreporting to employee demographics such as tenure and age, and fear of 
losing the job or job-related perks.  Jiang and Probst (2015) tied this to individual perception of 
adverse safety outcomes and how that can heighten feelings of job insecurity.  Jiang and Probst 
(2015) indicated that accident data reveal that nearly four in every 10 workplace accidents where 
an injury occur, there are clear evidence of safety procedures not being properly conducted, or a 
total case of safety procedures and practices being left out.  Jiang and Probst (2015) explored 
safety-related consequences in situations where effective job insecurity factored into safety 
attitudes and behavior.  Jiang and Probst accepted that insecurity strongly linked to workers’ 
safety, and safety outcomes.  Injury underreporting as described by Jiang and Probst (2015) and 
Probst (2015) is diametric to the position espoused by Tucker et al. (2016) where top 
management and supervisory efforts could positively impact safety outcomes. 
Leadership and Supervision 
Epistemological and leadership from the top.  Dekker (2015) describes the benefits of 
investigating workplace accidents as epistemological by allowing for establishing details of the 
accident, preventative by identifying how to avoid recurrence, moral tracing of the breaches that 
occurred, for reinforcing work procedures, and existential to genuinely understand the suffering.  
Dekker (2015) postulates that finding out what transpired when a workplace accident happens, 
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allow for the best opportunities to learn from the event and to avoid recurrence.  Dekker (2015) 
also indicated that accident investigations could provide meaning-making opportunities for 
organizations to develop a strong safety consciousness.  Tucker et al. (2016) suggest that a strong 
safety culture supported by top management can permeate the entire organization up to the front-
line workers to promote worker safety and safe work outcomes.  Conchie, Moon, & Duncan 
(2013) indicated that workplace demands like the underreporting of accidents reduce worker 
engagement, supported emotional burnout, and increase negative safety behavior.  Conchie et al. 
(2013) suggested that the downside of work demands is that it is particularly tricky for safety 
management especially when supervisors time and energy are primarily into follow-up actions 
from unplanned issues and requirements. 
Indirect supervision and positive work.  Huang et al. (2013) developed a safety climate 
measurement guide for workers who operate from remote locations and use electric power 
industry employees as exemplars to justify their technique.  Perception of safety is a crucial 
indicator of the multi-level safety climate which differentiated organizational focus from group-
level safety priority.  From this study emerged the advent of shared understandings from the 
workers from remote locations (Huang et al., 2013).  Huang et al. conducted a survey and 
followed that with a 15-day observation of electric utility workers as these individuals performed 
their regular duties.  Among the electric utility participants were trainers, managers, supervisors, 
and workers. 
Safety climate is an instantaneous and discrete reflection of shared worker-perception of 
the importance and value at the organizational level, especially with regards to policies, work 
procedures, and accepted practices (Huang et al., 2013).  Safety climate, in this Huang et al. 
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study, is determined through self-reports by participants of safety behavior and injuries; these are 
then analyzed and linked to near misses, recordable incidents, vehicular accidents,  lost days due 
to injuries.  Organizational safety climate measured and analyzed through accounts of accidents 
and safety behavior in six distinct ways; proactive safety acts, workplace training, equipment 
familiarity, fieldwork orientation, investment finance, and scheduling challenges and flexibility 
(Huang et al., 2013).  Group-level safety climate determined from an analysis of three particular 
perceptions are; the level of supervisor care, worker encouragement and participation, and 
straight talk about and on safety issues.  Huang et al. (2013) found significant statistical 
relationships between safety climate with safety behavior and workplace injury at the 
organizational level, and the group-level. 
Huang et al. (2013) believed that organizational policies are formal, explicit, and visible.  
Enforcement of these policies is implicit, effected through management actions and aimed at 
maintaining work production arrangements, and there are consequences for non-achievement 
production targets in favor of safety.  It is therefore understandable when comparing safety 
issues to the speed of conducting a given task or the production flow process. Managerial safety 
commitment aligned with the relative importance of safety and production and how well the 
leadership communicate these; in worker training, meetings, or workplace discussions.  Safety 
climate thrive when safety outcomes support the experience of infrequent accidents which are 
not severe or serious.  Huang et al. (2013) accept that electric power industry workers generally 
work at different locations and when supervisors and managers are not present.  The reduced in-
person supervision, in an industry where working conditions are varied and hazardous, workers 
need to be exceptionally capable of determining risks and mitigating dangers that could make 
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safe work conditions unsustainable.  These workers must be technically skilled and competent so 
that if situations existed where safe work arrangements could not be developed and sustained for 
the entire work task, then appropriate communication with the supervisor would become 
necessary and imperative for individual safety.  Factors which contribute to injury risk include 
long and physically demanding working shifts and conditions, emergency work, a rapid influx of 
technology, and driving long distances sometimes in dangerous terrain (Huang et al., 2013).  
Huang et al. added that electric utility restructuring, increased competition, and profitability that 
result from the restructured business, together with worker diversity and demographics are 
challenging factors that also impacted on workplace safety.  Huang et al. (2013) depended on 
participant self-reporting of safety behavior as a critical input for analysis in this study.  
Information derived from the self-reports include conditions on jobs before work tasks began, 
arrangements for communicating work-related hazards and mitigating actions to workers on job-
sites, how workers conducted work, and supervisor response to requests for assistance for safety-
related challenges.  Huang et al. (2013) indicated that workers were positively influenced and 
exhibited safety behavior when organizational safety climate is strong; even when working in 
situations where direct supervision is absent.  
Leadership and safety outcomes.  Tucker et al. (2016) recounted from social learning 
theory and suggest that individuals who are high status and powerful could and did influence the 
behavior of other individuals.  Tucker et al. then extended the logic to organizational leaders and 
their influence on workers behavior; especially the advent of worker injuries and workplace 
accidents.  The Top Manager’s (CEO) impact on organizational safety climate is through a series 
of influential alignments from the CEO to the executive management team, managers, and 
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supervisors before bearing on worker performance levels and outcomes.  Collective top 
management support for a positive safety environment lead to work arrangements where this 
focus encourage and promote safe work behavior among front-line workers (Tucker et al., 2016).  
Strong safety culture is dependent on management commitment and organizational support 
(Huang et al., 2013).  Tucker et al. (2016) postulate that supervisor safety support lead to a 
lessening of worker injuries.  Front-line supervisors are deemed crucial by Huang et al. (2013) 
for encouraging workers safe behavior especially regarding workplace communications, 
provision of timely feedbacks, flexible work scheduling, and encouragement of safety work 
procedures despite other work challenges such as customer demands and productivity targets. 
Leadership and sub-standard safety.  Blinder (2015) describe a case where 29 
employees died at work, and the CEO of that organization is held responsible but not liable for 
the accident by a US Federal Court in Charleston Western Virginia and did not serve prison time.  
That judgment held that the CEO is responsible for ensuring and maintaining safety standards.  
In this case, the main point was that the leader of an organization is responsible for treating the 
safety of workers as a high priority and that all reasonable measures were always in place to 
prevent workers injuries and deaths.  
McGrory, Bedi, and Dawson (2017) reported that the US Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) charged a Florida Power Company for willfully disregarding and 
violating federal safety rules in an accident that killed five employees including a senior 
manager.  Charges of willful violations were associated with and tagged to organizations that 
intentionally disregarded safety requirements and procedures designed to keep individuals safe at 
work.  OSHA indicated that the dangerous situation which led to the accident existed for 13 
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hours whereas company rules required that the hazardous equipment was shut down after four to 
six hours of the condition (McGrory et al., 2017). 
Amorim and Pereira (2015) studied workplace accidents that were caused by the 
improvisation of safe-work arrangements and breached safeguards and barriers.  Among their 
findings is that improvised work safety arrangements are creative and innovative means of 
getting work done.  That usually extend to disregard of work safety rules as these tend to make 
the work activity longer and more cumbersome.  The desire to overcome barriers is a natural 
inclination of individuals and a product of the knowledge and ability of the workforce. The need 
for shorter outage times, higher customer satisfaction, improved technologies, and work 
procedures all added to the level of worker knowledge and the desire to even better that. Amorim 
and Pereira (2015) indicated that this work mentality proved successful but the likelihood of 
accidents always is elevated as changed procedures, and work sequence tend to introduce 
different hazards in the working environment.  Usually, these hazards are unrecognized before an 
accident.  Reason (2000) noted that sometimes the best people would make mistakes and this is a 
commonly overlooked issue in situations where the cause of accidents is seen only from the 
direct causal factors perspective.  Reason (2000) further suggested that by considering direct 
causal factors as the real cause of errors, near misses, and accidents opportunities to understand 
systemic flaws and how they contribute to the last act before an accident are futile. These 
strategies miss opportunities and are significant disadvantages.  The systemic approach is built 
on the premise that errors are symptoms and not the cause of workplace accidents and other more 
relevant flaws normally attributed to working schedules, task assignments, and employee 
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workload, all of which indirectly impact work outcomes (Dekker, 2015; Holland, 2018; Labib, 
2015; Murata, 2017). 
Atak and Kingma (2011) indicated that the safety culture in an organization is dependent 
on the growth phase of the entity and this phase explicitly determined the safety culture and 
production relationship.  In this study, technicians highlighted how difficult and challenging it 
was to balance the demands from maintenance managers, the quality assurance team, how that 
resulted in stressful the working arrangements, and where a compromise always existed between 
production and safety.  Atak and Kingma (2011) recognized the challenges which are prevalent 
in the aviation industry, the consequences of possible errors, and the high impact of adverse 
work outcomes.  
The mitigating role of supervisor safety priority.  Barnes, Ghumman, and Scott (2013) 
suggested that economic reality and social environments often encourage individuals to increase 
waking hours; either due to expanded working hours or from other activities that the individual 
may be involved.  Kao et al. (2016) posited that organizational response should be to employ 
situational control and to require individuals to conform to safety arrangements.  Kao et al., also 
suggested that supervisors communicate and enforce organizational policies and procedures; so 
supervisors should remove individuals who were not capable of performing safety-sensitive and 
challenging tasks.  Kao et al. (2016) affirmed that supervisors are structurally well-placed to 
influence worker attitudes, job behavior, and performance outcomes, and at the same time, 
promote organizational values and policies (Tucker et al., 2016).  Supervisor safety behavior and 
attitudes are critical to the maintenance of safe working conditions.  Probst (2015) countered that 
supervisors could also encourage safety rule violations, unsafe employee behavior, and accidents 
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by not enforcing organizational policies, rules, and work procedures especially when they 
encouraged the underreporting of accidents and near-misses and if untrained and unskilled 
workers were assigned difficult and dangerous tasks.  Kao et al. (2016) looked at workers’ 
reactions to supervisors who enforced workplace safety arrangements and requirements and 
believed that safe-work without undue risk-taking would result in accident-free conditions.  
Supervisors who promoted safety at work were the ones who would review and monitor work 
activities, understand the worker challenges, and intervene on a timely basis to avert near misses 
and accidents.  That also encouraged worker self-regulation and response where safe work 
outcomes were realized (Kao et al., 2016).  The results obtained from this study are two-fold; 
insomnia affected worker safety directly by injuries sustained on the job and indirectly through 
worsening individual behavior and its consequences.  Insomnia also contributed to workplace 
safety problems because of the effect of supervisor actions; a failure to address the issue led to an 
increase in safety violations, risky operations, near misses, and accidents; A direct approach to 
maintain safe work operations, resulted in worker self-regulation and compliance with 
organizational safety requirements (Kao et al., 2016). 
Leadership and Gaps 
Mills and Koliba (2015) indicated about the Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig on April 20, 
2010, that regulatory governance needed to be balanced with the democratic accountability of 
elected officials especially when the existing arrangements convolute into safety challenging 
situations.  Tucker et al. (2016) supported this by adding that organizational leaders are very 
much aware of their responsibilities for the prevention of workplace accidents, injury, and death 
to workers, and environmental disasters that result from these accidents.  Tucker et al. (2016) 
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recounted the public confirmation by the British Petroleum (BP) CEO at the time of the 
Deepwater Horizon industrial accident that organizations and its leaders had a duty of care to 
ensure that operations were safe.  The Deepwater Horizon accident resulted in 11 workers killed 
and an oil spill that was and still is the worst in the history of offshore drilling operations: The 
CEO at BP in 2010 was not able to positively impact on safety performance and outcomes.  
Tucker et al. (2016) indicated that organizational leaders influenced workplace safety 
performance in two ways: by measuring safety through managers and supervisors in the 
organization and actively fostering a safety climate promoted by collective social priorities for 
safety.  Tucker et al., believed that the CEO had a significant responsibility to influence the 
executive management on workplace safety and how this could be diametric to other 
organizational demands; akin to use of positional power to drive organizational performance 
through a strong executive management safety climate.  Top management, once influenced, 
would also engage the active support of managers and supervisors.  Once set, supervisors and 
managers arrange work in line with organizational safe work procedures and will encourage 
workers to adopt safety at work.  A safety climate supported by the CEO would likely promote 
shared perceptions of safety by individual and groups of front-line workers, especially when 
safety priority was on worker well-being; It was a form of social learning encouraged by the 
CEO (Tucker et al., 2016). 
Electrical Power Industry Experience 
Fordyce et al. (2007) investigated employee-suffered burn injuries from information 
contained in the Occupational Health and Safety Database (OHSD) for electric utility accidents, 
managed by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI).  They found that while burn injuries 
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were infrequent, it was usually severe and resulted in more days away from work than for other 
workplace injuries suffered by electric utility workers.  Fordyce et al. (2007) separated the burn 
injury data into different categories; thermal burns, chemical burns, and electrical burns.  
Electrocutions or death due to electricity was in the group of electrical burn injuries.  Fordyce et 
al. indicated that the victims were predominantly electricians, welders, and line workers who 
suffered injuries in the head, upper body, and hands.  Line workers sustained the majority of fatal 
injuries: Despite extensive state and federal regulatory oversight and organizational safety 
management efforts and program, electrical hazards represented significant safety risks for 
electric power industry workers (Fordyce et al., 2007). 
Fordyce et al. (2007) lamented that the EPRI OHSD database used for this study 
consisted of incomplete information and data from only 15 utility companies.  That was a 
significant disadvantage as the data was self-reported and contained several omissions. Fordyce 
et al. suggested that accurate data on accidents were difficult to source and the information at 
hand were challenging to code for useful analysis: this challenge was as a direct result of the 
variation in injury-reporting requirements across the United States and the different requirements 
for state-managed injury compensation plans.  There were cases of non-reporting of accidents 
which was supported by management.  Fordyce et al. (2007) explained the advantage of 
sufficient information on near misses, which were not available from the data used in this study; 
and near misses were opportunities to appropriate actions that could have addressed problems 
before accidents where workers became injured.  Fordyce et al. (2007) found that line workers 
frequently injured were experienced and in their 30s and 40s and inferred that younger workers 
were still in training and likely not exposed to more risky and challenging tasks. 
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 Fordyce et al. (2007) described the working arrangements and conditions for some of the 
cases they analyzed and suggested that despite line workers extensive training and 
apprenticeships, there were instances where personal protective equipment was necessary, 
available to workers, and not used as required.  Some of these situations included working close 
to energized conductors, non-use of flame-retardant clothing, and failure to detect hazards.  To 
this end, Fordyce et al. (2007) suggested that workplace training was a possible way of 
overcoming the problem, and to address inappropriate worker actions. 
Fordyce et al. (2007) recommended that workers must use personal protection and other 
equipment to ensure safety arrangements at work; these included the use of flame retardant 
apparel, insulating blankets, non-conductive ladders, and other safety devices.  Training 
improvements were to include provisions for ensuring that systems were safe to conduct work as 
well as to include modules aimed at developing an excellent workplace safety culture.  
Volberg et al. (2017) recognized the vast array of work tasks and the hazardous nature of 
these activities and working environments that electric power industry workers regularly faced. 
Volberg et al. (2017) conducted a similar analysis to Fordyce et al. (2007) and used the same 
EPRI OHSD database.  In this study, with the updated database, there were 18 contributing 
utility companies instead of the 15 in 2007.  Line workers and welders remained as the working 
groups that were most times injured at work even though there was still a significant level of 
uncertainty about accidents in the electric power industry.  The EPRI OHSD was not an entirely 
representative database of the US electricity industry: there were more than 200 different electric 
power companies conducting business in the electric power industry.  On the other hand, the 
available data from the US Bureau of Labor was a combination of information from electricity 
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distribution, transmission, and generation as well as from other utilities such as natural gas, and 
wastewater and sewage companies.  It was therefore complicated to filter information from this 
database effectively for proper analysis (Volberg et al., 2017).  
Volberg et al. (2017) indicated that there were 63, 194 recordable injuries reported by the 
18 companies that contributed data to the EPRI OHSD database from 1995 to 2013 and that not 
all of these companies provided information for each year.  It meant that for the missing years, 
there were accidents that occurred in these organizations that did not form part of the database. 
Typically, safety statistics calculation was on a reference of 200 000 hours per year, often 
referred to as the OSHA 300 rate, which reflected the working hours of 100 employees working 
40 hours per week for 50 weeks (40 X 50 X 100 = 200 000).  The frequency, severity, and other 
accident rates were then determined.  From the EPRI OHSD database, primary data for all the 
contributing companies were used to determine a value for employee-years.  Volberg et al. 
estimated that the data represented a total of 1 977 436 employee-years; it also indicated that 
60% of the workers came from five companies.  It was not possible to link the accidents to 
particular companies as there were missing data confirm that the larger companies provided data 
for the entire period from 1995 to 2013.  The data contained information on the location where 
the accident occurred, the event description, the activity which resulted in injury or death, the 
injured body part, and the nature of the injury.  Additional information about the injured worker 
and the arrangements for medical treatment and possible claims were also analyzed.  
There were 21 line worker deaths and another 12 fatalities among electric power industry 
workers from data used in this study:  A total of 33 deaths among 18 companies that contributed 
to the EPRI OSHD database.  Volberg et al. (2017) indicated that only six of the companies 
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provided information from 1995 to 2013 while another six provided data for the last decade.  The 
data presented were incomplete and therefore insufficient for exhaustive analysis.  Fordyce et al. 
(2007) were hampered by similar data integrity flaws a decade earlier.  Just like Fordyce et al. 
found, Volberg et al. indicated that welders were among the group of workers frequently 
involved in workplace accidents.  Younger welders, under-20 years old, predominantly suffered 
injuries to the eyes or head.  Older welders, over 65, were more likely to fall at the same level.  
Generally, though, welders were less severely injured than line workers and therefore were less 
often away from work due to injury.  Meter Readers and line workers were the groups of 
employees who mostly suffered from cuts and puncture wounds or sprains and strains.  The 
majority of meter readers were females while the opposite was true for line workers.  Sprains and 
strains injury victims suffered back and trunk type problems that tended to be long-term and high 
cost.  Contributing factors included overexertion, twisting, awkward motion, and task frequency 
and duration.  Most injuries occurred in summer while the least was in winter and linked to fewer 
working days in winter. Slip, trip, and fall (STF) injuries occurred mostly in winter.  Volberg et 
al. (2017) found that Meter Reader injuries were difficult to explain and believed this was likely 
a result of insufficient and ineffective training.  Training in this context was both formal and 
informal.  Volberg et al. (2017) recommended further studies in this area. Office staff 
predominantly suffered injuries to wrists and hands.  That was not fully explained but could be 
cumulative trauma disorders (CTD) and repetitive strain injuries; linked to office ergonomics.  
Volberg et al. (2017) observed that the number of fatal accidents and injuries tended to 
lessen each year from 1995 to 2013.  It could have been due to higher safety consciousness 
among workers, a proactive safety management approach, and improved workplace design and 
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procedures.  It could have also been a uniqueness of the database itself, underreporting of 
accidents, the non-reporting of contractor related accidents, and the non-reporting of dangerous 
near misses.  Contractors in the electric power industry were usually hired to perform high-risk 
tasks not done by the permanent workforce.  Keeping and reporting of accidents involving 
contractors were not a mandatory or compliance requirement for electric power companies 
(Volberg et al., 2017).  A significant shortcoming and limitation in this Volberg et al. study was 
the voluntary nature of the reporting done by the companies that contributed to the EPRI OSHD 
database and the incompleteness of that data.  That was unchanged from the 2007 study 
conducted by Fordyce et al.  The different regulatory arrangements from different states and 
regions in the United States also presented significant challenges and very likely led to critical 
data being underrepresented.  Underreporting of workplace accidents might even have occurred 
because of management remuneration schemes that hinged the number of workplace accidents to 
bonuses and other performance-related factors.  There were other cases where an interpretation 
of incidents as not recordable or near-misses when injuries occurred was not entirely ruled out by 
Volberg et al. (2017). 
Accident Investigation Techniques  
 Spain-wait, riatt.  Accident investigations offered opportunities to discover the real 
causes of workplace accidents for individuals at work to help prevent recurrence of similar future 
accidents, and for proactive informing of workers about accidents that occurred.  Salguero-
Caparros et al. (2015) recognized that accident investigations were necessary for identifying the 
contributing factors in an accident event.  It was an essential input in the design and 
implementation of barriers and other systemic protection against similar future accident events. 
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Salguero-Caparros et al. (2015) reviewed accident investigations conducted in Spain for the 
period 2009 to 2012.  These accidents occurred mainly in construction, agriculture, 
manufacturing, and the service industry.  Salguero-Caparros et al. identified omissions and 
investigative flaws which they believed resulted in missed opportunities for regulators, 
organizations, and managers to understand how accidents occurred and how best to mitigate 
recurrence.  There was an impression that with only the active fault identified, the investigations 
were short on the in-depth latent organizational and management contributing factors.  A 
reasonable investigation was, therefore, one in which investigators extracted all the contributing 
risk factors and analyzed them to determine how they combined to result in the accident event.  
The control of these risks was critical to keeping workplaces safe from the effects of hazards. 
Salguero-Caparros et al. (2015)  recommend the adoption of the European model for accident 
investigations and access to accident investigation databases by investigators.  Salguero-
Caparros et al. ascribed that accident investigations should involve investigation planning, an 
initial report, a data collection exercise, analysis of that information, report writing, 
recommendations, the initiation of appropriate corrective action, implementation of 
recommended actions, and follow-up activities for identification and evaluation of the 
effectiveness of preventative measures.    
Salguero-Caparros et al. (2015) described the early accident causation model by Reason 
(1997) as organizational accidents and another model by Hollnagel (1998) as human error.  
These were two models that became widely used in accident investigations.  There had been an 
over-emphasis on the human error causes instead of the identification of systemic problems 
outside the control of the accident victim (Dekker, 2006; Manuele, 2014).  Salguero-Caparros et 
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al. (2015) preferred the Jacinto and Aspinwall (2004) work accident investigation technique 
(WAIT) as the systemic model that was simple to understand and implement even by 
inexperienced investigators.  Jacinto and Aspinwall (2004) posited that WAIT was a 9-step 
process over two main phases of an accident investigation.  Phase one involved legal and 
regulatory requirements and constraints regarding the information about accidents and how that 
information could be analyzed to determine the causes and factors that contributed to the 
accident.  These represented the what-happened observations about the accident.  Phase two 
involved an in-depth analysis of weaknesses and circumstances that were organizational 
systemic and which contributed to the failure event.  That represented the opportunities for 
organizational control and for preventative action to be initiated.  
Salguero-Caparros et al. (2015)  further indicated that the WAIT methodology later 
evolved into a recording, investigation, and analysis of accidents (RIAA) model.  Salguero-
Caparros et al. (2015) found that in accident investigations, data collection was a significant 
issue factored in the accident findings; if the data was congruent and homogenous, the findings 
were credible; heterogeneous data were difficult to use in determining the exact cause of 
accidents in the workplace.  Salguero-Caparros et al. (2015) forwarded a coding of data 
recommendation for converting accident information into a homogeneous dataset.  They found 
that these codes led to the causal factors of accidents.  Coding was also useful in understanding 
the circumstances relevant to the accident.  It was by following the factors that contributed to 
accidents where opportunities for the implementation of adequate preventative measures to avert 
other accidents existed. 
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Salguero-Caparros et al. (2015)  suggested that the Phase one stage of accident 
investigations was necessary to determine unsafe acts and unsafe conditions that actively 
contributed as the immediate causes of the accident.  The underlying causes, however, were not 
found from the active, direct, and immediate reasons for accidents.  These evolved from an 
analysis of the reasons for the immediate factors which resulted in the event occurrence 
(Salguero-Caparros et al., 2015).  Latent causes from the evolving interactions of individual and 
job factors with organizational procedures and work arrangements led to an understanding of 
situations where errors could lead to a severe or fatal injury type accident.  Salguero-Caparros et 
al. (2015) proposed that direct, indirect, and ancillary cost estimates, of accident investigations, 
could be used to indicate the monetary value of the effort.  That way, the report, the financial 
impact, and not only of the losses due to the accident event could be useful and help to determine 
how best to prevent other accidents.  Salguero-Caparros et al. (2015) also suggested that the 
number of days that elapsed during an accident investigation should indicate a value of 
opportunities lost, including time for other organizational activities. 
Counting on everything for safety.  Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) posited the thinking 
that organizations through management and supervision application of safety values, policies, 
rules, and procedures could influence workplace safety performance and outcomes in line with 
expected organizational objectives.  At the worker level, attitudes, behavior, and motivation were 
shaped by the way that management and supervision implemented the safety arrangements; 
considering the level of worker involvement and commitment to worker well-being.  Safety 
climate, in this context, represented the common perceptions regarding an organizational safety 
program and the practical functioning of that program.  It was a reflection of a shared 
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understanding of organizational safety policies, safe work procedures and rules, and other safety 
arrangements. 
Miller et al. (2016) researched slip, trip, and fall (STF) in the workplace.  STF was a 
major workplace safety hazard and a causal factor in numerous cases where employees suffered 
injuries.  Miller et al. (2016) suggested a four-part model analyzing STF incidents stemming 
from their company database, to determine hazard awareness among workers, an examination of 
the effectiveness of preventive measures to mitigate the risks, and to institute a training focus on 
how to maintain proper personal balance; especially when workers negotiated wet and slippery 
work conditions. Miller et al. (2016) stressed the lifelong struggle of fall survivors to keep good 
health and pain-free living; STF was the second leading cause of worker deaths after motor 
vehicle accidents and more than one-fifth of all emergency room visits in the United States 
(Miller et al., 2016).  The traditional approach to identifying and mitigating STF challenges was 
to focus on the environment and to encourage constant vigilance from workers.  With vigilance 
workers were expected to identify flooring problems, weather-related issues caused by rain, 
snow, and ice, surface transitions, conditions and unevenness, and a combination of different 
permutations of these factors (Miller et al., 2016).  In this study, Miller et al. included the 
orthodox review and analysis of previous incidents, actively encouraged the identification and 
mitigation of hazards and risks, and supported worker training for maintaining personal balance.  
This approach promoted changes to individual worker responsibility and actions, attitudes, and 
behavior.  It grew on a foundation where employees were able to identify and assess hazards and 
the dangers that these presented.  It was more an exercise in information management and 
initiation of proactive actions to possible problems before these escalated into accident 
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situations.  The balance initiative was an organizational led initiative where workers were re-
oriented to appreciate newer techniques about human dynamics and how each person should 
compensate for their unique requirements.  It was a way for individuals to remain in control of 
their actions, all aimed at ensuring that individuals were not injured and that near-misses did not 
occur.  Miller et al. (2016) showed that the ratio of slip, trip, and fall was 33:43:24 for all STF 
cases.  That was a simple but powerful breakdown.  It was evident that snow and ice were not the 
greatest STF factors.   
Trip incidents were due to poor housekeeping, inappropriate supervision, and worker 
inattention.  These resulted in cases where debris, doors, stairway, carpet, cable/hose, bump stop,  
and chairs all factored in similar ways.  A closer focus of slip incidents revealed that wet surfaces 
were the leading factor in 4 out of every ten slip-cases.  Oily surface, vehicle entry/exit, debris, 
ladders, tiled surfaces, and stairs were cumulatively less than wet surfaces as a contributor to 
slip-cases.  For almost one in every three slip-cases, the reason was listed as unknown (Miller et 
al., 2016).  For falls, one in every five cases was leg or ankle related.  One in three was due to an 
unsafe act or an undefined causal factor.  Broken chair factored in one of every nine instances 
while missed steps, walking too fast and an unknown factor each figured in one from every 
twelve accident situations.  Footwear, loss of balance, and foot placement were separately 
identified as the causal factor in one from every twenty-five accident (Miller et al., 2016). 
Miller et al. (2016) identified employee training as critical to shaping new attitudes and 
behavior.  The training was to encompass a common-sense approach to preventive actions as the 
primary strategy and covered topics such as cell phone use and how that contributed to worker 
distraction, especially in trip and fall situations (Miller et al., 2016).  Another common-sense 
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approach was to encourage a renewal of watching where one was going, using the right 
footwear, not standing or rolling on chairs, and the benefits of keeping the work zone free from 
debris and other unnecessary objects.  Safety slogans developed for this purpose included eye-
catching phrases meant to encourage worker safe-behavior and the idea of not becoming another 
injury statistic. 
Miller et al. (2016)  indicated that the balance initiative was one where employees had to 
individually consent to the program as it required confidential medical information that was 
personal to the individual.  That information was for personalized training on the balance 
initiative.  This STF program has been at NASA since 2013, and actively supported by the top 
management and employees (Miller et al., 2016).  The 4-plan program was aimed at an 
organizational safety culture shift from employer-centric arrangements to make and keep the 
workplace safe to an employer-employee-centric culture where employees could initiate actions 
to mitigate hazards and to keep the workplace safe (Miller et al., 2016).  That change was 
possible because of changed attitudes, behavior, and appreciation for personal safety 
responsibility. 
Electric power industry.  Fordyce et al. (2007) and Volberg et al. (2017) showed how 
difficult it was to get appropriate near miss data for the U.S. electric power industry.  The 
unavailability of relevant data on electric industry accidents was also a significant negative.  
Considerable difficulty in applying information derived from one study to other situations and 
industries was that the prevailing conditions in both cases were not identical.  Taking the results 
obtained by Miller et al. (2016) for example, and applying that thinking to the electric power 
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industry might result in an entirely different outcome; because of the uniqueness of the electric 
power industry arena. 
Missing data.  Fordyce et al. (2007) and Volberg et al. (2017) lamented the absence of 
near-miss data from the EPRI OSHD used in their respective studies in the U.S. electrical power 
industry.  Reason (2000) likened this absence of necessary information to not making the best 
use of free lessons to help recognize when the precipice was very close:  Reason further 
suggested that it was a primary reason for the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power station accident.  
Reason (2000) connected trust, a workplace culture that supported fair treatment, and a 
blameless working environment as critical elements for a favorable safety climate in an 
organization.  Reason (2000) believed that by only considering accident causal factors as worker-
related and not organizational or systemic, finding the actual causes of accidents remained 
elusive and challenging.  The systemic factors such as work planning, equipment purchase, 
material unavailability, inadequate planning, changed work procedures, work team selection, and 
insufficient supervision control were among numerous other organizational factors outside of 
worker control which contributed to accidents (Fordyce et al., 2007; Volberg et al., 2017; 
Reason, 2000). 
Delphi Research Technique 
Using the Delphi technique, researchers could add to informed decision making in a 
myriad of different technical, business, and policy environments and situations.  The objectives 
of this study included an understanding and explanation of the reasons why fatal and serious 
workplace accidents were occurring in the electric power industry and the promotion of possible 
ways to prevent future accidents.  The aim developed through a Delphi technique where selected 
129 
 
experienced and knowledgeable electric industry practitioners and professionals deliberated on 
this high impacting topic.  The Greek origins of the Delphi described a process where predictions 
were the natural order.  Today, however, methodological design drives this type of research for 
results in cases where expertise and experience were significant influencing factors (Novakowski 
& Wellar, 2008). 
No suitable similar studies were found in the literature search to indicate that the Delphi 
technique was ideal for research on how to prevent fatal and serious accidents in the electric 
power industry.  It was logical to approach this topic from the perspective that the experts would 
be knowledgeable and experienced:  That alone was an opportunity to gather valuable 
information from them since an analysis of information they provided could be sufficient for a 
critical and unbiased examination of the deep and underlying factors which could prove 
important to this study.  The approach adopted for the present study was to elucidate the Delphi 
technique and describe the different study conditions that it was applied; with an explanation of 
how previous study experiences could likely lead to positive results in the current circumstance. 
In 1953, Dalkey and Helmer working at the Rand Corporation, developed the Delphi 
technique.  They aimed to explore the different strategies that the then Soviet Army could adapt 
to deploy nuclear bombs (Novakowski & Wellar, 2008).  The Rand Corporation was contracted 
by the United States Air Force (USAF) to decipher this complicated and possibly dangerous task.  
The Dalkey and Hemler approach were to poll American knowledge possessed by individuals 
throughout the United States.  Their aim was for each expert to provide critical information while 
not being influenced by the communication challenges usually associated with in-person 
interpersonal interactions.  Linstone and Turoff (1975) indicated that one characteristic of the 
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Delphi technique was a structuring of the communication process, especially group interaction 
on complex problem resolution, for active participation by all members. 
In this research, I was the monitor or facilitator.  I facilitated group communication.  I 
coordinated the process so that the experts could address the research questions.  I hosted the 
questionnaires forwarded through Survey Monkey.  Communication to the designated experts 
was through emails sent via Survey Monkey.  The experts then responded to each item on each 
of the questionnaires.  The response allowed me to conduct data harvesting, coding and 
summarizing.  The rounds of deliberations continued until consensus for each item occurred, or 
to the point where agreement could not occur.  
For the first round, I forwarded a list of reasons why accidents happened and invited the 
participants to add to the list and to provide suggestions on how to possibly prevent accidents.  
The participants each had two weeks to respond.  This information and feedback, from the 
research participants, were summarized, coded and used to generate questionnaires for the 
second and subsequent Delphi rounds.  A five-point Likert-type scale for the participant to 
register their response to each of the questions in the second round was in the questionnaire.  
Round 2 of the exercise commenced when participants received notification of Round 2 via 
Survey Monkey.   
After the second round, I reviewed each response and calculated statistical measures from 
the received data to indicate what the leading answers were. The criteria, set as 70% or more of 
the participants selecting a score of three or greater on the Likert-type scale for each item on the 
questionnaire, was necessary for including the issue in the next round.  These responses would 
be used to determine the degree to which the respondents agreed or disagreed with a particular 
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item (Novakowski & Wellar, 2008). I proceeded to develop a third-round questionnaire which 
showed a summary of the answers to the items in the Round 2 questionnaire and what the overall 
results for the entire group were.     
Linstone and Turoff (1975) indicated that the greatest opportunity for response 
convergence occurred in Round 1 and Round 2 of the Delphi.  In this study, the Linstone and 
Turoff (1975) Round 1 and Round 2 were the Round 2 and Round 3; This study was more in line 
with the exercise done by Heitner, Kahn, and Sherman (2013).  Novakowski and Wellar (2008) 
described three different Delphi technique study categories: Normative, Forecasting, and Policy.  
Normative Delphi explorations aimed to derive consensus on a challenging issue when starting 
from a reference set by the level of current knowledge and thinking (Novakowski & Wellar, 
2008).  The Delphi technique could enable researchers to evaluate different frameworks used to 
ascertain which future-plan or program may provide the best solutions based on the information 
currently available.  The electric power industry managers, supervisors, trainers, and workers 
exposed to situations, where employees were at risk of becoming injured or even killed while at 
work, provided opinions on how to prevent these from happening.  The many different hazards, 
hazardous conditions, work procedures, safety systems, work commitment, planning, techniques, 
scheduling, and other micro details were known to these experts.  Expert knowledge and 
information were what this researcher relied on to derive an understanding of how to prevent 
fatal and serious accidents in the electric power industry and to support future initiatives to 
prevent worker injuries and death from workplace accidents. 
A forecasting Delphi focussed on future predictions of events in situations where there 
was little knowledge, or in cases where there were a diverse array of or conflicting information 
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and ideas about the issue under examination (Novakowski & Wellar, 2008).  Forecasting could 
happen in different ways; from data extrapolation, indicator examination, to modeling, and also 
by stochastic analysis type methods.  A researcher employing the Forecasting Delphi technique 
would likely process data from one or a combination of all of these methodologies.  The Delphi 
participants could even be experts at these analytical competencies, and their responses might 
require me to also be capable and competent with these tools  (Novakowski & Wellar, 2008).  
The policy Delphi preference occurred in studies that involved political interests and matters or 
consequence: In this type of study, the aim was not to generate consensus but with identifying 
the range of possible contextual and politically relevant and influential parameters and variables 
(Novakowski & Wellar, 2008; Sinclair, Oyebode, & Owens, 2016).  
Despite the different Delphi categories, the fundamental approach to the Delphi technique 
remained unchanged.  These revolved around participant anonymity, an interaction between me 
and the participants, coordination of group information, and the statistical measures used to 
analyze data derived from the process.  However, I aligned the method with the actual study for 
best results from the exercise.  In this current study, the preference was for a normative Delphi as 
it allowed for consensus derived from the experience and knowledge of the experts as research 
participants.  Appendix C, shows the different forms of Delphi research as described by Hasson 
and Keeney (2011). 
 The relevance of the Delphi technique to electric power industry accidents research 
Linstone and Turoff (1975) promoted that when a research problem was not one where 
precise quantitative assessment and analysis was preferred, the Delphi technique could be 
beneficial particularly when a collection of ideas and subjective judgments would be available .  
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In this context, the Delphi technique was ideal for investigating, understanding, and analyzing 
how to prevent fatal and serious accidents occurring in the electric power industry.  The Delphi 
technique allowed for experts in the electric power industry to apply and utilize knowledge and 
experience, and understanding of issues that contributed to workplace errors and accidents to the 
extent that individuals were killed or permanently injured, and equipment destroyed.  
Novakowski and Wellar (2008) extended the Delphi as being relevant in situations for analysis 
of philosophical and conceptual issues with simple statistics and where objective observation 
was neither easy to confirm nor deny.  These conditions existed in the electric power industry, so 
it made the Delphi methodology useful for examining the study topic. 
Participants in a study done using the Delphi technique enjoyed equal and the same 
opportunities to contribute towards the research.  There were no interpersonal challenges; 
situations where any individual views or mannerisms were dominant over others.  Participants 
expressed opinions, which I considered without ranking nor weighting.  Each participant’s 
response contributed equally to the statistical measures derived from the Delphi technique.  
Workers' contribution to the research was treated similarly to those from managers and 
supervisors.  It also made the value of each input essential:  That removed bias which could have 
existed in other research methods, including phenomenology, case studies, or quantitative.  I 
developed questions were crucially important as careful crafting elicited the best responses from 
the expert participants:  If not adequately designed, the value of the expert deliberations might be 
affected (De Loë, Melnychuk, Murray, & Plummer, 2016). 
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Transparency and Research Design 
The literature review was critical for the preparation of a comprehensive description of 
current information, knowledge, and thinking about the research topic.  It was apt for identifying 
where gaps existed in current knowledge, what the research interests and direction were, the 
theoretical challenges and misdirection, and how difficult relevant data was to find.  The 
literature review guided the determination of what new research was necessary, and what needed 
clarification.  The literature review was also be used to guide me on how to effectively identify 
which subject area expert would be best for the Delphi exercise.  The literature review guided me 
on the research design determination.  Research can be exploratory to find out more about the 
research topic.  It can also be confirmatory if the focus was on substantiating that a real 
phenomenon remained valid.  From the literature review, I effectively developed the research 
content, and this helped to determine the best research direction and what research methodology 
should be adopted.  It was crucially important from the points highlighted that conduct of a 
proper review by me was for the best indication of current knowledge and research direction on a 
given research topic.      
Novakowski and Wellar (2008) indicated that the more common literature review 
strategies included an acknowledgment of the prevailing ideas about the topic, the learning 
direction, and polling of the best topic repositories on the subject; professional associations, 
industry journals, research academicians, regulatory resources among other resources. 
Novakowski and Wellar (2008) cautioned that the omission of critical resource sources and 
overemphasis on other sources were equally likely to produce research bias as I could be 
influenced by one thinking and neglect another body of ideas about the same topic.  That was 
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likely to affect the overall credibility of the entire research.  Novakowski and Wellar (2008) 
indicated that pretest and trial run were distinct research activities even though there were 
significant confusion and misuse of the terms among researchers.  Ackoff (1956) indicated that 
the pretest was done by a researcher when the research methodology was undecided and for 
effective finalization of the best approach for the actual research.  
Acoff further indicated that the trial run was conducted to determine and to fine-tune the 
research instrument and so enhance the research viability and efficiency.  Novakowski and 
Wellar (2008) suggested that when there was insufficient research information on how to 
proceed, engaging experts was acceptable for researchers to contact for suggestions and ideas to 
consider.  I must first accept that an expert-based technique was suitable for the study and 
contacting individuals before the research commenced, were only for me to eventually crystallize 
and settle on the most suitable way forward.  Aside from the Delphi, suitable expert contact 
methods included surveys, professional polling, roundtables, workshops, and brainstorming with 
each approach providing research advantages confirmed in a pretest (De Loë, Melnychuk, 
Murray, & Plummer, 2016; Miller, 2006). 
A background report for each expert participating in the Delphi technique was necessary 
so that they could understand the reasons for conducting the research, what the research topic 
was and how the research process could work.  It specified who were possible candidates (skills, 
experience, knowledge, interests, and expertise).  It was essential that I included the research 
problem statement as part of the background report to the experts.  That prevented time delay 
and eventual participant disinterest if they were fully aware of the specific research before 
committing to taking part in the exercise.  Helmer (1983) referred to this process as the Delphi 
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Round 0.  It was essential that I sent sufficient information to each expert for the most informed 
decision to be made by the participant.  That proved to be a financially wise decision as delays 
added to the overall cost of the research. 
Novakowski and Wellar (2008) suggested that in some instances, even with the provision 
of sufficient information to the participants, a Round 0 was required primarily due to the 
complexity and the vagueness of the research topic.  In this study, once the selection of experts 
occurred from experienced and knowledgeable industry practitioners, the initial thinking was that 
a Round 0 was not necessary.  The mitigating factor was how time-consuming the entire research 
was and how likely participants could maintain interest for that duration.  There were different 
ways that a researcher could circumvent research delay: these included expert interviews, 
conducting focus group sessions, and brainstorming with a group of experts who were not be 
engaged otherwise in the study.  The focus group option was impractical for this study. 
The selection of research participants covered the entire United States.  That made a 
focus group interaction almost impossible unless there could have been a video conference in 
which all the participants could simultaneously attend.  Even if this was likely, it was not a first 
choice option and therefore was ruled out entirely.  The interpersonal challenges that could occur 
would only compound the overall difficulties in the research exercise.  Conducting interviews 
was an attractive option and was likely to factor in this research.  Therefore, it was a possible 
consideration until I was satisfied that there were sufficient candidates for a Delphi study.  
Novakowski and Wellar (2008) suggested that interviews could replace the Round 1  of the 
Delphi.  This approach was not adopted but remained a viable option up to the commencement 
of Round 1 of the Delphi. 
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Linstone and Turoff (1975) cautioned that care must be taken to ensure that questions 
were clear, written in language that was not ambiguous, and used terms that the experts would 
have a common understanding.  The content density of each sentence must not be such that the 
participant would be overwhelmed and taxed.  Novakowski and Wellar (2008) suggested using a 
diagram or a pictorial as a representation of the process and how the different stages would 
follow:  That would be an excellent way for the researcher to convey crucial information to the 
expert about the research exercise and how the exercise should progress.  The approach preferred 
for this research was a modified version of the Novakowski and Wellar (2008) flowchart for 
normative Delphi, is shown below in Figure 11.  Professor Wellar provided permission for 
replication of their flowchart for normative Delphi in this study; This permission forms part one 
of Appendix A (Novakowski & Wellar, 2008).  Professor Wellar confirmed in an email that Dr. 
Nonakowski had passed before the request for permission to use the flowchart in this study, 
reproduced in Appendix D, was with the permission of Professor Wellar (Novakokowski & 
Wellar, 2008). 
A normative Delphi was employed to determine how to prevent fatal and serious 
workplace accidents in the electric power industry, is shown in Figure 11: This was a 
modification of the Novakowski and Wellar (2008) model as shown in Appendix D. 
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Figure 11: Modified Flowchart for a Normative Delphi. Adapted from N. Novakowski, & B. 
Wellar (2008). Reprinted with permission. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
Chapter 2 is built on a platform informed by previous research into the same area of study 
or from similar studies even if those are not identical or from the same setting.  The learnings 
derived from earlier studies and research literature are carefully crafted to build support for the 
current research on the accidents that were occurring in the electrical power industry.  These are 
credible and from the most recent and relevant research work.  The importance of peer work and 
emphasis is tempered for a balance with the research literature from books, periodicals and 
research dissertations from sources that are credible for this particular research.  These are, for 
this exercise, assumed to be valid, at least, to ensure that the research learnings and knowledge 
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up to and before conducting this actual research and the information synthesized to show how 
the prior findings are crucial in determining the exact knowledge base on the topic (Patton, 2015; 
Ravitch & Carl, 2016).    This literature review is interpreted and informed by unbiased intent 
and fairness.  That is possible because it shows how the information is relevant to the current 
study (Rubin & Rubin, 2012; Saldaña, 2016). 
The primary intent was to conduct a Delphi research exercise and to use the Bolman and 
Deal four-frame model. Selection of the Delphi participants came from electric utility experts in 
the United States. Electric industry regulators were different for different regions in the United 
States, but industry practice is closely aligned.  Professionals practicing throughout the industry 
were university and professionally trained and came from the geographical span covering the 
United States (Feng, Teo, Ling, & Low, 2014).  That made for well-informed industry experts 
effectively helping in determining how best to prevent workers from being killed or severely 
injured at work. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
The purpose of this normative Delphi research was to prevent workplace accidents and 
serious and fatal worker injuries by gaining consensus on the reasons why these occur and 
desirable and feasible solutions from a select group of experienced U.S. electric power industry 
experts including trainers, employees, supervisors, and managers.  This chapter contains a 
description of specific research methods and practices I used to conduct this study.  In it, I also 
discuss the tools and strategies I used for analyzing the collected data.     
Research Design and Rationale 
Research Design   
I explored the following research question:  
What is the consensus of opinion of a panel of experts in the electrical power industry 
regarding desirable and feasible solutions to fatal and serious workplace accidents occurring in 
the United States?  
The focus of this study was two-fold. First, I sought to determine what trainers, 
employees, supervisors, and managers experienced with electric power industry accidents, 
attributed as the real causes of workplace accidents, worker fatalities, and serious injuries.  
Second, with an understanding of the real causes, my focus was on identifying ways to prevent 
future accidents, worker fatalities, and serious injuries. 
I used a qualitative method for this study.  Qualitative researchers attempt to understand 
human behavior and actions by focusing on unique people and factors.  Quantitative researchers 
develop and test hypotheses to prove or disprove researcher thinking.  Mixed methods research 
combines elements of qualitative and quantitative studies (Barnham, 2015).  Qualitative research 
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promotes the likelihood of understanding and appreciating human factors, and from that, 
evaluating unique world experiences and environments (Fassinger & Morrow, 2013).  
Qualitative research methodologies support flexible, evolving, and emerging research exercises, 
unlike quantitative studies where boundary conditions are rigid and tested for acceptance 
(Barnham, 2015).  Practical application of quantitative research had traditionally been more 
useful in natural sciences than in social science despite a sizeable percentage of social science 
studies done using a statistical approach (Fassinger & Morrow, 2013).  While quantitative 
studies are premised on clearly delineated researcher-set conditions for acceptable and not 
acceptable results, they do not clearly explain the human influences that significantly impact 
those results.  Qualitative studies are thus better suited for exploring the human factors where the 
delineation of acceptable and non-acceptable is difficult to accomplish (Fassinger & Morrow, 
2013). 
In this qualitative study, I used the normative Delphi technique (Novakokowski & 
Wellar, 2008; Yousuf, 2007).  The normative Delphi technique was referred to as the classical 
Delphi technique by Hasson and Keeney (2011). In it, the primary focus is to obtain a consensus 
among experts as research participants.  A full discussion of different aspects of a Delphi study 
from its origins to its limitations follows in this chapter.  The discussion includes different 
applications where the Delphi technique is preferred, the rationale and benefit of this research 
method.  Hasson and Keeney (2011) listed several different Delphi techniques and showed how 
these were relevant for different research perspectives.  These techniques ranged from the 
classical, where the emphasis was on gaining consensus of expert opinion among the research 
participants, to the e-Delphi which depended on the nature of the research topic (Hasson & 
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Keeney, 2011; Novakokowski & Wellar, 2008).  Aligning successful and reliable outcomes with 
safe work strategies to achieve organizational safety objectives is a difficult task.  Barnham 
(2015) noted that qualitative research involves a psychological approach where the focus is on 
understanding why individuals think and behaved in unique ways.   
The Delphi technique supported a process of iterations to establish consensus among the 
research participants through questionnaires and feedback I coordinated (see Heitner et al., 
2013).  The Delphi technique involved a process of expert participant selection based on 
qualifications, knowledge, and recognition of experience and exemplary practice (see Heitner et 
al., 2013).  Participants’ interacted with me while remaining anonymous to the other expert 
participants (see Brady, 2015).  Information gathered from each participant was collated so that 
only I was able to redistribute information to participants over the subsequent iterations 
(Cegielski, Bourrie, & Hazen, 2013), and only I combined and analyzed individual participant 
responses (Eleftheriadou et al., 2015).  
Rationale for Using the Delphi Technique 
Generally, the safety management systems employed in the electric power industry are 
superior to minimal standards guaranteed by industry, federal, state, and regional regulators in 
the United States (OSHA, 2017).  Therefore, accidents are an indication that significant problems 
exist.  The versatility of and straightforward approach of the normative Delphi technique made it 
appropriate to this inquiry into accidents in the electric power industry.  The literature review 
done as part of this research allowed me to set questions for Round 1 of this normative Delphi 
study.  The existing lack of knowledge, the gap between extant research, and data on electric 
power industry accidents was sufficient reason for conducting this study.  A phenomenological 
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approach was possible.  This method would have limited the geographic span to a particular 
region.  That was inconsistent with my focus.  Groenewald (2004) listed core phenomenological 
research principles as involving field notes, unstructured interviews, memo writing, participant 
essays, and group discussion.  None of these were relevant to this study.  Larkin, Watts, & 
Clifton (2006) indicated that phenomenological research demands required the researcher to 
balance judgment with the broader context of the lived experiences of the participant.  In this 
study, I was not focused on individual consciousness and experience, but rather on the extraction 
of knowledge possessed by the research participants about workplace accidents that they know 
about in working conditions and arrangements that they, as experts and specialists, knew. 
A case study was also possible.  Yin (2013) indicated that case study research is used to 
explore a phenomenon that is bounded by time and space.  Case studies are good when 
researchers seek answers to "how" or "why" questions and on real-life events over which there is 
little control (Yin, 2017).  Yin (2013) also indicated that the research design and analysis must 
align with the research method for research success.  My study was incompatible with the 
specific focus that case studies support.  For this study, I wanted to understand the issues that 
resulted in workers becoming fatally or severely injured and to find solutions to prevent fatal and 
serious workplace injuries.  I did not select the case study option because it would have required 
the specific involvement of individuals with detailed information about particular circumstances, 
locations, working conditions, and detailed information about accidents that occurred.  That 
approach would require research participants to agree to conditions where they might be or could 
be liable for contributing to accidents where individuals were killed or seriously injured at work.  
This result was not the focus of this research. 
144 
 
 Role of the Researcher 
Sanjari, Bahramnezhad, Fomani, Shoghi, and Cheraghi (2014) noted that a researcher in 
qualitative studies is a process tool used for completion of the study.  Patton (2015) extended this 
by suggesting that qualitative research depends on clearly defined and identified researcher roles 
articulated to the research participants.  The first research quality management opportunity was 
in the research literature search.  Another chance to remove bias was in the identification and 
selection of suitable experts for this Delphi study (see Yin, 2013).  A third opportunity to remove 
bias was for me to declare beforehand that while there was no familiarity with prospective U.S. 
electric industry participants for this study, I was an industry practitioner with extensive 
knowledge in the Caribbean and Canada.  In this study, I was responsible for data collection.  
Because there was the potential for individual bias, I made a deliberate effort to maintain 
research integrity throughout the process.  I was particularly careful during data processing and 
analysis, thematic categorizing, summarising, coding, and development of questions for the 
Delphi rounds so that my thinking and perspectives were not actively influential in the shaping 
of the research (Sanjari et al., 2014).  Development of the questionnaire items for the subsequent 
rounds were opportunities for me to remove bias that could influence the research direction and 
credibility (see Gobo & Mauceri, 2014).  
One significant researcher influence, as coordinator of the research exercise, was the 
maintenance of anonymity among the Delphi Panelists as research participants.  The entire study 
grew on a foundation that participants should freely contribute in an uninhibited manner 
supported by individuals remaining anonymous.  I was the critical axle for the maintenance of 
that trust.  I maintained all safeguards for research reliability, credibility, and trustworthiness by 
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strict and confidential handling of the identity of the Delphi panelists and the integrity of the data 
provided by these experts (see Golkar & Crawley, 2014; Houghton, Casey, Shaw, & Murphy, 
2013). 
Tufford and Newman (2012) indicated qualitative researchers use bracketing to mitigate 
preconceptions that may taint the entire process.  I was mindful that familiarity with the research 
topic because of professional practice must remain subservient to the quality controls barriers 
necessary for removal of research bias.  Failure to recognize and to remove this bias could have 
been deleterious to the study. 
Methodology  
The normative, commonly known as classical or conventional, Delphi technique involved 
a process of iterations which commenced with an open-ended question or set of questions shared 
with expert contributors (Donohoe & Needham, 2009; Hasson & Keeney, 2011).  Open-ended 
questions encouraged a free sharing of information by expert contributors (Yousuf, 2007).  The 
responses ranged from a first-hand recollection of a sequence of events and how that impacted 
on a particular research topic, to the opinion of the participant on items where there were no set 
or agreed to guidelines or common knowledge (Novakowski & Wellar, 2008).  From the initial 
responses to the Round 1 questions, I developed the Delphi second round questionnaire.  For 
Round 1 of this study, participants commented on a list of reasons for accidents in the electric 
power industry, provided additional reasons for accidents, proffered possible solutions to 
accidents, and suggested ways to prevent further and future accident events. 
In the second round, participants provided information on the desirability and feasibility 
of possible issues identified in the first round.  The solutions then formed the basis for the Round 
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3 questionnaire where participants explored the importance of the issues that met the acceptance 
criteria from Round 2.  In Round 4, participants provided their confidence and final agreement 
on the relevant and important solutions to accidents, where electrical power industry workers 
were seriously injured or killed, derived through the earlier rounds of this study. 
In Round 2, participants responded to two different and distinct 5-point Likert-type 
scales; one for responses that they considered as desirable and another for what they considered 
as feasible. Where 70% or more of the participant responses selected a score of 3 or more on 
both Likert-type scale for an issue, the same item remained for inclusion in the Round 3 
questionnaire (Brady, 2015).  In Round 3 I provided information feedback on Round 2, via 
Survey Monkey, to each participant, and this contained comments about the overall responses 
that differed from the response from that particular participant.  For each Round 3 question, the 
participants were invited to review the feedback and to provide a response on a 5-point Likert-
type scale developed to measure the importance of the solutions (Brady, 2015; Heitner et al., 
2013). 
This process continued until the results from the exercise met the consensus condition 
that I set or if there was no likelihood of a consensus.  If there were no consensus, the study 
would have ended prematurely with a contrary conclusion.  I set the necessary conditions for 
consensus or agreement condition.  As an example, more than 70% of the participants must 
support a point by selecting a score of more than 2 on the Likert-type scale for any item to reach 
a consensus after the study.  This condition signified that the item is desirable, feasible, 
important, and with the confidence of more than 70% of the Delphi panelists. If for any question, 
70% or more of the participants selected a score of 1 or 2 on the 5-point Likert-type scale then 
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the consensus point remained unmet.  Heitner et al. (2013) used a similar approach to determine 
consensus: A statistical determination made with more than 80% of the respondents’ responses 
for each question. 
I assumed great responsibility for ensuring that information shared with the research 
participants were correctly analyzed and did not misinform the experts about progress on the 
study.  I could have influenced actual expert-participant responses and effectively bias the study 
in this way.  The main research aim was to encourage free thinking and not to condition reactions 
in an artificial and biased manner (Hsu & Sandford, 2007; Sandrey & Bulger, 2008).  If the 
research did not end after the fourth round, participants might have become disinterested and not 
continue to provide quality feedback (Hsu & Sandford, 2007).  Research delay was also possible 
if I was unable to return feedback on the participants’ responses promptly (Hsu & Sandford, 
2007). 
Linstone and Turoff (2011) indicated that a weakness of the Delphi was that researchers 
did not press expert participants far enough to encourage them to change opinions, to think 
differently, and to challenge their fundamental assumptions.  Linstone and Turoff (2011) further 
suggested that researchers should focus more on divergent thinking and why experts feel 
differently about critical issues rather than shared and convergent positions that provide 
consensus.  A low drop-off rate of research participants was usually a good indication of research 
credibility and resulted in confidence.  The acceptable sample size for a Delphi technique was 
often around 12 to 20 participants (Hsu & Sandford, 2007).   
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Participant Selection Logic 
Electricity was a widely known hazard, and it was dangerous if not managed, just like 
fire (Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al., 1999).  Experienced electric power industry managers, 
supervisors, skilled workers, and trainers were practitioners with the ability to recognize the 
dangers associated with electricity and the other hazards associated with work activities in this 
sphere.  Practitioners with more than 10 years in this industry should possess sufficient industry 
knowledge, understanding of systems, technologies, rules, procedures, and regulatory framework 
that drive this industry (Albert & Hallowell, 2013).    
Hsu and Sandford (2007) advised that a careful selection of research expert participant 
candidates was crucial to the eventual success of the study.  Linstone and Turoff (1975) and 
Hallowell and Gambatese (2010), indicated that experts for Delphi studies must be highly 
regarded, respected, and well-known in the area of focus for the study.  Baker, Lovell, and Harris 
(2006) described experts suitable for Delphi technique as individuals with knowledge, 
experience, understanding of policies, procedures as well as the practices and how these were 
relevant for the field.    
For this study, practicing, experienced, and knowledgeable electric power industry 
managers, supervisors, workers, and trainers formed a purposive sample of experts.  This 
normative Delphi approach aimed to determine how to prevent fatal and serious accidents that 
were happening in the U.S. electric power industry.  Experts were individuals sourced through 
Social Media (LinkedIn).   
For this study, an expert panelist satisfied three criteria: (a) was a manager, supervisor, 
trainer, or worker in the electric power industry; (b) had more than 10 years of industry practice 
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and experience; and (c) had knowledge about accidents in the electric power industry in the 
United States.  Five participants in each category, manager, supervisor, trainer, or worker, were 
originally considered as adequate for this study.  A minimum sample size of 20 was sufficient. 
Heitner et al. (2013) considered an acceptable sample size of 30.  For drop-offs, higher than 10% 
would negatively impact research influence and success (Hsu & Sandford, 2007).  To cater for 
this possibility, I focussed on prompt feedback to participants and careful analysis of data so that 
consensus could become possible without participants compromising their individual views in 
favor of group thinking (Hsu & Sandford, 2007).  For this study, a similar approach to that used 
by Heitner et al. (2013) was an acceptable option.  The number of research participants would 
vary depending on the research topic and my preference.  Saturation of information depended on 
the actual research problem, the number of participants, and my focus (Heitner et al., 2013).  
Hallowell and Gambatese (2010) cautioned that the sample size must always accommodate 
possible participant drop-off during the study and therefore the minimum sample size must be 
avoided and not researcher preferred.  That avoidance was essential for maintaining research 
credibility.  Hsu and Sandford (2007) cautioned that a large expert sample could make the data 
difficult to manage and thus can require longer times for researcher processing and analysis.  
Table 5 lists different sample sizes used in previous studies.  For this study, the expectation was 
that 20 participants would provide credible results and saturation especially if there were five 
individuals in each category of participants.  Another five panelists were enlisted to start the 
study to allow for panelist drop-off before the conclusion of the process; to equal the 25 
participants who contributed to the Heitner et al. (2013) study.  A panel size greater than 30 
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could contribute to researcher inefficiencies and delays that could promote panelist drop-out 
(Yousuf, 2007).  
Table 5 
Recommended Sample Size Source Different Source 
7 – 10 Linstone and Turoff, (1975) Donohoe and Needham 
(2009) 
3 - 80 Rowe and Wright (1999)  
15 - 20 Delbecq, Van de Ven, and 
Gustafson (1975) 
Hsu and Sandford (2007) 
>20 Heitner et al. (2013) Van Hecke et al. (2015) 
Note. Sample sizes from previous studies 
 
Selection of participants for multi-round Delphi study.  For this normative Delphi 
study, invitees were potential experts from each of the operating across the United States.  I sent 
correspondence to well regarded regulatory agencies and professional organizations requesting 
assistance in identifying possible participants for this study.  I also searched public social media 
(LinkedIn) for possible participants. Participants for this study needed to satisfy the conditions 
listed for an Expert Panelist previously defined in Chapter 1.  An expert panelist was an 
individual who met three criteria: (a) be a manager, supervisor, trainer, or worker in the electric 
power industry; (b) have more than ten years of industry practice and experience; (c) have 
knowledge about accidents in the electric power industry in the United States.  
E-mail invitations via Survey Monkey went to other prospective candidates; this 
happened when I received feedback from potential candidates identified through LinkedIn.  No 
participant was accepted for this study before I conducted a suitability check.  I required that 
participants provide demographic information on their years of industry experience, particulars 
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about their specialty, certification, and education; Participants, identified from LinkedIn, were 
requested to confirm their information publicly available through that medium. 
Each participant received a personal request which aligned with the Walden University 
policies for researching human subjects.  All regulatory requirements at the federal, state, 
regional, industry, and professional levels were satisfied in the pursuit of this study.  The 
invitation (via Survey Monkey) included information about the purpose of this study.  It included 
a summary of the research methodology, the level of contribution and requested participation 
from potential participants, an estimate of the time that they were asked to commit, reasons why 
the individual was suitable, and how vital and valuable this study is. 
Instrumentation  
The first round research focus came from the literature review conducted as part of this 
study.  The reasons for accidents, worker deaths, and injuries, as identified in previous studies 
were I analyzed before the commencement of the Delphi process. The data derived from the 
literature review guided the development of questions for Round 1 of the Delphi process.  
Demographic information about the participants gleaned from questions added for this specific 
purpose.  These questions are in Appendix E.  I grouped the Round 1 questions in a manner that 
would come from the literature review and the research questions which aligned the reasons for 
worker fatalities and injuries from accidents occurring in the U.S. electric power industry and 
why these occurred.  
Round 1 commenced when the expert panelists received the questionnaire, accessed 
through Survey Monkey.  Results of Round 1 were analyzed to find the major themes about 
possible solutions as identified from the Delphi panelists responses and coded in line with the 
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Bolman and Deal four-frame model.  These themes formed the basis for Round 2 questions 
where participants responded on a 5-point Likert-type scale to each of the issues identified in 
Round 1.  The items derived from Round 2 provided input for the Round 3 questionnaire.  In 
Round 2, participants responded to two different and distinct 5-point Likert-type scales; one for 
responses that they considered as desirable and another where they considered how feasible 
addressing and correcting these issues were to prevent accidents, serious worker injuries and 
deaths. Where 70% or more of the participant responses selected a score of 3 or more on both 
Likert-type scales for the same issue, the item remained for inclusion in the Round 3 
questionnaire.  For each of Round 3 and Round 4,  participants responded to a 5-point Likert-
type survey.  The Likert-type scales mirrored those used by Heitner et al. (2013). Desirability in 
Round 2, rated as 5 for highly desirable to 1 for highly undesirable and feasibility rated from 5 
for definitely feasible to 1 for definitely unfeasible. Rating in Round 3 ranged from 5 to 1 for 
extremely important to not at all important respectively. Rating in Round 4 ranged from 5 to 1 
for definitely certain to unreliable.  Questions from Round 3 where 70% or more of the 
participant responses selected a score of 3 or more on the 5-point Likert-type scale were treated 
as important, and as a consensus item.  In Round 4 participants rated their confidence in the 
overall findings of consensus-based solutions emergent from Round 3.      
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
Data collection from participating experts in the Delphi technique multi-round process 
came from details volunteered about their competencies which justified their selection consistent 
with a definition of expert I provided.  For Round 1, participants received the questionnaire via 
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Survey Monkey.  This questionnaire listed questions I set , and determined from the literature 
review conducted as part of this study (see Appendix E).   
For the first round of this study, I provided a listing of possible reasons about how 
accidents happened in the U.S. electric power industry and invited participants’ comments and 
responses.  Participants provided an understanding of what to do to prevent future accidents.  
Novakowski and Wellar (2008) suggested that the participants should be allowed to indicate 
other pertinent information relevant at this stage of the process and not captured before in the set 
of Round 1 questions.  I conducted data collation and coding from this phase and developed a 
summary of the top solutions identified by 70% or more participants in Round 1.  This summary 
was on the opening page of Round 2.  
In Round 2, participants responded, via Survey Monkey, to two different and distinct 5-
point Likert-type scales; one for responses that they considered as desirable and another where 
they considered how feasible addressing and correcting these issues were to prevent accidents, 
serious worker injuries and deaths. Where 70% or more of the participant responses selected a 
score of 3 or more on both Likert-type scales for the same issue, the item remained for inclusion 
in the Round 3 questionnaire.  For each of Round 3 and Round 4,  participants responded to a 5-
point Likert-type survey.  The Likert-type scales mirrored those used by Heitner et al. (2013). 
Desirability in Round 2, rated as 5 for highly desirable to 1 for highly undesirable and feasibility 
rated from 5 for definitely feasible to 1 for definitely unfeasible.  I then provided the results of 
Round 2 and a survey developed for the Round 3 via Survey Monkey.  The participants then 
responded to each Round 3 question and ranked these according to the five ratings on the Likert-
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type scale from "not important at all" to "extremely important" based on their understanding of 
the importance of the issue.   
My aim in Round 3 was determining the importance of different points derived from 
Round 2.  For Round 4, responses from Round 3 where 70% or more of the participant responses 
selected a score of 3 or more on the 5-point Likert-type scale; were treated as important and 
extracted.  In Round 4 participants rated their confidence in the overall findings of consensus-
based solutions emergent from Round 3.   These solutions, based on the Delphi panelists 
responses, to accidents in the electrical power industry where workers were seriously injured or 
killed and derived through the different Delphi rounds of this study, might prove integral to the 
prevention of future accidents in this industry and elsewhere.  The study ended after Round 4.  A 
real consensus in this study came from important, desirable, and feasible factors that were agreed 
to by the Delphi panelists.  The factors identified as desirable and feasible and important 
constituted the major findings of this study.  The desirable and feasible factors that were not 
deemed important could provide opportunities for further research. 
For each round of this study, I sent an email via Survey Monkey to each participant, and 
they had two weeks to respond to the questionnaire.  I programmed a reminder email on Survey 
Monkey for participants who did not respond after the first week.  For each round, the 
questionnaire closed after two weeks.  Afterward, the participants were no longer be able to 
access the questionnaire.  I performed data analysis at the close of each round and developed 
questionnaires for Round 2, Round 3, and Round 4 accordingly.  Once the research ended, after 
Round 4, I forwarded to each participant a “thank you” communication to formally close the 
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Delphi exercise.  I provided a summary document listing the main research results to each 
participant as part of the process close-out.   
Data Analysis Plan 
Data from participants responses derived from the Delphi Round 1 are analyzed 
thematically based on a review of common terms and ideas. A further grouping of the codes 
derived from the thematic approach according to the Bolman and Deal four-frame model (as 
shown in Table 2 in Chapter 2 Overview of the Four-Frame Model) followed. This grouping then 
guides the development of questions for the Delphi Round 2.  Given that participants are 
electrical power industry practitioners, there were similar terms used by these individuals in their 
responses to the questions.  I searched for these common terms and grouped them into the same 
data category.  As an example, a high voltage power line and a high-power installation had the 
same meaning once I identified the context of each response.  I conducted an examination and 
coding analysis of participant responses based on consensus and commonality of terms used, 
individual views, the frequency of use of words,  and concepts.  I then assessed the data derived 
from the word frequency, grouped them into broad categories, and identified fundamental ideas 
and issues.  This approach was used to reduce different responses from Round 1 into broad 
categories from which I developed the Round 2 questions.  This thematic analysis proved 
beneficial as it allowed for the organization of the questions in Round 2 in a logical, systematic 
way while seeking participant responses from Round 2 and in the later rounds. 
Assessment and analysis of responses received from the Delphi Round 1, was done by 
tagging of different themes that evolved from the data derived from the Delphi process and other 
broader groups where multiple themes, aligned with analysis.  The identification of actual 
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themes and data categories, in this study, occurred when the responses from the Delphi Round 1 
exercise are obtained and assessed.  I analyzed the participants' responses from Round 1 by 
employing a direct transfer of data from Survey Monkey into NVivo 12 Plus. Each response 
from Round 1 formed the input for the Round 2 questionnaire.  
The aim in Round 2 was to determine the desirability and feasibility of the issues 
identified in Round 1 about the solutions to these accidents, and how to prevent other accidents.  
The items from Round 2 with a score of 3 or higher on the Likert-type scale and endorsed by 
70% or more respondents proceeded to Round 3.  The aim of Round 3 was to determine the 
importance of possible solutions after Round 2.  Data received from each expert in the Delphi 
Round 3 with a score of 3 or higher on the Likert-type scale and endorsed by 70% or more 
respondents for each item proceeded to Round 4.  For each item on the Round 3 questionnaire, 
the Delphi panelists were asked to indicate their choice from most important to not important in 
determining solutions to workplace accidents.  Most important was reflected as a five (5) on the 
Likert-type scale for Round 3 and not important was the lowest rank (Heitner et al., 2013).   
In Round 4 participants rated their confidence in the overall findings of consensus-based 
solutions emergent from Round 3 for accidents where electrical power industry workers may 
become seriously injured or killed.  Dalkey and Helmer (1963) suggested that these were 
powerful tools that could describe data in a simple but effective manner.  Hsu and Sandford 
(2007), Heitner et al. (2013), and Linstone and Turoff, (1975) converged on this view.    
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Issues of Trustworthiness 
Credibility 
The primary attribute for a credible study was how believable it was.  In a Delphi study, 
consensus promoted that belief.  As the research participants remained anonymous, it was 
imperative that I crafted the research documentation so that the quality of the responses and the 
awareness of the participants blended to widespread acceptability that they were appropriate and 
sufficient to review the research problem and questions.  That required researcher vigilance and 
diligence to prevent possible bias in participant selection and their responses to the items on the 
different questionnaires (Houghton et al., 2013).  Keeping a reflective research journal 
(McGuinness & Brien, 2007), exercising a process of bracketing (Tufford & Newman, 2012), 
and achieving saturation from the responses of the Delphi panelists, supported research 
credibility. Confidence derived from Round 4 deliberations in this study also supported research 
credibility.   
This researcher did not favor the pre-test as it would have been only possible after the 
research participants were known and selected.  My dependence on previously available studies 
and data, an assessment of that data using the Bolman and Deal four-frame model, and data 
derived from the Delphi technique supported research credibility.  I also achieved credibility by 
keeping a reflexive journal and audit traceable documentation. 
Transferability 
Patton (2015) indicated that transferability surrounded the responsibility I assumed as the 
researcher to ensure that results derived can be scrutinized and the process can find relevance in 
other research areas.  One risk for this current study was that it focussed on the U.S. electric 
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power industry.  It was possible that the unique nature of this industry made transferability 
challenging.  Transferability could also depend on how convincing I was in describing the 
research sampling methods, the process of selecting research participants, and how well the 
results were crafted and believable.  This study could prove useful in further studies conducted 
on the U.S. electrical power industry and elsewhere.  
Dependability 
The efficiency with which I recorded the research process, the quality of data and the 
consistency achieved throughout the study were vital for the dependability of the study (Ravitch 
& Carl, 2016).  My first test as the researcher was to provide consistent details to each Delphi 
panelist for a proper understanding of the process and what their roles were.  I improved the 
likelihood of providing consistent details as indicated by keeping and utilizing a reflective 
research journal (McGuinness & Brien, 2007).  The best indication of research dependability was 
panelist dropouts from the process, before the completion of the overall exercise, as that could 
have brought the results into focus and possibly derail the entire study. Dropouts in a study 
where the participants could become disinterested or if the process was confusing and not 
providing for consensus negatively impact the dependability of the study (Dalkey & Helmer, 
1963; Hsu & Sandford, 2007; Linstone & Turoff, 1975; Yousuf, 2007). 
Confirmability 
Patton (2015) suggested that research bias was a critical influence on research 
confirmability.  Yin (2013) extended this into the tangible evidence from any research which, if 
invalid, can set conditions for research challenge and loss of confirmability.  In this study, the 
focus on maintaining data that could be reproduced to substantiate research thinking and 
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direction was paramount in ensuring research confirmability.  Strategies for data coding, for 
example, were sufficient to encourage support reproducibility of the research exercise.  The 
conceptual framework for this study, Bolman and Deal four-frame model, supported and fully 
explained strategic suitability, relevance, and confidence (Bolman & Deal, 2013).  That was a 
possible risk to the research confirmability in this study.  It was a versatile and practical model 
and not considered high risk or as a concern to the successful completion of this research.  I 
enhanced research dependability by keeping appropriate research records that can provide for 
successful audit trails (Tufford & Newman, 2012).   
Ethical Procedures 
Research students at Walden University must comply with the research guidelines set by 
the institution.  These guidelines referenced the university accepted standards of ethics and the 
federal regulations that governed research work.  IRB review of the current research maintained 
these standards (Walden University, 2018).  As the researcher, I accepted my responsibility to 
maintain the highest ethical, research, and moral standards as I aimed to accomplish this research 
into the prevention of fatal and serious accidents in the U.S. electric power industry.  
Before contacting individuals to determine whether they may be suitable as Delphi 
panelists, I received IRB approval.  The Walden  University IRB approval number is 02‐28‐19‐
0648285 which will expire on February 27, 2020.  A participant consent form was drafted and 
submitted to the IRB for that approval.  The IRB clarified all permissions needed for this study.  
This approval was necessary before personal communication with prospective panelists 
occurred.  That communication included an informed consent form which guaranteed that 
participation in this study was voluntary and contact information so that the individual could 
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query concerns or questions that they had.  The informed consent communication on Survey 
Monkey with research participants included the research question and purpose.  The research 
risks, benefits, and a reminder that panelists can withdraw from the study if that option was 
preferred were also in the informed consent communication.  No personal information was 
solicited outside of vital demographics necessary to ensure an audit trail and for research 
credibility.  The Informed Consent form was the initial page of the Survey Monkey survey. 
Potential participants saw the informed consent and were asked to click that they agreed.  If there 
was agreement, they continued with the survey.  If they disagreed the survey ended, and Survey 
Monkey thanked them for participating.  It was not possible or practical to remove the data 
provided in the earlier Delphi-Rounds by participants who withdrew. 
The use of a Likert-type survey conducted through Survey Monkey removed 
opportunities to link individual panelist response to particular questions or answers.  I solely 
maintained all research materials and data and will continue to do so for five years as required by 
Walden University.  I was the sole individual who was responsible for maintaining 
confidentiality in this research.  Participants were asked to provide some demographic 
information. No identifying information was necessary.  Participant-to-participant anonymity 
was guaranteed.  The identities of the Delphi panelists will not be published or communicated in 
data linked to this study.  I ensured that safeguards were in place to maintain this data anonymity 
guarantee.  First, all data was encrypted, password protected, and devoid of emails or traceable 
demographic indicators.  I retained sole responsibility for password maintenance.   
Delphi panelists were assigned a random identifier, through Survey Monkey, to maintain 
anonymity.  All electronic data from this study is kept in an external hard-drive locked at a 
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commercial bank safety deposit box maintained by me.  I will destroy this data after the fifth 
year in line with the Walden University guarantee of the keeping of individual and personal 
information for five years after the study.  I accepted responsibility for maintaining panelist 
anonymity and for the coordination of communications between the panelist and researcher in a 
manner that can be scrutinized by the IRB should the panelist have questions for me as the 
researcher or the IRB. 
Summary 
This research was conducted to determine ways to prevent fatal and serious accidents that 
are occurring in the U.S. electric power industry.  Included in this chapter was a description of 
the research methodology.  A normative Delphi technique was preferred.  The aim was that with 
this effort, the findings were meaningful and could be used to help improve working 
arrangements to avert workplace accidents in the U.S. electric power industry.  The research 
structure included a detailed description of how to conduct the research and the actual research 
question explored.  Since any research of this kind must address the human ethical and moral 
guidelines set by the University and the Federal Government; all actions and arrangements that 
followed fully complied with these requirements.  The data management arrangements, as well 
as the advantages and disadvantages of the Delphi technique, were addressed in this chapter. 
For this normative Delphi study, the panel experts had to meet three criteria: (a) be a 
manager, supervisor, trainer, or worker in the electric power industry; (b) have more than ten 
years of industry practice and experience; (c) have knowledge about accidents in the electric 
power industry in the United States.  The measures that crucially provided for bias reduction, 
issues of trustworthiness and ethics are in this chapter; this consisted of the steps to support the 
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researcher to maintain trustworthiness, such as panelist selection, bracketing, a reflexive journal, 
and an audit trail.  The process for maintaining panelist assurance on anonymity and 
confidentiality against potential risks and IRB requirements also are in this chapter.  Chapter 4 
will involve the analysis and discussion of the research results. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
In this chapter, I present the results of this Delphi study on possible actions that can be 
taken to prevent workplace accidents in the U.S. electric power industry.  This research is an 
investigation designed from factors identified in previous studies as causes of accidents and the 
subsequent exploration to determine if practicing experts believed that these factors were 
relevant to the U.S. electric power industry.  The effort also involved consideration of how to 
prevent these accident causal factors on the assumption that by preventing accidents, workers 
will not suffer serious injuries or be killed when working.  
The research question was: What is the consensus of opinion of a panel of experts in the 
electrical power industry regarding desirable and feasible solutions to fatal and serious 
workplace accidents occurring in the United States?  
To answer this question, I sought consensus practicing experts from the U.S. electric 
power industry via a four-round normative Delphi study.  Practitioners satisfied pre-set criteria 
before becoming participants.  For this study, an expert was an individual who meets three 
criteria: (a) be a manager, supervisor, trainer, or worker in the electric power industry; (b) have 
more than 10 years of industry practice and experience; and (c) have knowledge about accidents 
in the electric power industry in the United States. 
The study was a complex one, with 28 of the 30 questions from Round 1 being voted by 
participants as relevant to the U.S. electric power industry and on the number of possible 
solution responses in Round 1. This reality required data analysis to be much more detailed than 
I initially expected, and as a result, the study did not mirror the original intention as described in 
Chapter 3. This departure was because of the volume and varied responses that 26 of the 
164 
 
participants provided to 28 different items in the Round 1 questionnaire. To maintain a 
manageable study, I preserved the same format of the questionnaire throughout the Delphi 
rounds. Each question required a response using a 5-point Likert-type scale, as described in 
Chapter 3. For Round 2, I developed the questionnaire after an analysis conducted on the 
solution data that participants provided in Round 1. The Round 2 questionnaire is in Appendix F. 
By maintaining the exact solution responses, rather than the grouped solutions responses as 
shown in Tables 9, 10, and 11, critical details were kept for the entire study. In Round 3, I 
requested that participants list their answer on a 5-point Likert-type scale to rate the importance 
for each item. This approach was a departure from the original intent: It was expected, but not 
categorically detailed in Chapter 3 that, for Round 3, participants would rank the importance of 
desirable and feasible solutions derived from Round 2.  In Round 4, I asked participants to list 
their answer on a 5-point Likert-type scale to indicate confidence in the entire study. Instead, the 
questionnaire was done for participants to note confidence in each item. This approach was also 
a departure from the original intent. For Round 4, participants indicated their confidence in 
individual items of that questionnaire instead of the entire study.  
This chapter includes sections on (a) research setting, (b) demographics, (c) data 
collection, (d) data analysis, (e) evidence of trustworthiness, and (f) the study results. 
Research Setting 
Skulmoski, Hartman, and Krahn (2007) suggested that the Delphi study is useful for 
determining whether consensus could exist among anonymous individuals, as experts, on topics 
that are challenging and complex.  The Delphi methodology allowed me to confirm that the 
literature review I conducted as part of the preparation for this study was relevant, appropriate, 
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and applicable to the real focus on the electric power industry (see Hsu & Sandford, 2007; 
Yousuf, 2007).  The four different rounds of deliberations by the expert panelists were consistent 
with similar Delphi studies conducted by Linstone and Turoff (2011) and Delbecq, Van de Ven, 
and Gustafson (1975).  
Electric power industry practitioners from across the United States were invited to 
participate in this study.  Participation in this study was voluntary.  Each of the invitees had to 
consent to participate before being accepted and permitted access to the Round 1 questions.  I 
received Walden University IRB approval before for seeking possible participants, which 
occurred by invitation on public social media.  The Walden University approval number is 02‐
28-19-0648285.  I used LinkedIn to search for suitable study candidates.  Emails were sent to 
two of the more recognized institutions with a broad reach in the U.S. electric industry; 
consistent with IRB approval.  One of the institutions has responsibility for reliability regulation, 
while the other is an internationally recognized professional association.  There was no response 
to these emails.  I then searched for electric industry practitioners on LinkedIn, a purposeful 
search with 320 invitations, 27 positive responses, and the only participants in this study.  Each 
of the participants satisfied the requisite ask for an expert in this study.  
I then sent a formal invitation to each candidate via SurveyMonkey.  Once the candidate 
responded, I sent a consent request to the candidate via SurveyMonkey.  The IRB approved the 
consent request sent to prospective participants by issuing the approval number for this study.  
The Round 1 questionnaire was available to participants only after the invitee provided consent 
and returned the form to me via Survey Monkey. 
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Demographics 
The geographical area from which the participants came spanned the mainland United 
States and included Hawaii.  The average length of service for participants in the electric power 
industry was 25.2 years.  There were three (3) individuals who started their careers as workers 
and remained workers at the time of this study. These individuals were a power station 
electrician (31 years service), a line worker/forrester (17 years service), and another electrician 
(17 years service).  Seven (7) participants began their careers as workers and eventually became 
supervisors.  These participants had an average of 28.14 years of service.  Only two (2) of these 
individuals remained supervisors at the time of this study; a general foreman and a 
lineman/foreman/general foreman.  The others became trainers, professionals, or managers.  
Eleven participants were supervisors at one point during their careers.  Six (6) participants 
indicated that they were trainers at some point in their careers. Only one of these individuals was 
hired as a trainer and was a trainer for 15 years at the time of this study.  Two individuals were 
supervisors before becoming trainers, with 42 and 38 years of service.  Three trainers eventually 
became managers, while another two trainers became professionals.  Eleven (11) participants 
were electric industry professionals.  There were 12 managers, as represented in Tables 6 and 7.  
Only two (2) managers began their careers as managers.  Four (4) of these individuals 
started as professionals.  Their service lengths were 43, 38, 37, and 15 years in the U.S. electric 
power industry.  Another manager began as a trainer and had 38 years service.  Two (2) 
managers started as workers and moved to supervisors, trainers, professionals before becoming 
managers.  Their industry experience was 51 and 42 years.  I removed participants' identities, as 
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this was a condition set for this study included in the consent agreement between me and each 
participant.     
Table 6  
  
 Participant 
Yrs 
Service Worker Supervisor Trainer Professional Manager 
New York #1 38   T   M  
Montana  #2 37    P M 
Texas  #3 16 W  T P  
Texas  #4 31 W     
New York #5 16     M 
New York #6 42 W S T  M 
Missouri  #7 30 W S   M 
Philadelphia #8 30 W S  P  
Texas  #9 51 W  T  M 
Arizona #10 30 W S    
Washington 
D.C. #11 10    P  
Georgia #12 36 W S T P  
New York #13 43    P M 
Mississippi #14 20  S    
New York #15 31     M 
California #16 10  S   M 
North 
Carolina #17 20  S  P  
New York #18 15    P M 
Hawaiian 
Islands  #19 20  S   M 
Missouri #20 19 W S    
Mississippi  #21 10 W S    
San 
Francisco 
Bay  #22 15    P  
 Missouri #23 38    P M 
Idaho #24 24    P  
Florida #25 17 W     
New Jersey #26 17 W     
Texas  #27 15   T   
Number of Invitees  12 11 6 11 12 
320 27.42 24.27 33.00 25.82 30.92 
Managers who started as Workers = 2 Average # Years Service  = 46.50  
Professionals started as Workers = 3 Average # Years Service  = 27.33  
Trainers who started as Workers = 4 Average # Years Service  = 36.25  
Supervisors started as Workers = 7 Average # Years Service  = 28.14  
Workers who started as Workers = 3 Average # Years Service  = 21.67  
   Average Service (Yrs)  25.22  
Note: Participant Information      
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Table 7  
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Data Collection 
In Round 1, each of the participants had an opportunity to indicate whether the 30 
different reasons for workplace accidents, as I developed based on previous studies, were 
relevant and pertinent in the electric power industry.  Participants were also asked to provide 
other reasons for why accidents occurred not covered in the list developed for Round 1 and what 
they considered as ways of preventing further accidents in the electric power industry.  I used 
possible solutions to prevent accidents suggested by the participants in Round 1 to develop the 
questionnaire for Round 2 of the Delphi study.  In Round 2, participants considered whether 
these solutions were desirable and feasible.  In Round 3, participants were asked to identify the 
important items, while in Round 4, they indicated their confidence with the list of overall 
solutions and preventative methods, derived from the earlier rounds, based on importance, 
feasibility, and desirability.  I provided separate 5-point Likert-type scales for participant 
response for feasibility and desirability in Round 2; another 5-point Likert-type scale for 
importance in Round 3, and a final 5-point Likert-type scale for confidence in Round 4. 
Solutions in this study were only accepted if items were scored as a 3 or more on each Likert-
type scale by 70% or more of the participants. 
Prior to beginning Round 1, I estimated that the average time to complete each of the four 
questionnaires was less than 30 minutes.  There were 27 participants in Round 1, 25 in Round 2, 
24 in Round 3, and 23 participants completing Round 4.  The average time taken by participants 
in Round 1 to complete the questionnaire was approximately three hours.  Two participants took 
more than 24 hours while another participant took more than 17 hours to complete the Round 1 
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exercise. In Round 2, the average time taken was 30 minutes while they took an average time of 
9 minutes in Round 3 and 67 minutes in Round 4. 
Participants in Round 1 were asked to provide solutions to accidents for each item on the 
questionnaire and to indicate the possible challenges.  The responses were collated for each 
question and then analyzed using the NVivo 12 Plus qualitative analysis software.  I used the 
responses to develop a word cloud for each question and followed that with a word tree analysis.  
These pictorially represented critical words identified by the study participants.  That way, I had 
a good indication of the common terms used by the participants and the context of these words 
and phrases.  I then conducted auto-coding, sentiment coding, and researcher manual coding 
afterward.  The auto-coding was done first to provide me with a view of the participants' 
responses and for a review to determine how relevant these could be in the data analysis.  I then 
manually conducted sentiment coding (positive and negative).  That indicated participants’ 
response perspective, which preceded my manual coding.  The manual coding involved the use 
of industry-relevant terms, the other questions on the Round 1 questionnaire, and themes that I 
deciphered from the word cloud, word tree, auto-coding, and sentiment coding done before.  I 
then conducted a manual coding in line with the four-frames as offered by Bolman and Deal, 
which was the conceptual framework adopted in this study.  This coding approach occurred for 
each of the 30 items listed in the Round 1 questionnaire.  Appendix I includes all coding done as 
part of this study and more detailed information.   
Data Analysis 
Table 8 above shows the Yes responses, as a percentage, for each issue, from Round 1, to 
indicate whether these contributed to accidents, serious worker injuries, and fatalities in the 
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electric power industry.  Participants provided solutions to each of the 30 items in Table 8.  Two 
of these items were not supported with a yes-response by 70% or more of the participants, and I 
removed them from further consideration in this study.   
The deleted items were Poor Regulatory Oversight, with 59.26% participant yes-response 
support, and Incorrect Labeling with 66.67%.  I also removed the solutions provided in Round 1 
for these two items from further consideration in the study.  Each of the issues where more than 
70% of the participants provided a yes-response remained for further consideration in Round 2 of 
the Delphi study.   
As an example, Q4 in Round 1 was: List at least one way to prevent accidents that may 
be caused by "Poor work ethics; history of wrongdoing that went unaddressed."  What are the 
possible challenges? 
There was a 92.59% yes- response to question Q4 with 26 different solutions forwarded 
by participants for poor work ethics: history of wrongdoing that went unaddressed: This is shown 
in Appendix J. From the Q4 solutions, a word cloud, word tree, auto-coding, and sentiment 
coding was done using NVivo 12 Plus before I conducted manual coding in line with the Bolman 
and Deal four-frames.  
Figure 12 shows the word cloud generated for Poor work ethics; history of wrongdoing 
that went unaddressed. The associated word tree was developed by conducting word search 
queries based on the word cloud. The top words were work, safety, and practices. Figure 13 
shows the Word Tree developed for work (the top word from the word cloud). auto-coding of the 
data followed, as shown in Figure 14. Figure 15 includes sentiments done afterward. 
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Table 8  Round 1 Causes that participants provided solutions 
% Yes Question Remarks 
70.37 A: Q1: Poor Design Move to Next Round  
88.89 B: Q2: Management System Flaw Move to Next Round  
59.26 Q3: Poor Regulatory Oversight Drop  
92.59 
C: Q4: Poor work ethics; history of wrongdoing that went 
unaddressed 
Move to Next Round  
66.67 Q5: Incorrect labeling Drop  
85.19 D: Q6: Medical and other personal issues Move to Next Round  
88.89 E: Q7: Grounding, earthing failures / errors Move to Next Round  
88.89 F: Q8: Ineffective and inefficient maintenance Move to Next Round  
70.37 G: Q9: Animals / living organisms Move to Next Round  
92.59 H: Q10: Hazardous worksite conditions Move to Next Round  
96.30 I: Q11: Unplanned events Move to Next Round  
96.30 J: Q12: Inappropriate work methods Move to Next Round  
81.48 K: Q13: Stakeholder demands Move to Next Round  
96.30 L: Q14: Poor judgment by individuals or work crews Move to Next Round  
88.89 M: Q15: Poor attitude and or behavior by individuals or work crews Move to Next Round  
92.59 N: Q16: Ineffective or no workplace training Move to Next Round  
92.59 O: Q17: Poor supervision Move to Next Round  
96.30 P: Q18: Work planning Move to Next Round  
85.19 Q: Q19: Management priorities Move to Next Round  
92.59 R: Q20: Poor team communication Move to Next Round  
81.48 S: Q21: Willful disregard for safety rules Move to Next Round  
81.48 T: Q22: Permit to work violations Move to Next Round  
96.30 U: Q23: Lock-out tag-out non-compliance Move to Next Round  
92.59 V: Q24: Organizational safety culture Move to Next Round  
92.59 W: Q25: Individual risk taking and negligence Move to Next Round  
92.59 X: Q26: Equipment failure Move to Next Round  
88.89 Y: Q27: Procedural error Move to Next Round  
88.89 Z: Q28: Poor management oversight Move to Next Round  
70.37 AA: Q29: Poor quality material Move to Next Round  
92.59 AB: Q30: Non-use or personal protective equipment Move to Next Round  
Note: Data from Round 1 of Delphi study 
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Figure 12: Word Cloud (Poor work ethics; history of wrongdoing that went unaddressed) 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Word Tree (Poor work ethics; history of wrongdoing that went unaddressed) 
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Figure 14 Auto-Coding (Poor work ethics; history of wrongdoing that went unaddressed) 
 
Figure 15: Sentiments ((Poor work ethics; history of wrongdoing that went unaddressed) 
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I then conducted manual coding; shown in Fig 16. 
 
Figure 16: Researcher Conducted Manual Coding 
Finally, I conducted coding consistent with the four-frames as espoused by Bolman and 
Deal; shown in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17: Group Query 
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I conducted a similar analysis for each of the other problem items where participants 
provided solution responses: shown in Appendix K. 
 Table 9 contains a summary of the top three solutions for each problem item where more 
than 70% of participants in Round 1 provided a yes-response to accident causation: Problems 
listed in Table 8 (with Poor Regulatory Oversight and Incorrect Labeling removed after Round 
1).  Solutions shown in Table 9, were Focus on People; S1, Work Standards; S2, Safety 
Management; S3, Workplace Training; S4, Management; S5, and Supervision; S6.   
Solutions to Poor work ethics; History of wrongdoing that went unaddressed emerged 
from this analysis. These were Management-S5 (31% coding reference), Safety Management -S3 
(16%), and Focus on People-S1 (15%).  Similarly, the top three solutions for problem A (Poor 
Design) were Work Standards-S2 (28% coding reference), Management-S5 (28%), and 
Supervision-S6 (17%).  The top three solutions for problem AB (Non-use of Personal Protective 
Equipment) were Supervision-S6 (22% coding reference), Work Standards-S2 (19%), and Safety 
Management -S3 (19%).   
A weighted ranking of these top solutions was then done for each problem item in Table 
9 and summarized in Table 10. I used a rank multiplier of seven for the top-ranked solution for 
each problem. The other two solutions had rank multipliers of five and three, respectively.  These 
were arbitrary rankings that were used to separate the solutions derived to identify the top ranked 
solutions from the other solutions (Lourenço, & Lebensztajn; 2018). 
Focus on People, S1, included solution coding regarding qualified personnel; experts and 
consults; human performance monitoring; regular job visits; management - workers 
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communication and feedback; Individual and group behavior and habits; culture; teamwork; 
confidence; work planning and review.   
Table 9 Top 3 Solutions to Identified Problems (Round 1)  
The Top Three Solution Areas for each question in Round 1 (% Coding) 
Problems (From A, B, C,….., AB) / Solutions (S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, & S6) 
 A  B  C  D  E 
S2 28 S1 25 S5 31 S1 26 S2 58 
S5 28 S5 22 S3 16 S5 26 S4 21 
S6 17 S3 16 S1 15 S3 19 S6 17 
          
 F   G   H   I  J 
S2 21 S4 22 S3 19 S5 21 S4 19 
S3 21 S2 20 S4 19 S4 19 S5 17 
S4 20 S6 18 S2 14 S6 17 S6 16 
          
 K   L   M   N  O 
S5 27 S5 22 S6 25 S6 23 S5 21 
S6 22 S6 22 S5 23 S2 18 S6 21 
S4 18 S4 21 S2 16 S1 18 S1 16 
          
 P   Q   R   S  T 
S6 29 S5 26 S6 21 S6 22 S6 22 
S2 22 S6 22 S2 18 S5 22 S2 20 
S4 15 S2 21 S3 18 S2 19 S3 17 
          
 U   V   W   X  Y 
S2 23 S6 23 S6 24 S6 21 S6 22 
S6 22 S5 18 S5 18 S2 19 S4 19 
S3 16 S2 17 S3 17 S3 18 S2 18 
          
 Z   AA   AB     
S6 24 S6 21 S6 22     
S5 20 S4 20 S2 19     
S2 17 S3 18 S3 19     
Note: Top three solution sets 
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Table 10 Solutions to Accidents  
 Solution Areas 
Rank 
1 
PTS 
Rank 
2 
PTS 
Rank 
3 
PTS W/PTS PTS 
Focus on People   S1 2 7 0 5 3 3 23 5 
Work Standards   S2 4 7 7 5 7 3 84 18 
Safety Management   S3 1 7 2 5 9 3 44 12 
Workplace Training    S4 2 7 5 5 4 3 51 11 
Management   S5 6 7 9 5 0 3 87 15 
Supervision   S6 13 7 5 5 5 3 131 23 
Note: Top Group Solutions 
Work Standards, S2, included solutions coding regarding: maintenance; reliability; 
inspection; international best practice; compliance; technology use, diagnostic testing, and 
research; quality management systems; troubleshooting; breakdowns; calibration; construction; 
operating; performance monitoring; focus on compliance; work methods, documented standard, 
procedures, implementation of change; work planning; work monitoring and review; qualified 
and experienced workers; manufacturers instructions; spares, materials, tools, and personal 
protective equipment; safety culture, barriers, housekeeping; and equipment failure.  
Safety Management, S3, included solution coding regarding focus on safety; safety 
legislation; focus on compliance with approved work methods and procedures; culture of change; 
organizational culture; safety culture; quality of regulator inspections; distraction; individual 
obligation to inform; safe work procedures and documented standards; compliance with 
manufacturers instructions; workplace inspections; work planning, monitoring, and review; 
spares, materials, tools, and personal protective equipment; safety barriers; housekeeping; lock-
out-tag-out, permit to work; and recordkeeping. 
Workplace Training, S4, included solution coding regarding training frequency, quality, 
methods, and location ; company core values; communication and feedback; work processes, 
rules, and procedures; correcting (flaws); manufacturers instructions; compliance; work 
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planning, monitoring, and review; materials, tools, documented standards, and inspection; 
personal protective equipment; safety systems; safe work barriers; good housekeeping; 
prevention of equipment failure.  
Management, S5, included solution coding regarding management coaching and support; 
priorities, focus, and assumptions; response management and arrangements; actions; significance 
of regulator findings; regulator communication; industry stakeholders; qualitative of intake and 
recruits; disciplinary action; company-union collaboration; HR services; work planning, 
monitoring, and review; availability and quality of spares, materials, and tools; procedures and 
documented standards; organizational safety culture; equipment failure. 
Supervision, S6, included solution coding regarding supervisor support and interaction; 
confidence; knowledge; ability; involvement in job – work; work team selection; compliance 
demand; reporting; worker involvement in work planning, monitoring, and review; availability 
of spares, materials, and tools; adherence with work procedures and documented standards; work 
inspection; personal protective equipment audits and inspection; tools inspection; recordkeeping; 
Lock-Out-Tag-Out oversight; safety barriers; safety culture; permit to work arrangements; 
equipment failure. 
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
A study is worthy if the research value and process support clarity maintained throughout 
the study (Cope, 2014).  Brady (2015) described the trustworthiness as the integrity of the 
research process and the results and outcome of the study.  I was determined, in this study, to 
maintain cognizance of these requirements and not to be biased.  Houghton, Casey, Shaw, & 
Murphy (2013) suggested that bias reduction was possible if I deliberately and proactively 
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looked for opportunities to mitigate possible bias situations during the study.  Achieving 
trustworthiness means that research credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability 
have been established. 
Credibility 
The primary attribute for a credible study is how believable it is.  Credibility is the first 
strategy that I used to ensure research quality and to remove bias (Yin, 2013).  This strategy, 
exemplified in the quality of data collected during the study and by the systematic approach to 
interpret the results derived from the entire process.  Data collection in this study occurred from 
the literature search to the information developed through the four Rounds of the Delphi 
exercise.  Items moved from one Delphi round to another when supported by more than 70% of 
the participants selecting a 3, 4 or 5 on a 5-point Likert-type scale provided for each item in each 
round of the Delphi study.  Credibility developed from the systematic approach to analyzing 
qualitative data in this study.  Responses were collated for each question and analyzed using 
NVivo 12 Plus.  A word cloud and word tree analysis pictorially represented critical and 
common words participants used.  These were a good reflection of the common terms and the 
context of these words and phrases.  I conducted auto-coding of data before sentiment and 
manual coding.  I also conducted manual coding in line with the Bolman and Deal four-frame 
conceptual framework adopted in this study.  In a Delphi study, consensus promotes that belief.  
In this study, there was a consensus on 28 items.  Achieving saturation from participants’ 
responses also adds to research credibility (McGuinness & Brien, 2007).  There was data 
saturation.  Data were consistent and repeated by different participants in the Delphi (Dalkey & 
Helmer, 1963; Linstone & Turoff, 1975). 
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Transferability 
Patton (2015) postulated that transferability was applying the findings from one study to 
other research in different spheres and disciplines.  Transferability surrounds the responsibility I 
assumed to ensure that results derived can be scrutinized and the process can find relevance in 
other research areas (Patton, 2015).  It is possible that while this study covered the entire United 
States, the results are relevant in the electric power industry outside the United States; in Canada 
where I,  work, and in the Caribbean where I have extensive experience and knowledge.  There 
are issues considered in this research, including workers working in remote locations, without 
direct supervision from supervisors and managers. The study findings may, therefore, be relevant 
to other industries in the United States, such as the telecommunication and other utilities such as 
water, natural gas, transportation, and high energy industry.   
Dependability 
Dalkey and Helmer (1963) postulated that the maintenance of data consistency in 
different areas of research is a measure of dependability.  In this study, data gathering occurred 
through participants’ responses, which resulted in consensus on a topic that has real-world 
significance.  Data, sourced from an arrangement where questionnaires, were administered via 
Survey Monkey and research participants were anonymous to one another.  Data analysis was 
done through a systematic approach using NVivo 12 Plus, which involved the automatic 
generation of word clouds, word trees, and auto-codes.  These automatic analyses preceded 
manual coding in line with the conceptual framework upon which the study occurred. 
Additionally, a set criterion of 70% or more participants agreeing to a particular issue by 
selecting a 3, 4, or 5 on a Likert-type scale before that item went to the next round of the Delphi 
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study.  The efficiency with which I recorded the research process, the quality of data and the 
consistency achieved throughout the study are vital for the dependability and captured in this 
study (Ravitch & Carl, 2016).  Consistent details sent to each Delphi panelist, as approved by the 
IRB, for a proper understanding of the process and what their roles will be, also supported 
dependability (Hsu & Sandford, 2007; Yousuf, 2007).  I kept a reflective journal which 
improved research details and management (McGuinness & Brien, 2007). Participant dropouts 
did occur, but 23 individuals completed the entire four Rounds of the Delphi.  Before the 
exercise, a participant population of 20 was deemed sufficient for this study. There was data 
saturation.  Data were consistent and repeated by different participants in the Delphi (Dalkey & 
Helmer, 1963; Linstone & Turoff, 1975). 
Confirmability  
Confirmability is a measure of objective corroboration of research results by an 
independent and unbiased party (Venkatesh, Brown, & Bala, 2013).  Paton (2015) postulated that 
there is a potential for bias in qualitative studies.  Yin (2013) supported that limitations and 
biases exist on data validation, analysis, and result explanation.  Mitigation of that bias occurred 
by me as the researcher adopting a data analysis methodology where the first three assessment of 
qualitative data were automatic features of and generated using NVivo 12 Plus before the 
researcher attempted any manual coding.  Even then, the conceptual framework I selected  for 
this study guided the coding.  I was deliberate in maintaining this strategy to data analysis and 
management throughout the study.  Tufford and Newman (2012) described this as bracketing, a 
method of improving research quality by removing researcher assumptions and mitigating 
researcher bias.  In this study, the focus on maintaining data that could be reproduced to 
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substantiate research thinking and direction is one that can be reproduced and therefore, lends 
positively to research confirmability.  The conceptual framework, Bolman and Deal four-frame 
model, was suitable, relevant, and provided research confidence (Bolman & Deal, 2013). 
Study Results 
The research question was specific in the search for answers:  
What is the consensus of opinion of a panel of experts in the electrical power industry regarding 
desirable and feasible solutions to fatal and serious workplace accidents occurring in the United 
States?  
The different solution groups, S1 to S7 as in Table 11, were developed from responses 
provided by participants and further clarified in Table 12 up to and including Table 18. The 
process followed is shown in Figure 18. As discussed earlier in Chapter 4, the S1 solution group 
is a composite of the different sub-points about the group shown in Table 12. For the S2 solution 
group and each of the other solution groups from S3 to S7, the information about the respective 
sub-points is in Table 13 through to Table 18. The chart shown in Figure 18 is a simple depiction 
of the study process. That way, the logical sequence of the study can be better understood.  
Testing and collation of participant responses on solutions to problems identified in 
Round 1 in this study occurred and were measured against the study criteria. In Round 2, the 
seven leading solutions (S1 to S7) was tested to determine whether participants found them 
desirable and feasible through two separate 5-point Likert-type scales; one for feasibility and 
another for desirability for each solution item. For S1, Focus on People, each of the sub-items 
described before was listed, and participant responses noted: as shown in Table 12.  
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Figure 18: Study Process 
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Table 11 Summary of Solutions (overall rating) 
   Indicate Indicate Indicate Indicate 
Rating  % response Desirable Feasible Importance  Confidence  
6 
S1: Focus on 
People 
 Worker knowledge, 
training, behavior, 
attitudes, judgment, 
communication, and 
Related solutions 
93 92 90 87 
3 
S2: Work 
Standards 
Work Method and 
Related solutions 
97 98 97 94 
5 
S3: Safety 
Management 
Safety Management, 
Regulatory and Related 
solutions 
95 94 93 88 
4 
S4: Workplace 
Training  
Workplace Training 
and Related solutions 
96 95 95 92 
2 S5: Management 
Management Related 
solutions 
98 97 98 98 
1 S6: Supervision 
Supervisor Related 
solutions 
100 100 100 100 
7 S7: Audit/Review 
Management Audits, 
Review, and Related 
solutions 
88 92 88 78 
Note: Summary of Solutions (overall rating) 
 
From Table 11 The top rated solution group is Supervision. Management, Work Standards are 
the next two solution groups.  
There was consistent support from participants for Focus on People type solutions to 
problems where individuals were becoming accident prone, seriously injured, or killed at work. 
It was desirable for manager and supervisor attention on behavior and habits, teamwork, and 
communication type solutions. Participants felt that if qualified personnel, as knowledgeable and 
experienced practitioners, are involved in work planning, prevention of errors due to work 
missteps can occur.  
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Table 12  Focus on People Solutions 
 
 response Round 2  Round 3   Round 4      
 
 Desirable  Feasible   Importance Confidence      
Focus on 
People 
S1 93% (25) 
92% 
(25) 
  90% (24) 87% (23) 
% response Worker knowledge, 
training, behavior, attitudes, 
judgment, communication, and 
Related solutions 
# Responses 
3, 4, or 5 
 24 23   22 19 
Involvement of qualified personnel, 
expert practitioners, and 
consultants,  
 
 24 22   20 22 Monitor human performance 
 
 24 24   23 21 
Regular supervisor and manager job 
visits 
 
 23 22   20 19 
Communication and feedback 
(management - workers)  
 
 24 23   23 19  Focus on people, behavior, habits   
 
 23 22   23 21 
Work methods, procedures, and 
management of change,  work 
planning, monitoring, review, 
procedures, documented standards   
 
 22 25   20 19 
Culture, Safety Culture, problem 
identification (the why)  
 
 24 22   20 19 
Teamwork, communication, 
confidence, confidential   
 
 21 23   23 21 
Prevention of equipment 
failure  
Note: Focus on People Solutions 
Participants unanimously supported an organizational safety culture which encouraged 
involvement by all at work as feasible: prompted by managers and supervisors conducting 
regular job visits.  In Round 3, regular supervisor and manager job visits; focus on people, 
behavior, habits; and work methods, procedures, and management of change, work planning, 
monitoring, review, procedures, documented standards were most important to participants as 
Focus on People type solutions. In Round 4, participants were most confident that once 
managers and supervisors monitored human performance, prevention of workplace accidents, 
worker injuries and fatalities could occur. Overall, Focus on People type solutions were deemed 
as desirable, feasible, and important by more than 90% of participants and with 87% of them 
confident that once implemented and managed accidents prevention could occur. 
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Actual participant Focus on People type solutions response: Feeder processing requires 
applying grounds. This step is clearly outlined in orders that are provided to the operator. One 
way to prevent this is to utilize HPI tools such as 3-way communication where the order is 
repeated back to the district operator to confirm that information was understood. 
A similar analysis, conducted for S2 (Work Standards), was as listed in Table 13.   
Adopting measures aimed at the prevention of equipment failure, maintenance of safety barriers, 
an enhanced safety culture, good housekeeping, and constant vigilance of work monitoring and 
review were the most desirable and feasible Work Standards type solutions highlighted by 
participants in Round 2.  The availability of personal protective equipment and how employees 
kept these were also unanimously deemed as desirable and feasible by all of the 25 responses 
received in Round 2. In Round 3, all participants found performance monitoring, work 
monitoring and review, personal protective equipment availability and condition, safety and 
housekeeping and equipment failure prevention-type solutions as important. 
Compliance focus, technology in use, work methods change management, work design, 
and planning type solutions were deemed as important by all participants in Round 3. All 
participants were confident that this focus was needed to prevent accidents. All participants were 
also confident that a focus on diagnostic testing of apparatus and manufacturer instructions, 
together with worker training, knowledge, and experience was necessary to prevent accidents. 
Overall, Work Standards type solutions were deemed as desirable, feasible, and important by 
more than 90% of participants who were confident that once implemented and managed 
accidents could be prevented.   
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Table 13. Work Standards Solutions 
 
 
Note: Work Standards Solutions 
 
 response Round 2 Round 3 Round 4      
 
 Desirable  Feasible  Importance Confidence      
Work 
Standards 
S2 97% (25) 
98% 
(25) 
 97% (24) 94% (23) 
% response Work Method and 
Related solutions 
# Responses 
3, 4, or 5 
 24 24  24 20 Performance Monitoring 
 
 23 23  21 20 
Reliability Centered 
Maintenance, Maintenance 
scheduling and cycles, 
Recordkeeping and 
Recordkeeping   procedures 
 
 24 24  23 22 
inspection methods and 
arrangements, 
troubleshooting, breakdown 
management, equipment and 
device calibration 
 
 24 24  21 21 
Construction and Operating 
practices and procedures,  
International and Best 
Practice , Technology, 
Quality Management System 
 
 25 24  24 22 
Compliance Focus, 
Technology in Use, New 
Technology,  Work Methods 
change-management, Work 
design and planning  
 
 24 25  24 23 
Work monitoring, review, , 
documented, standard, worker 
training, knowledge and 
experience 
 
 23 25  24 23 
Diagnostic testing, Research, 
and Manufacturers 
instructions 
 
 25 25  24 21 
Available and condition of 
personal protective 
equipment, tools, and 
materials 
 
 25 25  24 22 
Safety Barriers, Safety 
Culture, and Housekeeping 
 
 25 25  24 22 
Prevention of equipment 
failure 
189 
 
Actual participant Work Standards type solutions response: Proper and effective 
maintenance can help prevent the failure of equipment, which can cause harm to individuals in 
the vicinity. Another method is to plan around the potential failure of equipment so that workers 
have barriers in between where they are working and the hazard. 
 
An analysis for S3 (Safety Management) yielded results that were similar for S1 and S2 
above; as shown in Table 14.  
Table 14 Safety Management Solutions 
 
  response Round 2 Round 3 Round 4      
 
 Desirable  Feasible  Importance Confidence      
Safety 
Management 
S3 95% (25) 
93% 
(25) 
 93% (24) 88% (23) 
% response Safety Management, 
Regulatory and Related solutions 
# Responses 
3, 4, or 5 
 24 24  24 20 Focus on safety and Legislation 
 
 25 25  24 21 
Focus on compliance, work 
methods, procedures, change 
 
 24 21  20 18 
Culture , Organizational Culture, 
Safety Culture 
 
 22 21  19 18  Quality of Regulator Inspection 
 
 23 22  24 21 
Distraction, individual obligation to 
inform, procedures, rules and 
documented standards  
 
 24 24  24 23 
Manufacturers instructions and 
other compliance 
 
 25 25  24 22 
Safety inspection, work planning, 
monitoring, and review  
 
 23 25  23 21 
Safety oversight and audits of 
materials, spares, materials, tools, 
and personal protective equipment 
 
 24 24  21 19 
Workplace training, safety Systems, 
barriers, safety culture, 
housekeeping, workplace safety 
arrangements 
 
 23 24  18 19 Prevention of equipment failure 
Note: Safety Management Solutions 
Overall, Safety Management type solutions were deemed as desirable, feasible, and 
important by more than 90% of participants and with 88% of them confident that once 
implemented and managed accidents prevention could occur. Focus on compliance, work 
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methods, procedures, change, manufacturer instructions, safety inspection, work planning, and 
review were the top solutions in this analysis: an active, direct, and forward management type 
approach that participants believed will reduce workplace errors, accidents injuries and fatalities. 
Actual participant Safety Management type solutions response: Have a Safety Program 
with a policy that reflects effective controls for any and all hazards associated with 
animals/living organisms. The Program should also consist of initial expectations training and 
periodic retraining. Conduct periodic audits. Periodically update the policy with Continuous 
Improvement in mind. 
Table 15 Workplace Training Solutions 
 
 response Round 2 Round 3 Round 4      
 
 Desirable  Feasible  Importance Confidence      
Workplace 
Training 
S4 96% (25) 
94% 
(25) 
 95% (24) 92% (23) 
% response Workplace Training 
and Related solutions 
# Responses 
3, 4, or 5 
 24 23  23 20 
Training philosophy, company 
core values training, and 
workplace training arrangements 
(cost, availability, management). 
 
 24 24  23 23 
Communication, process, 
procedures, frequency, quality, 
methods, and location  
 
 23 24  23 20 
Feedback (management - 
workers), Correct (Flaws) 
 
 25 22  24 20 
 Manufacturers instructions and 
other compliance 
 
 25 25  24 22 
Inspection, work planning, 
monitoring, and review 
 
 24 25  21 21 
Material science, use, testing, and 
maintenance of tools, work 
procedures, and documented 
standards  
 
 23 24  23 20 
Safety rules, procedures, and 
barriers, Safety Culture 
 
 24 25  22 21 Housekeeping 
 
 24 22  22 23 
Lessons from equipment failure, 
accident prevention 
Note: Workplace Training Solutions 
191 
 
An analysis for S4 (Workplace Training) yielded results that were similar for S1, S2, and 
S3 above: as shown in Table 15. Overall, Workplace Training type solutions were deemed as 
desirable, feasible, and important by more than 90% of participants who were confident that once 
implemented and managed, accident prevention could occur. There was a consistent spread of 
participant support for each of the different aspects of Workplace Training type solutions 
highlighted in Table  15. 
Table 16 Management Solutions 
 
 response Round 2 Round 3 Round 4      
 
 Desirable  Feasible  Importance Confidence      
Management 
S5 98% (25) 
97% 
(25) 
 98% (24) 98% (23) 
% response Management Related 
solutions 
# Responses 
3, 4, or 5 
 24 24  24 21 Focus and Assumptions 
 
 24 23  24 23 
Management Coaching /Support / 
Priorities / Response Management 
and Arrangements 
 
 25 24  24 23 Actions/Response 
 
 23 25  21 21 
Response of Regulator Findings / 
Regulator Communication / 
Industry Stakeholders 
 
 25 25  22 23 
Qualitative of intake/ recruit/ / HR 
Services  
 
 25 24  24 22 
Disciplinary Action/ Company-
Union collaboration 
 
 25 24  24 23 
Support for work planning/ 
monitoring/ review 
 
 25 25  24 23 
Purchase of 
spares/materials/tools/Equipment 
Failure 
 
 25 24  24 23 
Work procedures, documented 
standards  
 
 24 25  24 23 
Safety Management and Safety 
Culture 
Note: Management Solutions 
Actual participant Workplace Training type solutions response: More training and 
oversight; structured process. Require lineman to earn continuing education credits annually.  
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An analysis for S5 (Management) yielded results that were similar for S1, S2, S3, and S4 
above; as shown in Table 16. 
Overall, Management type solutions were deemed as desirable, feasible, and important by 
more than 95% of participants who were confident that if implemented and managed, accident 
prevention could occur. There was a consistent spread of participant support for each of the 
different aspects of Management type solutions highlighted in Table 16. 
Actual participant Management type solutions response: Station ground grids need to be 
tested periodically to ensure that grounds used for worker protection are actually providing the 
intended protection from inadvertent energization. 
 
Table 17 Supervision Solutions 
 
Note: Supervision Solutions 
An analysis for S6 (Supervision) yielded results that were similar for S1, S2, S3, S4, and 
S5 above; as shown in Table 16. Overall, Supervision type solutions were desirable, feasible, and 
 
 response Round 2 Round 3 Round 4      
 
 Desirable  Feasible  Importance Confidence      
Supervision 
S6 
100% 
(25) 
100% 
(25) 
 100% (24) 100% (23) 
% response Supervisor Related 
solutions 
# Responses 
3, 4, or 5 
 25 25  24 23 
Supervisor support, interaction, 
confidence, knowledge, ability, 
involvement in job - work 
 
 25 25  24 23 selection  
 
 25 25  24 23 
Demand for compliance, 
reporting, Inspection, adherence 
with  procedures, and documented 
standards  
 
 25 25  24 23 Worker Involvement 
 
 25 25  24 23 
Work planning, monitoring, 
review 
 
 25 25  24 23 
Arrangements for available spares, 
materials, and use of tools, 
personal protective equipment 
 
 25 25  24 23 Safety and Safety Culture 
 
 25 25  24 23 Permit to Work, Lock-out-tag-out 
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important to 100% of participants who were confident that once implemented and managed, 
accidents prevention could occur, and as highlighted in Table  17. 
Actual participant Supervision type solutions response: We have to teach workers when 
their "automatic mode" needs to slow down. Practical drift creates a sense that their work 
methods are fine because, they have gotten away with it for so long. 
 
An analysis for S7 (Audit/Review) yielded results that were similar for S1, S2, S3, S4, 
S5, and S6 above; as shown in Table 18. 
Table 18 Audit/Review Solutions 
 
 response Round 2 Round 3 Round 4      
 
 Desirable  Feasible  Importance Confidence      
Audit/Review 
S7 88% (25) 
92% 
(25) 
 88% (24) 78% (23) 
% response Management 
Audits, Review, and Related 
solutions 
# Responses 
3, 4, or 5 
 22 23  21 18 
Audits, review, corrective 
action response, management 
of inspection, safety culture 
Note: Audit/Review Solutions :  
There was a consistent spread of participant support for each of the different aspects of 
Audit/Review type solutions highlighted in Table  18.  
Actual participant Audit/Review type solutions response: Conduct Field Auditing to 
ensure that workers are knowledgeable and using proper work procedures. Another response: 
The Program should also consist of initial expectations training and periodic retraining. 
Conduct periodic audits. Periodically update the policy with Continuous Improvement in mind. 
The responses received from participants in this study on solutions to problems identified 
in Round 1 were collated, tested against the study criteria for consensus and listed below keeping 
the alignment of individual problems and the solutions identified for that particular issue. Testing 
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of these solutions occurred against participants'-indication of the solutions being desirable, 
feasible, important and provided confidence that, if addressed, the suggested ways can prevent 
further and future accidents where workers in the electric power industry can become seriously 
injured or even killed while performing work. A summary listing of the solutions proffered for 
each of the 30 items in Round 1 follows in Appendix J and Appendix K which contain a detailed 
listing of the actual solutions. 
 The design of this study was for a selection of a 3, 4, or a 5 on a 5-point Likert-type 
Scale for each item in each of the Delphi rounds resulted in 28 out of the 30 items originally 
identified and included in the Round 1 questionnaire remaining relevant throughout the Study. 
That made the data analysis and study management much more complex and complicated than 
originally anticipated. In Appendix K, a comparison of the possible results if the acceptance 
criteria were 4 or 5 only for each item in the different questionnaires in this study. Instead of 
participants’ responses to 28 items moving from Round 1 to Round 2 as actually occurred in this 
study, solutions to 20 items would have remained relevant for later consideration. The reduction 
may or may not have impacted on the overall conduct of the study, but this was not assessed in 
its entirety. 
Summary 
In Chapter 4, there was a description of the research setting and the process for receiving 
approval from the IRB at Walden University before collecting any data in this study.  Process 
description for identifying and eventually selecting the research participants also occurred. 
Demographic information on the research participants and their industry experience was used to 
show how suitable they were as experts for the Delphi study.  A description of the data collection 
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procedures and data analysis strategy adopted for this study was then detailed and discussed at 
length.  Evidence of the research trustworthiness was then tabled and supported by a rich 
description of how credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability of the study and 
study results. 
In Chapter 5, there is an interpretation of the research findings and how these relate to the 
research question and conceptual framework.  An explanation of the study limitations will 
precede the study implications and recommendations. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The primary motivation for this study was a significant misunderstanding among electric 
industry practitioners about how to prevent accidents, worker injuries, and fatalities.  The 
purpose of this Delphi study was to rely on experienced and knowledgeable electric industry 
practitioners to confirm the reasons for accidents and to suggest ways to prevent these from 
occurring.  I used the Bolman and Deal four-frame model to assist in the conceptualization of the 
issue and to assist in addressing the challenge in an approach not previously adopted.  Proposed 
solutions to accidents identified in this study, were desirable, feasible, and important for 
participants.  Participants concurred that organizational leadership, managers, supervisors, and 
workers are in different ways responsible for solving problems that can prevent accidents. The 
solutions to these accidents invariably require concerted and dedicated effort by each group of 
industry participants to ensure that systems remain safe and by extension, individuals at work 
will not be injured or killed. System issues can be solved by the dedicated attention of the 
different working groups. People problems add an entirely different challenge and cannot be 
easily solved. People issues stem from social dynamics to medical and personal difficulties, 
interpersonal communication, and trust. Participants in this study believed that it was possible to 
address and solve these issues. 
Interpretation of Findings 
Seven different groups of solutions evolved from this study.  Of these, supervision, the 
role of supervisors, supervisor understanding and supervisor action was the most fundamental 
and seen by participants as the most influential in accident prevention with no injuries, including 
fatalities, to workers in the electric power industry in the United States. Management aim and 
197 
 
focus was another top-ranked solution that evolved from this study: So too, was work methods 
and workplace training. The other but slightly less popular accident prevention solutions were 
safety management, a focus on people, and workplace audits and reviews. While it is possible to 
isolate each of these and specifically focus on the solution item, the most significant benefit can 
only occur if the solutions are holistically treated as interdependent. It is therefore not suggested 
that workplace training alone, for example, be considered as a right solution that if implemented 
would prevent worker injuries or deaths.  It is more likely that workplace training, management 
focus, together with supervisory understanding and action, would combine to realize a safer 
workplace where workers will be more inclined to comply with safety rules and work 
procedures.  That way, workplace errors can be reduced and possibly be entirely mitigated.  It 
will, therefore, mean that in workplaces where there is a significant effort to augment safety 
management systems, workplace audits, and reviews with a focus on people, especially attitudes, 
behavior, and judgment, with management focus, and supervisory action, the likelihood of 
workplace accidents occurring will be extremely low, if at all (Murata, 2017; Probst, 2015). It 
will be challenging for best results to be achieved from an audit exercise, for example, by not 
following the workplace training on audits and audit review; in line with safety management 
system requirements, or if not done with a management focus on accident prevention. It is 
equally not possible for workers to believe that workplace audits can achieve the best possible 
outcomes if there is a focus on technical and systemic problems and not also on people and 
people issues for which, if handled, could result in workers’ improved performance levels and 
while remaining safe.  As a result, the following must be considered via a combined focus on 
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several different solution strategies and not solely on the particular issue at any point in the 
discussion. 
A design flaw with electrical devices such as transformers and poles are sometimes only 
realized after being installed for extended periods.  To prevent accidents and for organizational 
success, employee engagement is critically important (Kaliannan & Adjovu, 2015).  Design 
considerations must include construction factors as well as maintenance, operation, worker 
safety, and working space considerations.  The International Electrotechnical Commission and 
the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers standards for electrical power systems 
construction can guide design in a safe manner utilizing industry best practice.  If changes or 
retrofitting to the design model occur while the equipment is in-service and with all associated 
hazards not adequately mitigated, this change can be dangerous.  Sometimes work crews can 
have a false sense of security concerning issues of clearance.  If measurements are inaccurate in 
a work-plan, this can complicate the work tasks. 
Safety management flaws can be difficult to identify and challenging to fix once 
identified.  The prevention of accidents depends on how well individuals address the known 
flaws (Dekker, 2006; Manuele, 2014).  Supervisors, managers, and trainers have significant 
responsibilities in this regard: managers in conducting system reviews and audits; supervisors in 
managing tailgate meetings or pre-job talks and for enforcing compliance with work 
requirements; and trainers in teaching workers and individuals at work and ensuring that workers 
can identify hazards, hazardous conditions, and effectively mitigating the associated danger 
(McGrory et al., 2017; Mills & Koliba, 2015).  
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Human issues: Workers not wearing personal protective equipment, bad habits, 
procedural deviation, poor judgment, willful violations of work rules and procedures, 
overconfidence, negligence, and inadequate and inconsistent supervision are among the factors 
that contribute to poor work ethics.  Vaughn (1997) suggested that deviation from standard 
human performance and practices, once allowed to flourish, is extremely difficult to rectify.  
Mitropoulos et al. (2005) suggested that focusing on compliance reduces hazard exposures and 
that it is possible that compliance promotes a limited view of accident causality and unnecessary 
attention on individuals at fault rather than on the system factors that do not address hazards.  
These hazardous situations eventually lead to and encourage unacceptable worker behaviors.  
Getting individuals at work to enforce compliance with rules and work procedures will keep 
individual behavior in check, temper attitudes, and prevent deviation from standard work 
requirements (Albright, 2017).   
Kao et al. (2016) contended that safety behavior was self-regulatory, which could help to 
prevent injuries and to avoid unsafe actions. Medical conditions and personal issues can impact 
on workplace activities.  Managers, supervisors, and coworkers need to exercise empathy and 
extend support to individuals who are affected by these issues and conditions.  At the same time, 
individuals must exercise self-control and follow all of the prescribed directions of their health 
care providers.  Workers must communicate medical conditions with their employers.  If known, 
administrative controls can lead to either the retirement of the worker as being medically unfit or 
for supervisors to designate duties to accommodate the worker.  To not do so may result in the 
worker putting themselves and others at risk when carrying out critical work operations (Uehli et 
al., 2014).  Grounding and earthing failures and errors are human issues much more than 
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technical or systemic problems.  There are locations where the installation of grounds or 
electrical-earths can be challenging and likely impractical, but work tasks can be revised to 
maintain safe working arrangements.  The value of worker training on equipotential earthing 
must never be underestimated.  Supervision and strict compliance with work procedures is 
critically important (Probst, 2015).  Complacency, laziness, and poor judgment by individuals 
and work teams not grounding systems before work is as much an indication of supervision and 
training failures (Albright, 2017; Price & Williams, 2018).  Managers and supervisors must set 
the expectation, offer initial and reoccurring training, guide work activities, and strictly enforce 
compliance with procedures. Violations, reflecting poor work ethic and wrongdoing, are grounds 
for immediate dismissal of  managers, supervisors, and workers who contribute to this 
procedural deviation (Merlin et al., 2016; Miller et al., 2016).   
Spares and parts necessary for effective maintenance are not always available, mainly 
due to inefficiency and poor planning, so that equipment remains in service for longer than 
optimum periods.  Uncompleted maintenance contributes to poor equipment condition and 
eventual failure.  Maintenance-related failures are many times misdiagnosed as random failures 
and treated as emergency breakdowns.  Park (2015) described how a commercial aircraft was 
destroyed by fire after landing at an airport as a result of a poorly done maintenance job. All of 
the passengers were still on board.  Maintenance related issues and work practices that deviate 
from standard methods, represent a willful disregard by workers and work teams.  Ineffective 
training if workers are incompetent afterward; and new technologies introduced without worker-
training are opportunities for superior work performance and accident prevention (McCall & 
Pruchnicki, 2017).  The political and symbolic frames are apt for analyzing the effects of 
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vegetation management strategies, stakeholder demands, and technical work standards on 
electric power system reliability and worker safety (Bolman & Deal, 2013).  The human 
resources and structural frames enable examination of existing industry practices and the 
workers' abilities, skills, and capabilities (Bolman & Deal, 2013).  Invariably, with tree cutting, 
trimming, and removal optimized both in the distance away from energized power lines and 
installations, it effectively means that workers are more often than before conducting tree 
trimming exercises in energized environments where higher risk levels exist. A possible side-
effect of this activity is that workers may develop confidence that can prove dangerous in the 
absence of meticulous hazard mitigation.  Park (2015) highlighted two maintenance-related 
safety recommendations.  The first focused on the preparation of instructions for maintenance 
jobs, and the second involved the planning and implementation of maintenance jobs. 
Electrical power lines, equipment, and stations are in places that can be a habitat for 
wildlife and dangerous plant species and organisms.  Workers, at times, have to work in 
territories where bears, alligators, venomous snakes, bees, and other dangerous animals can be. 
These present different challenges to workers who already work in some of the most dangerous 
and challenging working situations and environments.   Worker death, by tree contact with 
electric power lines, is known to have occurred (Casman, 2019).  Zhao, Ghiselli, Law, and Ma 
(2016) believed that intrinsic motivation affects job characteristic so it may be that electrical 
workers are intrinsically motivated and always aware of the dangers that wildlife and living 
organisms presented.  
 Management must set guidelines that will allow for full regulatory and industry 
compliance while still allowing for unique organizational and actual workplace and locational 
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challenges to be fully covered in the training course content (Wanik, Parent, Anagnostou, & 
Hartman, 2017).  Individuals performing work require the technical knowledge of the work 
tasks, working environment, and condition. Employees also need program schedules, acceptable 
performance outcomes, an indication of how these are measured, the work procedures, and the 
safety rules that guide work activities. All of these require appropriate and adequate supervision 
by competent and knowledgeable individuals capable of maintaining workers respect and focus 
on the work tasks to be performed.  The working conditions on and around energized power lines 
and installations where workers have to carry out work activities at heights with high risks of 
falls will always be dangerous.  There are instances where hazardous worksite conditions have 
led to accidents and where workers died (Fox, 2014; Sinclair, 2017).    
Work planning and hazard identification are critical activities to mitigate possible danger 
and to prevent accidents.  One way to avoid unplanned events is to have someone dedicated to 
looking at others performing work activities.  That way, when individuals would be micro-
focused on particular items of work, the onlooker will be scanning the work environment for 
issues that either encroached into the work zone after the work began or for situations possibly 
missed during the job briefing or tailgate discussions (Kaliannan & Adjovu, 2015).  A deviation 
from the planned work arrangements requires another tailboard before proceeding.  The 
opportunity will exist for the conducting of another thorough site-specific risk analysis and for 
effective and timely mitigation.  Stakeholder demands are many times conveniently 
overestimated and not treated in the right context.  Managers and supervisors are responsible for 
managing stakeholder demands and for ensuring that work remains fully compliant with 
standards and procedures (Bedarkar & Pandita, 2014; Ibrahim et al., 2016).   
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There are special work activities in the electric power industry where individuals may 
work alone: This may happen for individuals who perform functions that require specialized 
training and certification.  Even in this arrangement, these individuals must employ all of the 
safety procedures, double check that these arrangements are in place and active, and wear proper 
personal protective equipment before performing hazardous work operations (Jerie & Baldwin, 
2017).  At times, following an individual's actions in that way may not be possible as the 
communication medium is inhibited, absent, or not possible either technically or because of 
organizational procedures and practices.  Workplace training, supervision, management 
priorities, improper maintenance, or equipment failure each are significant contributors to poor 
decisions and judgment by workers.  Individuals, however, sometimes exercise personal 
behavior and attitudes that are less than appropriate; they willfully disregard working advice and 
guidance, sometimes because of overconfidence.  Individual self-discipline is critically essential 
if individuals are to remain safe while at work: this may be a single but most important factor in 
poor judgment and the prevention of accidents(Albright, 2017; Jerie & Baldwin, 2017).  
Workplace training is a core business activity; without it, the business will likely fail; 
with it, the best opportunities exist for successful organizational outcomes.  The right topics not 
delivered will not derive the practices and procedures perpetuated by the organization but the 
practices and procedures convenient to other individuals at work (Murata, 2017).  Supervisors in 
organizations are like the chassis of a vehicle.  There are wheels which take the vehicle where it 
goes; the engine to ensure that it can get there, and the driver who coordinates the speed, the 
actual route, and the time when the journey will commence.  The chassis keeps everything 
together and makes the vehicle work as a vehicle should.  In the workplace, the supervisor holds 
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everything together and causes the work operations and organizational outcomes to be what it 
should.   
Work planning, when done well, is an organizational commitment to conducting work in 
a methodological, strategic manner aimed at safe and productive performance outcomes.  Work 
planning, not well done, is a failure to meet the vision of conducting work in a manner intended 
at the safe and productive performance.  Management actions that are inconsistent or dismissive 
of worker concerns are anti-supportive and not conducive to a positive work environment where 
genuine efforts by all occur for organizational success.  Ballard, Miller, Piantadosi, Goodman, 
and McClure (2017) indicated that it was inherent for humans to develop categories determined 
by membership rules learned implicitly.  Humans, however, are generally gifted with the ability 
to learn (Kuselman, 2015).  The implications are that managers and supervisors can learn not to 
compromise workplace safety, even if it is not intentional when pressured to get things done and 
to meet organizational goals (Probst, 2015). Individuals who do not work to this end shall be 
removed or even dismissed; regardless of their job function (Ballard et al., 2017). It is critically 
important that the person in charge of a job must know and project the importance of good 
communication.  Workers cannot get help from supervisors and managers if they are unable to 
communicate this need in a clear and appropriate manner.  Managers and supervisors cannot 
expect superior and accident-free outcomes if their intent is effectively not transferred to workers 
understanding, agreement, and focus  (Moffatt-Bruce et al., 2017; Scott et al., 2014; White et al., 
2016). 
Individuals violating permits to work are either not aware of the provisions of the permit 
to work or have willfully disregarded one of the most sophisticated work management systems in 
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the electrical power industry.  To fix this type of safety breach, one must fully understand why 
breaches occur on a detailed work arrangement, where workers issuing or receiving permits are 
specially trained to issue or receive these instruments and where the declarations are deliberate 
and worded such that the signatories accept legal liabilities for ensuring that work measures are 
safe (Allen & D’Elia, 2015).  It is also critical that the individual issuing the permit to work 
usually is a supervisor or the supervisor of the work to be performed.  Implicit in this 
arrangement, is the quality of communication between the issuer and the receiver of the permit to 
work.  Also implied, is the job briefing that occurs with all members of the work party for a 
detailed discussion on the job (Labib, 2015).   
If a permit to work violation is an exquisite high-end violation, then lock-out-tag-out-
non-compliance is the most significant willful violation of safe work procedures and which is 
most times carried out by a supervisor or the person receiving the permit.  These violations are 
occurring in the electric power industry.  Ideally, the opportunity to learn from accident 
experiences are the best opportunities to apply new knowledge and to best prepare and to prevent 
other similar accidents (Murata, 2017).  Several things must happen for learning from accident to 
occur; findings of the accident investigations must guide the lesson.  The quality of the 
investigation should guide the credibility of the report findings, recommendations, and 
conclusions; organizational leaders, managers, and supervisors must support and facilitate 
learnings and implement recommendations once known.  Non-use of personal protective 
equipment speaks more to workers and their responsibility and duty of care while at work than 
anything else.  No amount of experience and work knowledge will substitute for workers 
wearing appropriate and necessary personal protective equipment while performing dangerous 
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work.  Defaulting employees are to be removed and even dismissed; to be saved from their 
irresponsible behavior.  
Limitations of the Study 
The first limitation could be that the study results may prove useful in the electrical 
power industry only because of the uniqueness that exists in this industry.  Safety Management 
System as a contributor to accidents, based on the findings of this study, seems not likely to 
restrict the application of the findings only to the electric power industry.  Deficiencies in Lock-
out Tag-out procedures, issues surrounding worksite responsibilities, and understanding of 
individual roles on job sites; a poor safety culture exists and promoted by management;  
management, worker unions, and regulators interaction and games; Job Safety Analysis issues 
and proper use of personal protective equipment are all issues that reflect a poor safety 
management arrangement in the electric power industry.  These were evident in other industries 
(Labib, 2015; Moshansky, 1992; Murata, 2017; Probst, 2015; Singh et al., 2010).  The use of the 
Bolman and Deal four-frame approach to analyzing data proved advantageous as it was easy to 
apply and sufficiently versatile that the results can extend the findings to industries and 
workplaces other than the electric power industry (Bolman & Deal, 2013; Moore, 2016).  The 
research scope was limited to the electric power industry and how to prevent accidents occurring 
in the United States.  The primary focus was to understand the contributing factors for situations 
where electricity industry workers become severely injured or even killed while performing 
work.  The strategy was to employ the Bolman and Deal (2013) four-frame model to analyze 
participants’ responses and to use the data to promote safe working arrangements: It may prove a 
helpful model for further studies in the electric power as well as other industrial sectors.  
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The second limitation is that the Delphi panelists as research participants brought very 
pointed views that may be prevalent only where the individual works.  Researcher tact and skill 
ensured that the research remained on-course (San Su, Wardell, & Thorkildsen, 2013).  The 
number of items, 28 out of 30 possible issues, that the participants supported as factors that 
contribute to workplace accidents, serious worker injuries, and even fatalities, are indicative of 
two cogent facts.  First, the electric power industry is a dangerous and hazardous industry where 
accidents can occur if individuals at work are not safe and do not take appropriate steps to 
mitigate the danger.  The second fact is that the issues tested in this study were from previous 
studies of accidents in other industries; the level of agreement indicate the wide-ranging 
implications of the findings in this study that the lessons can extend into different work areas 
(Labib, 2015; Moffatt-Bruce et al., 2017; Murata, 2017; Probst, 2015; Singh et al., 2010). 
The third possible limitation was if the best candidates did not participate in this study.  
The experienced and knowledgeable participants in this study were electric power industry 
managers, trainers, professionals, supervisors, and workers with an average of 25.2 years service. 
Their industry background was diverse and a good reflection of the practitioners who are 
crucially involved in dangerous and hazardous work in the electric power industry (Volberg et 
al., 2017).  Participants were able to describe work arrangements, procedures, environments, and 
pertinent issues connected to workplace safety management in the electrical power industry.  The 
participants willingly shared information and contributed to new learning and understanding of 
the challenges in and as contributors to accident prevention efforts in the electric power industry 
(Volberg et al., 2017).  
208 
 
A fourth limitation can be the personal and professional bias and possible influence on 
the strategy used to conduct the literature search, data collection, and analysis in this study.  
More than 20 electric power industry experts contributed to the extension of existing knowledge 
about the electric power industry.  They did this over the four separate rounds of the Delphi 
study: In the Round 1, I encouraged the participants to suggest other information they considered 
as pertinent and not covered in the questionnaire (Patton, 2015).  The information they provided 
enhanced the likelihood that the data is correct because of the consensus achieved on 28 different 
issues while participants remained anonymous to one another.  The 28 relevant issues 
represented a significant effort to improve the research trustworthiness and data derived from the 
process (Yin, 2013).  
The fifth limitation may be researcher management of the Delphi study.  The iterative 
process of the Delphi technique was a possible disadvantage as attrition by participants can affect 
the research and highlight credibility issues in the overall findings (Annear et al., 2015; Willems, 
Sutton, & Maybery, 2015).  Before the study I accepted that twenty-five (25) participants were 
acceptable if the attrition rate is less than 25 % over the entire study; to this end, 27 participants 
started Round 1 and 23 completed Round 4: 85% of the participants in this study remained 
interested to the end of the Delphi rounds (Brody et al., 2014; Sinclair, Oyebode, & Owens, 
2016).  I remained meticulous and exercised all available opportunities to keep the research 
exercise free of administrative delays and inefficiencies (De Loë et al., 2016; Patton, 2015).  
A sixth limitation may be possible social desirability bias if participants misrepresented 
their real views and behaved in socially acceptable ways (Heitner et al., 2013).  There is very 
little likelihood of this occurring as the questions did not require participants to reveal or recount 
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their behavior, contribution, or influence on any particular accident or workplace issue directly 
related to the study (Kim & Kim, 2016).  Also, I ensured strictest control on participant 
anonymity and research confidentiality  (Heitner et al., 2013).  
Understanding how accidents occur is preliminary to the deliberate taking of steps toward 
the prevention of future electric industry workplace accidents and to keep workers safe and 
uninjured.  For this study, a specific delimitation surrounded the use of the Bolman and Deal 
four-frame model.  The different perspectives described in the four-frames allowed for a better 
review of organizational and people issues and dynamics that contribute to workplace accidents. 
Since no previous study of this kind was conducted in the electric power industry using this 
model, the heavy reliance on participants and the detailed data they provided heightens the 
significance of the selection strategies and process (Brady, 2015).  It is possible that individuals 
with little or limited knowledge and experience made the research less meaningful, even with 
consensus.  That possibility makes participant retention and the integrity of their industry 
experience and knowledge crucially important. Participants selection were on LinkedIn through 
invitation. Participation was voluntary and spanned over two months.  The fact that 85% of the 
participants remained interested in the study over the entire four rounds more likely improved the 
study credibility and trustworthiness.  
Other specific issues, considered as a delimitation before the study, surrounded the use of 
the Normative Delphi technique, what a Delphi expert was, and how that aligned with the actual 
selection of participants.  It is possible that better and more suitable experts did not accept the 
invitation to participate or that the use of the public social media, LinkedIn, was not the best way 
to attract participants (Brady, 2015).  It is also possible that the participants, even over the vast 
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geographical space, were unhelpful because they were too personally-linked to electric power 
industry accidents.  That realization, as far as I know, did not materialize.  
The research question, whether it was too pointed and possibly contentious for experts to 
admit to issues in the electric power industry freely as a delimitation.  That likelihood is low as 
each of the four questionnaires in this study comprised more than 30 questions which required 
participants to indicate desirability, feasibility, importance, and confidence.  The likelihood of 
individual bias and coordinated bias among more than 20 anonymous participants in this 
arrangement is extremely low.  It is possible that workers could blame managers and vice versa, 
but that would more reflect a characteristic of the electric power industry rather than a research 
design factor.  With participant involvement limited to responses to me as the researcher 
developed questionnaires, participant actions and group politics, research inadequacies, 
technologies, and techniques that may have factored in this study is insignificant.  If during the 
period over which the study spanned accidents occurred, that experience may influence 
participant response for the remaining Delphi rounds.  The results of this study were consistent 
through the entire exercise.  That showed a consistent pattern of participants’ responses.  
A delimitation condition set before the study was the geographical area where 
participants were chosen (United States) and the requirements for research consensus: With the 
data coding strategy I adopted and the acceptance criteria for research results also delimited 
before the study.  It was possible that all these factors limited the results derived in this research. 
The fact that 28 out of the 30 issues remained as factors that lead to workplace accidents in the 
electric power industry makes these assumptions credible.  The likelihood of results limitation is, 
therefore, insignificant.  
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One possible limitation in this study surrounds the composition in terms of the job 
functions of the participant pool.  It is possible that if the participants came from only one 
discipline, linemen as an example, the results can be different.  Differentiation of the responses 
from linemen as compared to those from managers was not discernable in this study because of 
the anonymous manner the four Delphi rounds occurred via Survey Monkey.  If the participant 
pool were only trainers, then the responses using the approach from this study would produce 
trainers responses while still maintaining individual anonymity.  This way, it will likely be 
possible to identify where particular human performance issues may exist and how best to 
mitigate these for superior outcomes, including the prevention of accidents and worker injuries. 
Recommendations 
Organizations in the electric power industry should use the findings identified in this 
study to compare their own operating experiences and to appropriate suitable corrective actions 
for superior performance outcomes.  The approach may make it necessary for the recreation of 
the study and to compare actual organizational results against their desired results.  It may be that 
for particular organizations, the challenges can be different and so too will be the forward 
approach to addressing and correcting problems they may identify.  Organizations adopting this 
approach should measure the possible benefits against their accident and worker injury 
experience.  
Organizations and individuals in the electric power industry are experiencing a crisis with 
regards to individual attitudes, behavior, and a problem of willful disregard for work rules, and 
safe work procedures.  Further investigation is necessary to determine if this is isolated or 
widespread, even extending outside of the industry and into other realms of human endeavor. 
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The inquiry must include a review and understanding of safety culture in the electric power 
industry and whether there are elements in this culture that if promoted, can allow for improved 
organizational outcomes.  
Individual investigation, at an organizational level, of the items identified in this study as 
contributing to accidents in the electric power industry where workers suffer serious and fatal 
injuries should occur.  This aim of that investigation is to glean exact details on how in particular 
organizations, the work rules, procedures, and practices can be revised and updated, and for 
workplace changes to prevent further and future accidents.   
Further investigation on the items identified in this study where individuals at work either 
misjudged situations or disregarded safe work arrangements is necessary as that shows a 
negative pattern of human performance in the hazardous and dangerous industry and working 
environment.  It may be that with a more in-depth and focussed investigation of the human and 
social issues, significant opportunities and initiatives that would be unique to the region or 
company where that study occurs will evolve.  Organizational leadership, especially where 
employees suffered fatal and serious injuries in the last five years, should review the safety 
management systems to focus on and emphasize more on human interactions, the quality of 
interpersonal communication, and interactive person-to-person activities to augment existing 
organizational support for work procedures and technical compliance.  
A review of workplace training for work in critical functions should occur for 
opportunities to merge individual focus with organizational direction and if training 
arrangements can align with employee needs rather than only on organizational processes and 
procedures.  Possible benefits from this approach is an evolving human performance culture 
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which can appropriately address individual attitudes and behavior while discouraging willful 
violations of safety rules and poor judgment by individuals at work.  
Further studies can be conducted with single job functions for better identification and 
understanding of the human problems and challenges experienced by that homogenous group of 
participants.  It is possible that results from this study were skewed and tempered by the 
heterogeneous group of participants who represented a full cadre of job functions in the electrical 
power industry.  Participant groups can also be gleaned from Power Stations separately from 
those in Transmission or Distribution and the other divisions in the electric power industry.  It is 
possible that results can vary depending on the work division.  
A lot of the causes of accidents are related.  Proper supervision will prevent most of the 
reasons for accidents to occur.  Adequate training for supervisors is imperative for a safe 
working environment.  Specific supervisor-work procedures and oversight activities must grow 
on support by institutionalized knowledge resident in the organization, possessed by experienced 
practitioners, and in specialist training to augment the effort. 
The safety policies and rules in an organization must keep pace with advancements in 
technology and industry best practice.  Many times workers encounter tools, equipment, and 
procured material that are available on the market which encourage modes of operation that 
inherently vary from set work procedures and documented instructions.  As such, there must be 
continuous review and revision to ensure that new items procured are consistent with policy, 
rules, and procedures.  
Recommendations from accident investigations, appropriately reviewed and actioned, to 
ensure that there is no recurrence.  This review may involve revision of work procedures and 
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safety rules.  Disseminate information about work issues and work practices from accident 
investigation so that work teams can, in the future, prevent similar errors and breaches.  
Non-use of personal protective equipment is in the same category as poor work ethic, 
poor attitude, and poor supervision.  It is common that personal protective equipment is the last 
line of defense against hazards behind engineering and administrative controls. However, 
personal protective equipment is of utmost importance, especially in instances where there is a 
breakdown of the different lines of defense up to the worker. An example of this would be 
insulation breakdown when operating a switch. If for whatever reason the bushings of a switch 
were to crack while in operation, the operator must be wearing insulated gloves if the handle was 
to become energized as a result. Supervisors and managers must demand full compliance. 
Implications 
Unengaged management and uninterested supervision: complacency is a big contributing 
factor in accidents.  Personnel (including executive leadership), who do not have an 
understanding of what hazards are faced daily by frontline workers, allowing drift from strict 
adherence to the process and procedures.  Workers when performing the same types of tasks, day 
after day not being vigilant when the expected task changes or is slightly modified.  Workers 
often perform the customary steps and get themselves into challenging and dangerous situations.  
An example, provided by a participant in this study, was the preparing equipment for 
energization; there is a step where high voltage testing is one of the final activities.  An 
individual can perform this process many times in the same week.  Then on the Friday-afternoon, 
the worker gets instructions to prepare equipment for energization, but not with the high voltage 
testing because of a field task where someone is still at work.  The individual making the 
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equipment ready for energization follows the customary practice, without registering that 
someone is still at work on the system, performs the high voltage testing, electrocuting (killing) 
the individual in the field.  The implication is that whatever the task or work activity and 
wherever done; the effect can be that an individual at work in the electrical power industry can 
introduce unsafe conditions into the workplace.  If that goes unaddressed, the implications can 
include worker injuries or death. Organizational leaders, to clerical assistants, can impact on the 
quality of information upon which a lineman or an electrician may have to act.  If all other 
barriers fail as to err is human, then the frontline worker can be in danger. 
Latent organizational weaknesses which can lead to accidents where workers can become 
injured or killed including any undetected deficiencies in the management control processes 
(such as strategy, policies, work control, training, and resource allocation), values (shared 
beliefs, attitudes, norms, and assumptions), and workplace conditions which can cause individual 
error (precursors) or safety barrier breaches (flawed defenses).  Organizational Leadership must 
recognize the implications of promoting inherently flawed systems: individuals at work will not 
improve performance and workplace outcomes would suffer.  The consequence can also include 
worker injuries and fatalities.  
Potential hazards: If left uncontrolled, can contribute to an accident.  These include 
engineering factors, task demands, human factors and individual capabilities, management 
issues, work organization, and environmental factors, work pace and personal protective 
equipment, unexpected equipment conditions and proximity to other utilities.  The implications 
are that with poor work outcomes, electric power service availability, continuity, reliability 
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assurance to customers who depend on electric service to maintain their quality and living 
standards are no longer guaranteed.  
Deficiencies in work organization or planning, specialized equipment operation, the 
encroachment of minimum approach distances in energized environments all contribute to 
workplace accidents occurring in the electric power industry.  These can happen at any job site. 
Weather conditions can exacerbate road driving conditions and increase the likelihood of motor 
vehicle accident or a road mishap occurring at a location where individuals would be working on 
or near electrical systems.  That can exacerbate dangerous conditions, cause inattention and 
distraction as well as improper equipment operation.  The implications are that these accidents 
are more likely if the work crew installed an inadequate level of work area protection and 
incorrectly managed the hazards present at that location. It may be that individuals at the 
worksite were inexperienced, inadequately trained, or willfully disregarded safe work rules and 
procedures.  It can also happen if the individuals exercised poor judgment on the dangers of 
working at that location.  Human nature and habit patterns, their assumptions, and 
overconfidence can contribute to individuals making a poor judgment at work.  These are equally 
possible if there was mental short-cuts, inaccurate risk assessments due to the erroneous 
perception of risks. 
The above points addressed what can impact the safe performance of a job.  One problem 
is that in the electric power industry, workers frequently have to report to remote locations, and 
there is no one to oversee how a job is set up and performed.  Workers must be trained and must 
be encouraged to speak up when necessary.  Workers must be trained adequately so if there is 
something out of line, they will maintain control of the worksite and activities, and are capable of 
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deciding on how to do that and keep the safe performance of a job.  The implications are that the 
work can impact members of the public to the extent that there is equipment loss, individuals can 
become affected by unplanned and unanticipated power outages, or worse.  
Managers and supervisors must insist that the crew members understand that the 
foreman, as the supervisor, is ultimately responsible for completing a safe project, and it is their 
responsibility to follow the plan.  Specific arrangements are necessary for confirmation of 
worker retention of knowledge: This can be a topic of further research.  The implications are that 
the performance outcomes can improve, worker injuries or deaths prevented, and the lessons 
apply to other workplaces, in other industries or the electric power industry outside of the United 
States.  
Although this is a low probability scenario, there are instances of trees making contact 
with energized infrastructure and becoming energized.  One participant related that there was a 
situation where a frog closed a circuit between an energized LV conductor and the pole.  It 
created a high impedance fault, and as such, the fuse for the circuit did not operate.  The pole and 
down-guy-wire in this instance became energized as the bonding conductor burnt out.  Where the 
down-guy-wire entered the ground, there was a puddle of water that started to boil with the 
dissipated heat. These instances are particularly dangerous as the fault current is low and does 
not ensure that protective devices operate promptly.  The implications are that lessons learned 
from accident investigations into these and other electric power industry accidents and dangerous 
conditions can help to prevent accidents throughout the United States and in territories such as 
Canada and the Caribbean. 
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Where material procured is substandard and low quality, there can be unexpected failures 
at critical stages of a job which can result in accidents.  One participant related an example where 
on a pin-type insulator changeout hotline job, the new insulator failed while being installed.  This 
accident investigation revealed that a batch of pin-type insulators received was defective.  Even 
though it passed an insulation resistance test, it was a soft material that was cut easily by the tie 
wire.  In cases like this, both the specifications for future procurement and the acceptance testing 
of future material received must be reviewed and revised to prevent such occurrences.  The 
review of methods of field testing material must be comprehensive (technical and procurement 
practices).  The implications are that the lessons learned from these incidents and the 
improvements made to the procurement processes can be used to aide the positive development 
of similar arrangements in the electric power industry throughout the United States and in 
territories outside of the United States; such as Canada and the Caribbean. 
Equipment failure can be mitigated against on a job by proper inspection and testing of 
equipment and also using the equipment as intended.  In most instances, there are provisions and 
multiple layers of protection in the event of failure.  However, in some critical instances, 
equipment failure can cause fatal accidents.  Employees must be appropriately trained in critical 
thinking when reacting to such unplanned events.  Employees applying the teachings from 
training courses can impact on the serviceability of electric components and therefore prevent in-
service or premature equipment failure.  The implications are that customer service quality, 
availability, and reliability can be guaranteed as possible dangerous occurrences may be averted. 
Permitting systems are enforced to ensure the safety of the workforce.  It is a method of 
communication between plant operators and the executing crew to indicate that the portion of the 
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plant on which work occurs is safe.  Permits are necessary for instances where the plant has to be 
made safe by a plant operator before a crew executing work.  The switching process is usually 
the prerequisite to a cold line permit.  The permit is also a guide that ensures that the switching 
process is safe.  Violations to the permit to work procedure could mean that work is being carried 
out by crew/s on a plant that is not made safe for work by the plant operator, which can result in 
accidents.  Permitting is also imperative in instances where there are multiple working parties on 
the same circuit and coordinating between the working parties and the plant operators to safely 
re-energize circuits after completing work.  The implications are that multi-workgroups working 
on the same circuit for efficiency gains can continue to occur without issues of 
miscommunication between workgroups.  That way, workers can complete tasks successfully 
and in an injury-free manner. 
The safety rules would have been developed to prevent very particular unsafe situations 
and for mitigation of hazards.  By not adhering to the safety rules and without a proper 
supervisory assessment and implementation of controls, the result can be accidents.  These 
accidents are due to employees encountering situations and hazards that the safety rule was there 
to prevent and mitigate.  There are instances, however, where the safety rules are lagging behind 
industry best practice, and there are deviations in safety rules implementation.  In such cases, 
proper work planning and job hazard analysis must be done to ensure the necessary controls to 
prevent departure from standard practice, and to mitigate against the hazards, consistent with the 
safety rules.  The implications are that for instances where industry best practices are available, 
electric power industry organizational leaders shall adopt these and upgrade organizational 
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processes, practices, and rules and so benefit from the opportunity of improved performance 
outcomes and accident prevention. 
Poor judgment by individuals or work crews is the human aspect of the job.  Skilled 
workers are trained to make a continuous assessment of the job and adapt accordingly.  There 
have been several instances where wrong decisions taken by foremen and linemen have led to a 
loss of life or limb.  An example would be to attempt a reclosure on a circuit without tracing the 
entire circuit.  There could be a burst-wire on the ground which could become energized when 
closing the fuse.  In a fatality accident, involving a line clearing crew, the workers decided to 
utilize a porter wrap to cut a large tree-branch without taking a proper assessment.  This decision 
eventually led to an improper technique by a worker for the size of the branch resulting in the 
branch falling on one of the line clearers killing him instantly (George, 2018).  The implications 
of successful addressing of poor judgment instances and situations are that the lessons learned 
can be applied elsewhere in the United States and territories such as Canada and the Caribbean. 
Conclusion 
Financial pressures on management and time pressures put on crews create conditions 
where individuals in the electric power industry resort to taking short-cuts, which can inevitably 
lead to serious worker injuries and fatalities.  There are significant social and interpersonal 
challenges: poor supervision by individuals vested with the responsibility to maintain safe 
operations; field employees have poor attitudes towards management; and clueless management 
with no idea what’s going on in the field because they never go out and enforce the 
organizational expectations for its employees.  There is insufficient quality involvement in and 
an emphasis on job briefings and tailgate meetings by general foremen, foremen, and 
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supervisors.  A poor safety culture that strives on blame and finger-pointing where management 
seems fully aware but not inclined to repair.  Implementing change, even if poor performance is 
known, is difficult to accomplish.  Workers disregarding safe work procedures must know and 
understand that the price includes their becoming injured permanently, killed, or dismissed from 
the company.  Management issues such as the organizational culture,  leadership matters, 
inadequate controls, and sub-optimal allocation of resources can lead to worker errors, especially 
when work procedures, policies, and standards are not well promulgated.  Managers are 
responsible for ensuring appropriate communication of work procedures, policies, rules, and 
organizational priorities with employees.  Managers are also responsible for selecting employees 
with the right qualifications and for the actual placement of employees.  It is, therefore, an 
indictment on management and supervision if workers lack necessary job experience, 
knowledge, and were involved in workplace accidents, primarily when there was inadequate 
supervision of the work activities. 
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Walden University 
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Murata, A. (2017) Cultural Difference and Cognitive Biases as a Trigger of Critical Crashes or 
Disasters. Journal of Behavioral and Brain Science, 7, 399-415. 
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Ganesh Narine 
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To: Hasson, Felicity; Keeney, Sinead 
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Hi Felicity, 
 
Thank you very much. 
 
GN 
 
From: Hasson, Felicity <f.hasson@ulster.ac.uk> 
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To: Ganesh Narine; Keeney, Sinead 
Subject: Re: Request for permission to reproduce your Table 1. on page 1697 of "Enhancing 
rigour in the Delphi technique research"  
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From: Ganesh Narine <ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu> 
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Subject: Request for permission to reproduce your Table 1. on page 1697 of "Enhancing rigour 
in the Delphi technique research"  
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I am a doctoral research student at Walden University. I am conducting my research and using 
the Delphi Method. I found your document (Enhancing rigour in the Delphi technique 
research), relevant to my study.  
 
My request is for permission to reproduce your Table 1 Types of Delphi designs on page 1697. I 
assure you that all necessary recognition will be afforded your work as the data source if 
permission is granted. 
 
I look forward to your response and I thank you in advance. 
 
Ganesh Narine 
 
STUDENT ID: A00648285 
 
 
 
 
 
Source Doc:  
Hasson, F., & Keeney, S. (2011). Enhancing rigour in the Delphi technique 
research. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 78(9), 1695-
1704. doi:10.1016/j.techfore. 2011.04.005 
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From: Ganesh Narine 
Sent: June 6, 2018 8:41 PM 
Subject: Fw: Request for use of your Flowchart in my doctoral dissertation 
 
 
 
 
From: Ganesh Narine 
Sent: Wednesday, June 6, 2018 7:39 PM 
To: Barry Wellar 
Subject: Re: Request for use of your Flowchart in my doctoral dissertation  
  
Thank You Professor Wellar, 
 
I am sorry about the passing of Dr. Novakowski. I also apologize for incorrectly spelling your 
name before. 
 
I will update you when my Dissertation becomes available online. 
 
Ganesh 
 
From: Barry Wellar <wellarb@uottawa.ca> 
Sent: Wednesday, June 6, 2018 9:07:13 AM 
To: Ganesh Narine 
Subject: RE: Request for use of your Flowchart in my doctoral dissertation  
  
You are most welcome. Since Erin/Nick has passed away it seems that only my 
permission is needed in terms of authorship. Regarding the journal, to my knowledge it 
appears that as a rule journals only require what you are doing in terms of sourcing, so 
please consider permission granted to proceed as you propose. 
  
  
Dr. Barry Wellar, MCIP 
Professor Emeritus 
Department of Geography 
University of Ottawa 
Ottawa ON  K1N 6N5 
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From: Ganesh Narine [mailto:ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu]  
Sent: Tuesday, June 5, 2018 10:38 PM 
To: Barry Wellar; nnovakowski@swgc.mun.ca 
Subject: Re: Request for use of your Flowchart in my doctoral dissertation 
  
Thank You Dr. Weller, 
  
I truly appreciate your positive response. 
  
I most certainly will let you know when it can be accessed online. 
  
Ganesh 
 
From: Barry Wellar <wellarb@uottawa.ca> 
Sent: Tuesday, June 5, 2018 10:02:27 PM 
To: Ganesh Narine; nnovakowski@swgc.mun.ca 
Subject: RE: Request for use of your Flowchart in my doctoral dissertation  
  
Permission granted on my part, best wishes for a successful dissertation outcome. 
Please inform me when the dissertation can be viewed online.  
  
  
Dr. Barry Wellar, GISP  
President, Information Research Board Inc. 
133 Ridgefield Crescent  
Ottawa, ON   K2H 6T4 
CANADA 
  
  
From: Ganesh Narine [mailto:ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu]  
Sent: Tuesday, June 5, 2018 9:43 PM 
To: wellarb@uottawa.ca; nnovakowski@swgc.mun.ca 
Subject: Request for use of your Flowchart in my doctoral dissertation 
  
Hi, 
  
I am a doctoral research student at Walden University. I am conducting my research and using 
the Delphi Method. I found your document (Using the Delphi technique in normative planning 
research: methodological design considerations), relevant to my study.  
  
My request is for permission to reproduce your Figure 1 Flowchart for a normative Delphi on 
page 1488. I assure you that all necessary recognition will be afforded your work as the 
data source if permission is granted. 
  
I look forward to your response and I thank you in advance. 
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Ganesh Narine 
  
STUDENT ID: A00648285 
  
  
  
  
  
Novakowski, N., & Wellar, B. (2008). Using the Delphi technique in normative planning 
research: methodological design considerations. Environment and Planning A, 40(6), 
1485-1500. doi:10.1068/a39267 
  
 
 
 
From: Ganesh Narine 
Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2018 4:55 PM 
To: Icek Aizen 
Subject: Re: Request to reuse your diagram in my research 
  
Thank You Professor. 
 
GN 
 
 
From: Icek Aizen <aizen@psych.umass.edu> 
Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2018 2:16 PM 
To: Ganesh Narine 
Subject: Re: Request to reuse your diagram in my research 
  
Dear Ganesh Narine, 
 
No permission is needed to include an ORIGINAL drawing of the TPB model in a thesis, 
dissertation, presentation, poster, article, or book.  If you would like to reproduce a published 
drawing of the model (such as the one in the White et al. article, you need to get permission 
from the publisher who holds the copyright. You may use the drawings on my website 
("https://people.umass.edu/aizen/tpb.diag.html” or 
259 
 
"https://people.umass.edu/aizen/tpb.background.html") for non-commercial purposes, 
including publication in a journal article, so long as you retain the copyright notice. 
 
Best regards, 
 
Icek Ajzen 
Professor Emeritus 
University of Massachusetts - Amherst 
https://people.umass.edu/aizen 
 
 
On Jul 10, 2018, at 12:20, Ganesh Narine <ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu> wrote: 
 
Good Day to You Sir,  
 
I am a doctoral student at Walden University. I am at the dissertation stage of my research. Your 
research on the Theory of Planned Behaviour is relevant to my study on why accidents are occurring in 
the US Electric Power Industry. Your diagram on this theory was captured by White et al. (2016). My 
request is for permission to reuse this diagram in my doctoral dissertation. I assure you that all 
appropriate recognition will be afforded. 
 
I thank you in anticipation of a positive response. 
 
Ganesh Narine  
Student ID: A00648285 
Walden University  
 
 
From: Ganesh Narine 
Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2018 11:51 AM 
To: Katherine White 
Subject: Re: Request for copy of your paper to further my research (further request) 
  
Thank you for your kind response. I will contact the Azjen website as you suggested. Appreciate 
much. 
 
Ganesh  
 
 
From: Katherine White <km.white@qut.edu.au> 
Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2018 5:48:45 AM 
To: Ganesh Narine 
Cc: Nerina Jimmieson 
Subject: RE: Request for copy of your paper to further my research (further request) 
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Dear Ganesh, 
  
Thanks for your email. It is ok to use the idea of the Figure from this paper but it might be an 
idea for you to consult also Ajzen’s website for Figure suggestions. 
  
http://people.umass.edu/aizen/ 
  
Kind regards, 
Katy White 
  
 
 
 
From: Ganesh Narine 
Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2018 5:24 AM 
To: km.white@qut.edu.au 
Subject: Fw: Request for copy of your paper to further my research (further request) 
  
Hi Ms White, 
 
I found your article very much relevant to my study and I want to reuse your Figure on  "The 
Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991, p.182)" as captured Section 1.2.2 of your paper. I 
again assure you that all appropriate recognition will be afforded you and your colleagues as the 
source of this data. I believe that it compliments my research literature and makes my doctoral 
dissertation all the better. 
 
I look forward to your response. 
 
Ganesh Narine 
STUDENT ID: A00648285 
WALDEN UNIVERSITY 
 
 
Your paper:  
White, K. M., Jimmieson, N. L., Obst, P. L., Gee, P., Haneman, L., O’Brien-McInally, B., & 
Cockshaw, W. (2016). Identifying safety beliefs among Australian electrical 
workers. Safety science, 82, 164-173. doi: 10.1016/j.ssci.2015.09.008 
 
From: Ganesh Narine 
Sent: Friday, May 4, 2018 6:05 AM 
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To: Katherine White 
Cc: Nerina Jimmieson 
Subject: Re: Request for copy of your paper to further my research 
  
Thank You very much for your positive and kind response. 
 
GN 
 
 
From: Katherine White <km.white@qut.edu.au> 
Sent: Friday, May 4, 2018 12:21:57 AM 
To: Ganesh Narine 
Cc: Nerina Jimmieson 
Subject: RE: Request for copy of your paper to further my research 
  
Hi Ganesh, 
  
Thanks for your email. Please find the paper attached. 
  
All the best with your research. 
  
Kind regards, 
Katy White 
  
From: Ganesh Narine [mailto:ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu]  
Sent: Friday, 4 May 2018 11:24 AM 
To: Katherine White <km.white@qut.edu.au> 
Subject: Request for copy of your paper to further my research 
  
Good Evening Ms. White, 
  
I am a student at Walden University (USA) and I am conducting my doctoral research on 
accidents in the electric power industry in North Eastern USA. I found your paper on one of my 
literature search. This is relevant to my study. I therefore request that you allow me a copy. I 
assure you that all proper citations and source identification will be afforded to you and your 
colleagues. Thank you in advance. 
  
Your paper:  
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White, K. M., Jimmieson, N. L., Obst, P. L., Gee, P., Haneman, L., O’Brien-McInally, B., & 
Cockshaw, W. (2016). Identifying safety beliefs among Australian electrical 
workers. Safety science, 82, 164-173. doi: 10.1016/j.ssci.2015.09.008 
  
  
Ganesh Narine 
STUDENT ID: A00648285 
WALDEN UNIVERSITY 
  
  
 
From: Ganesh Narine 
Sent: Sunday, April 29, 2018 11:41 AM 
To: Matt Brearley 
Subject: Re: Request for a copy of your paper to further my research 
  
Thank You Dr. Brearly, 
 
I will provide you with details of my study progress and with any interesting studies that I 
unearth during this journey. I have not done any work on electrical safety but I am open to that 
possibility. I did an article in 2004 for the West Indian Engineering Forum. I will look for that and 
share it with you as soon as I can. 
 
Ganesh  
 
From: Matt Brearley <matt@thermalhyperformance.com.au> 
Sent: Thursday, April 26, 2018 6:59:59 AM 
To: Ganesh Narine 
Subject: Re: Request for a copy of your paper to further my research 
  
No Problem Ganesh, will send through within the next 7 days. Your research area is of great 
interest to me as I work with a variety of electrical utility organisations here in Australia – 
please let me know of any publications/documents you produce as I’d like to read them. 
  
Apologies for the typo in the previous email. 
  
Regards, 
 
Matt 
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From: Ganesh Narine <ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu> 
Date: Thursday, 26 April 2018 at 7:47 pm 
To: Matt Brearley <matt@thermalhyperformance.com.au> 
Subject: Re: Request for a copy of your paper to further my research 
  
Good Morning Sir, 
  
Thank You so much. I will very much be interested in your latest article as well. I assure you that 
appropriate recognition and citations for your work will be maintained. 
  
I look forward to your new article. 
Ganesh 
From: Matt Brearley <matt@thermalhyperformance.com.au> 
Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2018 11:08:54 PM 
To: Ganesh Narine 
Subject: Re: Request for a copy of your paper to further my research 
  
Hi Garesh, 
  
Please find attached the requested paper. We are close to submitting another paper regarding 
heat stress in the electrical utility industry, I can send that to you once submitted if you are 
interested. 
  
Regards, 
  
Matt 
  
Matt Brearley PhD  
Managing Director  
Thermal Hyperformance Pty Ltd 
+61420889399 
www.thermalhyperformance.com.au 
  
  
  
  
From: Ganesh Narine <ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu> 
Date: Thursday, 26 April 2018 at 12:56 pm 
To: "matt@thermalhyperformance.com.au" <matt@thermalhyperformance.com.au> 
Subject: Request for a copy of your paper to further my research 
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Good Evening Sir, 
 
I am a doctoral research student at Walden University in the USA. My research is on why 
serious and fatal accidents are happening in the electric power industry. 
My request is for a copy of your work (below). This is a paper that may prove very helpful to my 
research. Thank you in advance of a positive response. I assure you that all required citations 
and recognition will be afforded your work, if I include it in my research. 
Ganesh Narine 
STUDENT ID: A00648285 
 
Your Document: 
Working in Hot Conditions—A Study of Electrical Utility Workers in the Northern Territory of 
Australia 
Matt Brearley, Phillip Harrington, Doug Lee & Raymond Taylor 
Pages 156-162 | Accepted author version posted online: 29 Sep 2014, Published online: 29 Sep 
2014 
Download citation https://doi.org/10.1080/15459624.2014.957831 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From: Glen Kenny <gkenny@uottawa.ca> 
Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2018 10:28 PM 
To: Ganesh Narine 
Subject: Automatic reply: Request for a copy of your paper to further my research 
  
 
Hello, thank you for your message.  I am currently away from the office.  I will respond to your email on 
my return April 26.   
  
 
  
Regards, 
Glen P. Kenny, PhD (Med), FCAHS  
Professor and University Research Chair (Exercise and Environmental Physiology) 
Director, Human and Environmental Physiology Research Unit 
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Fellow of the Canadian Academy of Health Sciences 
Faculty of Health Sciences 
University of Ottawa 
Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 6N5 
(613) 562-5800 ext. 4282 (office) 
(613) 562-5497 (fax) 
 
 
From: Ganesh Narine 
Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2018 10:28 PM 
To: gkenny@uottawa.ca 
Subject: Request for a copy of your paper to further my research 
  
 
Good Evening Sir, 
 
I am a doctoral research student at Walden University in the USA. My research is on why 
serious and fatal accidents are happening in the electric power industry. 
My request is for a copy of your work (below). This is a paper that may prove very helpful to my 
research. Thank you in advance of a positive response. I assure you that all required citations 
and recognition will be afforded your work, if I include it in my research. 
Ganesh Narine 
STUDENT ID: A00648285 
 
 
Your Document: 
An Evaluation of the Physiological Strain Experienced by Electrical Utility Workers in North 
America 
Robert D. Meade, Martin Lauzon, Martin P. Poirier, Andreas D. Flouris & Glen P. Kenny 
Pages 708-720 | Accepted author version posted online: 26 May 2015, Published online: 02 Sep 
2015 
Download citation  https://doi.org/10.1080/15459624.2015.1043054    
 
 
 
 
 
 
From: Takis Mitropoulos <takism2009@gmail.com> 
Sent: Tuesday, April 3, 2018 3:37 PM 
To: Ganesh Narine 
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Cc: tabdelha@msu.edu; takism@asu.edu; gah2343@mac.com 
Subject: Re: Fw: Request for use of information 
  
HI Ganesh,  
yes you have permission to use the figures from the paper. 
Best 
P. Mitropoulos 
 
On Mon, Apr 2, 2018 at 6:26 AM, Ganesh Narine <ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu> wrote: 
Dear Professors, Director 
 
I hope that you are enjoying great health and happiness. I am a doctoral student at Walden 
University. I am conducting research on why accidents are occurring in the North American 
power industry. I have your research paper on " Accident prevention strategies: Causation model 
and research directions" (cited below). I am interested in using information, including your 
diagrams on my research dissertation. I will appropriately cite and fully recognize the source of 
my information. Before doing this, I seek your permission to do so. I assure you that I will 
attribute full recognition to you for the excellent work that you have done. 
  
I look forward to your positive response. Thank you in advance. 
  
Ganesh Narine 
STUDENT ID: A00648285 
 
 
Mitropoulos, P., Howell, G. A., & Abdelhamid, T. S. (2005). Accident prevention strategies: Causation 
model and research directions. In Construction Research Congress 2005: Broadening 
Perspectives (pp. 1-10). doi: 10.1061/40754(183)8 
 
 
 
From: Greg Howell <GHowell@Leanconstruction.org> 
Sent: Monday, April 2, 2018 9:18 AM 
To: Ganesh Narine 
Subject: Automatic reply: Request for use of unformation 
  
Thank you for your email. To reach Greg Howell, please contact gah2343@mac.com. 
 
Greg 
 
 
267 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From: Takis Mitropoulos <takism2009@gmail.com> 
Sent: Sunday, April 8, 2018 4:38 PM 
To: Ganesh Narine 
Cc: gah2343@mac.com 
Subject: Re: Fw: Request for use of unformation 
  
Ganesh, I already emailed you permission several days ago.  
Best 
 
On Sun, Apr 8, 2018, 6:19 AM Ganesh Narine <ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu> wrote: 
Good Morning Professor, 
 
Please assist me with regards to my request in the email thread below. 
 
Thank you in advance. 
 
GN 
 
 
From: Gregory Howell <gah2343@mac.com> 
Sent: Saturday, April 7, 2018 1:59 PM 
To: Ganesh Narine 
Cc: Takis Mitropoulos 
Subject: Re: Request for use of unformation 
  
Suggest you contact Takis Mitropoulos  
 
 
Takis Mitropoulos <takism2009@gmail.com 
 
 
Gregory A. Howell 
Box 1003 
Ketchum, ID 83340-1003 
 
Connecting people and ideas 
C - 208/726-9989 
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Skype GregHowell 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On Apr 2, 2018, at 11:50, Ganesh Narine <ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu> wrote: 
 
Hello Mr. Howell, 
 
The drawing that I am interested in is attached. Thank you for responding 
 
GN 
 
 
From: Gregory Howell <gah2343@mac.com> 
Sent: Monday, April 2, 2018 10:23 AM 
To: Ganesh Narine 
Subject: Re: Request for use of unformation 
  
I suggest you send me the diagrams from the paper - I am not where I can find the paper. I’ll 
read it and then suggest a time for you to call and we can figure out where to go from there. 
Best regards, GAH 
Greg Howell 
 
 
On Apr 2, 2018, at 7:26 AM, Ganesh Narine <ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu> wrote: 
Dear Professors, Director 
 
I hope that you are enjoying great health and happiness. I am a doctoral student at Walden 
University. I am conducting research on why accidents are occurring in the North American 
power industry. I have your research paper on " Accident prevention strategies: Causation model 
and research directions" (cited below). I am interested in using information, including your 
diagrams on my research dissertation. I will appropriately cite and fully recognize the source of 
my information. Before doing this, I seek your permission to do so. I assure you that I will 
attribute full recognition to you for the excellent work that you have done. 
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I look forward to your positive response. Thank you in advance. 
  
Ganesh Narine 
STUDENT ID: A00648285 
 
 
Mitropoulos, P., Howell, G. A., & Abdelhamid, T. S. (2005). Accident prevention strategies: Causation 
model and research directions. In Construction Research Congress 2005: Broadening 
Perspectives (pp. 1-10). doi: 10.1061/40754(183)8 
 
 
 
From: Greg Howell <GHowell@Leanconstruction.org> 
Sent: Monday, April 2, 2018 9:18 AM 
To: Ganesh Narine 
Subject: Automatic reply: Request for use of unformation 
  
Thank you for your email. To reach Greg Howell, please contact gah2343@mac.com. 
 
Greg 
<accident causation model  a.jpg> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From: Ganesh Narine 
Sent: Sunday, April 1, 2018 9:27 PM 
To: Ashraf Labib 
Subject: Re: Request for use of information 
  
Thank You Professor. 
 
I will proudly share my work with you afterwards. 
 
Ganesh 
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From: Ashraf Labib <ashraf.labib@port.ac.uk> 
Sent: Sunday, April 1, 2018 5:07 PM 
To: Ganesh Narine 
Subject: Re: Request for use of information 
  
Dear Ganesh, 
With pleasure. Good luck. 
Best wishes, 
Ashraf 
 
 
 
 
-----8<--------------------------------- 
Professor Ashraf Labib 
University of Portsmouth 
Faculty of Business and Law,  
Operations & Systems Management. 
Portsmouth PO1 3DE 
United Kingdom 
Tel: 0044(0)23 9284 4729  
Email: ashraf.labib@port.ac.uk 
-----8<--------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
On 1 April 2018 at 21:46, Ganesh Narine <ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu> wrote: 
Dear Professor Labib, 
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I hope that you are enjoying great health and happiness. I have your research paper on 
" Learning (and unlearning) from failures: 30 years on from Bhopal to Fukushima an analysis 
through reliability engineering techniques" (cited below). I am interested in using information, 
including your diagrams on my research dissertation. I will appropriately cite and fully recognize 
the source of my information. Before doing this, I seek your permission to do so. I assure you 
that I will attribute full recognition to you for the excellent work that you have done. 
  
I look forward to your positive response. Thank you in advance. 
  
Ganesh Narine 
STUDENT ID: A00648285 
 
 
Labib, A. (2015). Learning (and unlearning) from failures: 30 years on from Bhopal to 
Fukushima an analysis through reliability engineering techniques. Process Safety and 
Environmental Protection, 97, 80-90. doi: 10.1016/j.psep.2015.03.008 
 
 
From: Ashraf Labib <ashraf.labib@port.ac.uk> 
Sent: Tuesday, January 9, 2018 4:05 AM 
To: Ganesh Narine 
Subject: Re: Request for your permission and a copy 
  
Dear Ganesh, 
Thank you for your kind email.  I am sorry that at the moment, I am very busy in supervising 12 
doctoral students plus working on a large grant with strict deadlines, and many teaching 
responsibilities. So my availability will be very limited. Hope you do well in your research which 
is quite interesting.  
Best wishes, 
Ashraf 
 
 
 
 
 
-----8<--------------------------------- 
Professor Ashraf Labib 
University of Portsmouth 
Faculty of Business and Law,  
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Operations & Systems Management. 
Portsmouth PO1 3DE 
United Kingdom 
Tel: 0044(0)23 9284 4729  
Email: ashraf.labib@port.ac.uk 
-----8<--------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
On 8 January 2018 at 21:37, Ganesh Narine <ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu> wrote: 
Dear Professor Labib, 
 
Thank you for your kind gesture. Sir, your study is one that is very revealing. My study is 
focused on why accidents happen in the electric power industry and the prevention of 
future accidents.  This is in line with the disasters you have succinctly studied. Your work is one 
that extended knowledge in a way that I hope to do in my industry. Would you be willing to 
give me guidance if that becomes necessary? I am grateful for your response. Thank you in 
advance. 
 
Ganesh 
 
 
From: Ashraf Labib <ashraf.labib@port.ac.uk> 
Sent: Monday, January 8, 2018 9:21 AM 
To: Ganesh Narine 
Subject: Re: Request for your permission and a copy 
  
Dear Ganesh, 
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Please find attached as requested. Good luck in your studies. 
Best wishes, 
Ashraf 
 
 
 
 
-----8<--------------------------------- 
Professor Ashraf Labib 
University of Portsmouth 
Faculty of Business and Law,  
Operations & Systems Management. 
Portsmouth PO1 3DE 
United Kingdom 
Tel: 0044(0)23 9284 4729  
Email: ashraf.labib@port.ac.uk 
-----8<--------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
On 7 January 2018 at 14:43, Ganesh Narine <ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu> wrote: 
Hello, 
 
I am a doctoral student at Walden University conducting research on why workplace accidents 
happen. I am interested in your article (below). 
Is it possible for you to share a copy with me? I want to study this and to include the lessons in 
my own study. I will ensure full recognition of the high quality work that you have done. I may 
also communicate further with you as  I progress with my research. I am sure that I will learn 
from you. 
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Thank you for a great and positive response. 
 
Ganesh 
 
 
Learning (and unlearning) from failures: 30 years on from 
Bhopal to Fukushima an analysis through reliability 
engineering techniques 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2015.03.008 
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Appendix B: Disaster Comparison in Bhopal and Fukushima Daiichi  
 
Comparison of the 1984 Chemical Disaster in Bhopal and the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Station Meltdown. 
 Bhopal Fukushima Daiichi 
When midnight of December 2, 1984 March 11th, 2011,  
What (happened) Water leak into methyl isocyanate (MIC) 
tank 610. 
Japan earthquake (9.0 
Richter scale) followed by a 
tsunami.  AC electrical 
power lost at  Fukushima 
Daiichi site. 
How significant 
was the problem 
water leak bypassed safety systems and 
barriers. Other control systems 
unavailable due to maintenance. 
cooling capability of the four 
nuclear reactors lost 
Other issues Operational errors lead to further 
escalation of problem. 
Tsunami breached designed 
systems and barriers 
originally considered as 
adequate for this facility 
Disaster/ 
Accident/Event 
leads to an uncontrolled chemical 
reaction and deadly gas leak. 
nuclear melt-down 
Consequence >3400 persons died 
> ~200 000 injured 
Level 7 disaster (the highest 
severity level ) International 
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>300 cows died 
>40sqkm of vegetation and eco-
systems damaged. 
 
Nuclear and Radiological 
Event Scale (INES),  
Unique 
(learning/un-
learning) 
“Storm” waiting to happen Unexpected and not 
designed for this level of 
water from tsunami event 
What went wrong 1. safety devices not designed for 
major gas leak like this one. 
2. Safety devices not enabled, 
bypassed and unavailable 
3. The plant was losing money 
4. staff and maintenance cutbacks 
5. questionable safety culture 
6. worker/management problems. 
Plant was due to be closed. 
7. Ineffective emergency response 
and inability to treat injured 
victims 
8. Communities were uninformed 
resulting in thousands of victims 
being injured or killed. 
9. Environmental disaster. 
 
277 
 
After the Accident Led to organizations keeping less 
volume (storage) of volatile chemicals 
Global regulation, new 
licencing arrangements for 
nuclear power plants. 
 
Note: Learning (and unlearning) from failures: 30 years on from Bhopal to Fukushima an 
analysis through reliability engineering techniques. Adapted from  A. Labib (2015). Reprinted 
with permission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
278 
 
Appendix C: Delphi Design Types 
 
Design type Aim 
Target 
panellists 
Administration 
 Number of 
rounds 
Round 1 
design 
Classical 
To elicit 
opinion and 
gain 
consensus 
Experts selected 
based on aims of 
research 
Traditionally 
postal 
Employs 
three or 
more 
rounds 
Open 
qualitative 
first round, to 
allow 
panellists to 
record 
responses 
Modified 
Aim varies 
according to 
project 
design, from 
predicting 
future events 
to achieving 
consensus 
Experts selected 
based on aims of 
research 
Varies, postal, 
online etc. 
May employ 
fewer than 3 
rounds 
Panellists 
provided with 
pre-selected 
items, drawn 
from various 
sources, 
within which 
they are asked 
to consider 
their 
responses  
Decision  
To structure 
decision-
making and 
create the 
future in 
reality rather 
than 
predicting it  
Decision makers, 
selected according 
to hierarchical 
position and level 
of expertise 
Varies Varies 
Can adopt 
similar 
process to 
classical 
Delphi 
Policy 
To generate 
opposing 
views on 
policy and 
potential 
resolutions. 
Policy makers 
selected to obtain 
divergent opinions 
Can adopt a 
number of 
formats 
including 
bringing 
participants 
together in a 
group meeting 
Varies 
Can adopt 
similar 
process to 
classical 
Delphi 
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Real 
time/consensus 
conference 
To elicit 
opinion and 
gain 
consensus 
Experts selected 
based on aims of 
research 
Use of 
computer 
technology that 
panellists use 
in the same 
room to 
achieve 
consensus in 
real time rather 
than post  
Varies 
Can adopt 
similar 
process to 
classical 
Delphi 
e-Delphi 
Aim can vary 
depending on 
the nature of 
the research 
Expert selection 
can vary 
depending on the 
aim of the research 
Administration 
of Delphi via 
email or online 
web survey 
Varies 
Can adopt 
similar 
process to 
classical 
Delphi 
Technological 
Aim varies 
according to 
project 
design, from 
predicting 
future events 
to achieving 
consensus 
Experts selected 
based on aims of 
research 
Use of hand-
held keypads 
allowing 
responses to be 
recorded and 
instant 
feedback 
provided 
 
Can adopt 
similar 
process to 
classical 
Delphi 
Online 
Aim varies 
according to 
project 
design, from 
predicting 
future events 
to achieving 
consensus 
Experts selected 
based on aims of 
research 
Implementation 
of the 
technique on 
any online 
instrument 
such as a chat 
room, or 
forum. 
Varies 
Can adopt 
similar 
process to 
classical 
Delph 
Argument 
To develop 
relevant 
arguments 
and expose 
underlying 
reasons for 
different 
opinions on a 
specific 
single issue 
Panellists should 
represent the 
research issue 
from different 
perspectives 
Varies  Varies 
Can adopt 
similar 
process to 
modified 
Delphi i.e. 
first round 
involves 
expert 
interviews  
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Disaggregative 
policy 
Constructs 
future 
scenarios in 
which 
panellists are 
asked about 
their probable 
and the 
preferable 
future 
Expert selection 
can vary 
depending on the 
aim of the research  
Varies Varies 
Adoption of 
modified 
format using 
cluster 
analysis 
Note. Enhancing rigour in the Delphi technique research. Adapted from F. Hasson & S. Keeney 
(2011). Reprinted with permission. 
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Appendix D: Normative Delphi  
 
Figure 18: Using the Delphi technique in normative planning research: Methodological design 
considerations. Adapted from N. Novakowski & B. Wellar. (2008). Reprinted with permission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 12 
Step 10 
Step 11 
Step 14 
Step 5 
Step 4 
Step 3 
Step 2 
Step 1 
Iterations of the 
survey 
Step 9 
Literature review 
Establish the need for research 
Establish the knowledge gaps 
Round 2: redistribution of the 
survey 
Pretest 
Ensure that the Delphi is the most 
appropriate research instrument 
Identification of potential participants 
Identify potential trial-run participants 
Identify potential Delphi panel 
members 
Preparation of draft 
Background report 
Survey 
Incorporation of feedback from 
round 1. Incorporate new variables 
from open-ended questions 
Tabulation of round-1 results 
Rewording; refinement of survey 
Stabilization of conceptual 
hierarchy 
Incorporation of feedback from 
previous round 
Retabulation of responses 
Response stability testing 
Editing of relevant opinions Step 6 
Step7 
Step8 
Step 
13 
Step 15 
Final tabulation of responses 
Analysis of final results 
Response stability testing 
Application of the consensus 
criteria 
Anonymous post-Delphi survey 
Dissemination of research results 
Provide results to client 
Send results to panel members 
Telephone or e-mail contact and 
interviews Select trial run candidates 
Select Delphi panel members 
Trial run. Investigate viability of 
the draft background report and 
draft survey 
Final revision of background 
report and survey 
Round 1 
Initial distribution of background 
report and survey to panel 
Figure 2.12 Flowchart for a Normative Delphi. 
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Appendix E: Round 1 Questions 
Round 1 Questions 
 
    
1. The following are reasons why serious and fatal accidents occur in the electric power industry.  
For each of the listed items, indicate whether you agree and comment on why you 
selected your option.  
 
Accident Cause Agree (Yes/No) Comment - Potential solution 
Poor design    
Safety management system 
flaw 
 
  
Poor regulatory oversight    
Poor workplace ethics, 
history of wrongdoing that 
went unaddressed  
  
Incorrect labeling 
 
  
Medical and other personal 
issues 
  
Grounding, earthing 
failures/errors  
 
  
Ineffective and inefficient 
Maintenance  
  
Animals/ living organisms   
Hazardous Worksite 
conditions 
 
  
Unplanned events   
Inappropriate work methods    
Stakeholder demands   
Poor judgment by individuals 
or work crews 
  
Poor attitudes and or behavior 
by individuals or work crews 
 
  
Ineffective or no workplace 
Training 
  
Poor Supervision 
 
  
Work planning   
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Management priorities 
 
  
Poor team communication  
 
  
Willful disregard for safety 
rules 
  
Permit to work violations    
Lock out tag out non-
compliance  
  
Organizational safety culture   
Individual Risk taking and 
negligence 
  
Equipment failure   
Procedural error   
Poor management oversight    
Poor quality material   
Non-use of personal 
protective equipment  
  
 
 
2 What other contributing factors, either organizational and/or individual, that impact on safe 
work and how do these affect accidents events where individuals are killed or injured at work?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. What can be done to prevent further and future accidents caused by the items identified in 
questions 1 and 2 above? 
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Appendix F – Round 2 Questions 
 
Round 2 Questions 
 
    
1. Each of the following are solutions to accidents as suggested by >70% participants in Round 
1. With Desirability in Round 2, rated as 5 for highly desirable to 1 for highly undesirable and 
feasibility rated from 5 for definitely feasible to 1 for definitely unfeasible. Please indicate your 
response to each item. 
 
Solution to Prevent Accident Desirable  
Indicate on the 
scale provided (1 
to 5) on how 
desirable it is to 
address, and if 
this may lead to 
the prevention of 
accidents, 
serious worker 
injuries, and 
death. 
 
Feasible 
Indicate on the 
scale provided (1 
to 5) on how 
desirable it is to 
address, and if 
this may lead to 
the prevention of 
accidents, 
serious worker 
injuries, and 
death. 
In Round 1 > 70% 
of participants 
believed that Focus 
on People Solutions 
was a solution to 
accidents in the 
electric power 
industry where 
workers are 
seriously injured or 
killed while doing 
work. 
 
Involvement of Qualified 
Personnel, Expert Practitioners, 
and Consultants; 
  
Focus on People 
Solutions 
Human Performance 
Monitoring; 
  
Focus on People 
Solutions 
Regular Supervisor and Manager 
Job Visits 
  
Focus on People 
Solutions 
Management - Workers 
Communication and Feedback 
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Focus on People 
Solutions 
Individual and Group Behavior 
and Habits; Teamwork; 
Confidence, Confidential  
 
  
Focus on People 
Solutions 
Work Methods, Procedures, and 
Management of Change,  Work 
Planning, Monitoring, Review, 
Procedures, Documented 
Standard 
  
Focus on People 
Solutions 
Culture, Safety Culture, Problem 
Identification 
  
Focus on People 
Solutions 
Prevention of Equipment Failure   
In Round 1 > 70% 
of participants 
believed that Work 
Standards Solutions 
was a solution to 
accidents in the 
electric power 
industry where 
workers are 
seriously injured or 
killed while doing 
work.  
 
Performance Monitoring   
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Reliability Centered 
Maintenance, Maintenance 
Scheduling and Cycles, 
Recordkeeping and 
Recordkeeping   Procedures 
 
  
Work Standards 
Solutions 
 Inspection Methods and 
Arrangements, Troubleshooting, 
Breakdown Management, 
Equipment and Device 
Calibration 
  
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Construction and Operating 
Practices and Procedures,  
International and Best Practice , 
Technology, Quality 
Management System 
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Work Standards 
Solutions 
Compliance Focus, Technology 
in Use, New Technology,  Work 
Methods Change-Management 
  
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Work Design and Planning; 
Work Performance Monitoring 
and Review; Recordkeeping; 
Documented, Standard, Worker 
Training, Knowledge and 
Experience 
  
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Diagnostic Testing, Research, 
and Manufacturers’ Instructions 
  
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Available and Condition of 
Personal Protective Equipment, 
Tools, and Materials 
  
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Safety Barriers, Safety Culture, 
and Housekeeping 
  
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Equipment Failure   
In Round 1 > 70% 
of participants 
believed that Safety 
Management 
Solutions was a 
solution to 
accidents in the 
electric power 
industry where 
workers are 
seriously injured or 
killed while doing 
work. 
 
Focus on Safety Legislation    
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Focus on Compliance, Work 
Methods, Procedures, Change 
  
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Culture; Organizational Culture; 
Safety Culture 
  
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Quality of Regulator Inspections   
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Distraction, Individual 
Obligation to Inform, 
Procedures, Rules and 
Documented Standards 
  
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Compliance with Manufacturers 
Instructions 
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Safety Management 
Solutions 
Safety Inspection, Workplace 
Inspections; Work Planning, 
Monitoring, and Review 
  
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Safety Oversight and Audits of 
Materials, Spares, Materials, 
Tools, and Personal Protective 
Equipment 
  
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Workplace Training; Safety 
Barriers; Housekeeping; Lock-
Out-Tag-Out, Permit to Work; 
Recordkeeping  
  
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Equipment Failure   
In Round 1 > 70% 
of participants 
believed that 
Workplace 
Training Solutions 
was a solution to 
accidents in the 
electric power 
industry where 
workers are 
seriously injured or 
killed while doing 
work.  
Training Philosophy, Company 
Core Values Training, and 
Workplace Training 
Arrangements (Cost, 
Availability, Management). 
  
Workplace 
Training Solutions 
Communication, Process, 
Procedures, Frequency, Quality, 
Methods, and Location 
  
Workplace 
Training Solutions 
Feedback (Management - 
Workers), Correct (Flaws) 
  
Workplace 
Training Solutions 
Manufacturers Instructions; 
Compliance 
  
Workplace 
Training Solutions 
Work Planning, Monitoring, and 
Review 
  
Workplace 
Training Solutions 
Material Science, Use, Testing, 
and Maintenance of Tools, Work 
Procedures, and Documented 
Standards 
  
Workplace 
Training Solutions 
Safety Rules, Procedures, and 
Barriers, Safety Culture 
  
Workplace 
Training Solutions 
Good Housekeeping   
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Workplace 
Training Solutions 
Prevention of Equipment Failure   
In Round 1 > 70% 
of participants 
believed that 
Management 
Solutions was a 
solution to 
accidents in the 
electric power 
industry where 
workers are 
seriously injured or 
killed while doing 
work. 
 
Focus and Assumptions   
Management 
Solutions 
Management Coaching /Support 
/ Priorities / Response 
Management and Arrangements 
  
Management 
Solutions 
Actions/Response   
Management 
Solutions 
Response of Regulator Findings 
/ Regulator Communication / 
Industry Stakeholders 
  
Management 
Solutions 
Quality of intake/ recruit/ / HR 
Services 
  
Management 
Solutions 
Disciplinary Action/ Company-
Union collaboration 
  
Management 
Solutions 
Support for work planning/ 
monitoring/ review 
  
Management 
Solutions 
Purchase of 
spares/materials/tools/Equipment 
Failure 
  
Management 
Solutions 
Work procedures, documented 
standards 
  
Management 
Solutions 
Safety Management and Safety 
Culture 
  
In Round 1 > 70% 
of participants 
believed that 
Supervision 
Solutions was a 
solution to 
accidents in the 
Supervisor support, interaction, 
confidence, knowledge, ability 
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electric power 
industry where 
workers are 
seriously injured or 
killed while doing 
work.  
 
Supervision Involvement in job – work; work 
team selection   
  
Supervision Compliance demand; reporting   
Supervision Inspection, adherence with  
procedures, and documented 
standards 
  
Supervision Worker involvement    
Supervision Work planning, monitoring, 
review 
  
Supervision Arrangements for available 
spares, materials, and use of 
tools, personal protective 
equipment 
  
Supervision Safety and Safety Culture   
Supervision Permit to Work, Lock-out-tag-
out 
  
Audit/Review 
solutions are 
desirable in the 
prevention of 
accidents where 
workers can 
become seriously 
injured or killed 
 
Audit/Review solutions are 
feasible 
  
Solutions to Poor design   
Solutions to Safety management system flaw 
 
  
Solutions to Poor regulatory oversight   
Solutions to Poor workplace ethics, history of 
wrongdoing that went unaddressed 
  
Solutions to Incorrect labeling   
Solutions to Medical and other personal issues   
Solutions to Grounding, earthing failures/errors 
 
  
Solutions to Ineffective and inefficient Maintenance   
Solutions to Animals/ living organisms   
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Solutions to Hazardous Worksite conditions 
 
  
Solutions to Unplanned events   
Solutions to Inappropriate work methods   
Solutions to Stakeholder demands   
Solutions to Poor judgment by individuals or work 
crews 
  
Solutions to Poor attitudes and or behavior by 
individuals or work crews 
 
  
Solutions to Ineffective or no workplace Training   
Solutions to Poor Supervision 
 
  
Solutions to Work planning   
Solutions to Management priorities 
 
  
Solutions to Poor team communication 
 
  
Solutions to Willful disregard for safety rules   
Solutions to Permit to work violations   
Solutions to Lock out tag out non-compliance   
Solutions to Organizational safety culture   
Solutions to Individual Risk taking and negligence   
Solutions to Equipment failure   
Solutions to Procedural error   
Solutions to Poor management oversight   
Solutions to Poor quality material   
Solutions to Non-use of personal protective equipment   
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Appendix G – Round 3 Questions 
 
Round 3 Questions 
 
    
1. The following are solutions to accidents as suggested by participants in Round 2. Rating in 
Round 3 ranges from 5 for extremely important to 1 for not at all important.  Please indicate your 
response  
 
Solutions to Prevent Accident Importance  
Indicate on the scale 
provided (1 to 5) the 
importance of 
addressing this issue 
to realize the 
prevention of 
accidents, serious 
worker injuries, and 
death. 
Focus on People 
Solutions 
Involvement of Qualified 
Personnel, Expert Practitioners, 
and Consultants; 
 
Focus on People 
Solutions 
Human Performance 
Monitoring; 
 
Focus on People 
Solutions 
Regular Supervisor and Manager 
Job Visits 
 
Focus on People 
Solutions 
Management - Workers 
Communication and Feedback 
 
Focus on People 
Solutions 
Individual and Group Behavior 
and Habits; Teamwork; 
Confidence, Confidential  
 
Focus on People 
Solutions 
Work Methods, Procedures, and 
Management of Change,  Work 
Planning, Monitoring, Review, 
Procedures, Documented 
Standard 
 
Focus on People 
Solutions 
Culture, Safety Culture, Problem 
Identification 
 
Focus on People 
Solutions 
Prevention of Equipment Failure  
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Work Standards 
Solutions 
Performance Monitoring  
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Reliability Centered 
Maintenance, Maintenance 
Scheduling and Cycles, 
Recordkeeping and 
Recordkeeping   Procedures 
 
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Inspection Methods and 
Arrangements, Troubleshooting, 
Breakdown Management, 
Equipment and Device 
Calibration 
 
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Construction and Operating 
Practices and Procedures,  
International and Best Practice , 
Technology, Quality 
Management System 
 
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Compliance Focus, Technology 
in Use, New Technology,  Work 
Methods Change-Management 
 
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Work Design and Planning; 
Work Performance Monitoring 
and Review; Recordkeeping; 
Documented, Standard, Worker 
Training, Knowledge and 
Experience 
 
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Diagnostic Testing, Research, 
and Manufacturers’ Instructions 
 
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Available and Condition of 
Personal Protective Equipment, 
Tools, and Materials 
 
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Safety Barriers, Safety Culture, 
and Housekeeping 
 
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Equipment failure  
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Focus on Safety Legislation  
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Focus on Compliance, Work 
Methods, Procedures, Change 
 
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Culture; Organizational Culture; 
Safety Culture 
 
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Quality of Regulator Inspections  
293 
 
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Distraction, Individual 
Obligation to Inform, 
Procedures, Rules and 
Documented Standards 
 
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Compliance with Manufacturers 
Instructions 
 
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Safety Inspection, Workplace 
Inspections; Work Planning, 
Monitoring, and Review 
 
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Safety Oversight and Audits of 
Materials, Spares, Materials, 
Tools, and Personal Protective 
Equipment 
 
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Workplace Training; Safety 
Barriers; Housekeeping; Lock-
Out-Tag-Out, Permit to Work; 
Recordkeeping 
 
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Equipment Failure  
Workplace Training 
Solutions 
Training Philosophy, Company 
Core Values Training, and 
Workplace Training 
Arrangements (Cost, 
Availability, Management). 
 
Workplace Training 
Solutions 
Communication, Process, 
Procedures, Frequency, Quality, 
Methods, and Location 
 
Workplace Training 
Solutions 
Feedback (Management - 
Workers), Correct (Flaws) 
 
Workplace Training 
Solutions 
Manufacturers Instructions; 
Compliance 
 
Workplace Training 
Solutions 
Work Planning, Monitoring, and 
Review 
 
Workplace Training 
Solutions 
Material Science, Use, Testing, 
and Maintenance of Tools, Work 
Procedures, and Documented 
Standards 
 
Workplace Training 
Solutions 
Safety Rules, Procedures, and 
Barriers, Safety Culture 
 
Workplace Training 
Solutions 
Good Housekeeping  
Workplace Training 
Solutions 
Prevention of Equipment Failure  
Management Solutions Focus and Assumptions  
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Management Solutions Management Coaching /Support 
/ Priorities / Response 
Management and Arrangements 
 
Management Solutions Actions/Response  
Management Solutions Response of Regulator Findings 
/ Regulator Communication / 
Industry Stakeholders 
 
Management Solutions Quality of intake/ recruit/ HR 
Services 
 
Management Solutions Disciplinary Action/ Company-
Union collaboration 
 
Management Solutions Support for work planning/ 
monitoring/ review 
 
Management Solutions Support for work planning/ 
monitoring/ review 
 
Management Solutions Purchase of 
spares/materials/tools/Equipment 
Failure 
 
Management Solutions Work procedures, documented 
standards 
 
Management Solutions Safety Management and Safety 
Culture 
 
Supervision Supervisor support, interaction, 
confidence, knowledge, ability 
 
Supervision Involvement in job – work; work 
team selection   
 
Supervision Compliance demand; reporting  
Supervision Inspection, adherence with  
procedures, and documented 
standards 
 
Supervision Worker involvement   
Supervision Work planning, monitoring, 
review 
 
Supervision Arrangements for available 
spares, materials, and use of 
tools, personal protective 
equipment 
 
Supervision Safety and Safety Culture  
Supervision Permit to Work, Lock-out-tag-
out 
 
Audit/Review solutions are important in the prevention of 
accidents where workers can become seriously injured or 
killed 
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Solutions to Poor design  
Solutions to Safety management system flaw 
 
 
Solutions to Poor regulatory oversight  
Solutions to Poor workplace ethics, history of wrongdoing 
that went unaddressed 
 
Solutions to Incorrect labeling  
Solutions to Medical and other personal issues  
Solutions to Grounding, earthing failures/errors 
 
 
Solutions to Ineffective and inefficient Maintenance  
Solutions to Animals/ living organisms  
Solutions to Hazardous Worksite conditions 
 
 
Solutions to Unplanned events  
Solutions to Inappropriate work methods  
Solutions to Stakeholder demands  
Solutions to Poor judgment by individuals or work crews  
Solutions to Poor attitudes and or behavior by individuals or 
work crews 
 
 
Solutions to Ineffective or no workplace Training  
Solutions to Poor Supervision 
 
 
Solutions to Work planning  
Solutions to Management priorities 
 
 
Solutions to Poor team communication 
 
 
Solutions to Willful disregard for safety rules  
Solutions to Permit to work violations  
Solutions to Lock out tag out non-compliance  
Solutions to Organizational safety culture  
Solutions to Individual Risk taking and negligence  
Solutions to Equipment failure  
Solutions to Procedural error  
Solutions to Poor management oversight  
Solutions to Poor quality material  
Solutions to Non-use of personal protective equipment  
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Appendix H – Round 4 Questions 
 
Round 4 Questions 
 
    
1. The following are solutions to accidents as suggested by participants through Round 1, 2, and 
3. With the rating in Round 4 ranging from 5 to 1 for definitely certain to unreliable respectively, 
please indicate your response. 
 
 
 
Solutions to Prevent Accident Confidence  
Indicate on the scale 
provided (1 to 5) your 
confidence in the 
solutions to accidents 
in the electric power 
industry where 
workers are seriously 
injured or killed while 
doing work, derived 
in this study. 
Focus on People 
Solutions 
Involvement of Qualified 
Personnel, Expert Practitioners, 
and Consultants; 
 
Focus on People 
Solutions 
Human Performance 
Monitoring; 
 
Focus on People 
Solutions 
Regular Supervisor and Manager 
Job Visits 
 
Focus on People 
Solutions 
Management - Workers 
Communication and Feedback 
 
Focus on People 
Solutions 
Individual and Group Behavior 
and Habits; Teamwork; 
Confidence, Confidential  
 
Focus on People 
Solutions 
Work Methods, Procedures, and 
Management of Change,  Work 
Planning, Monitoring, Review, 
Procedures, Documented 
Standard 
 
Focus on People 
Solutions 
Culture, Safety Culture, Problem 
Identification 
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Focus on People 
Solutions 
Prevention of Equipment Failure  
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Performance Monitoring  
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Reliability Centered 
Maintenance, Maintenance 
Scheduling and Cycles, 
Recordkeeping and 
Recordkeeping   Procedures 
 
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Inspection Methods and 
Arrangements, Troubleshooting, 
Breakdown Management, 
Equipment and Device 
Calibration 
 
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Construction and Operating 
Practices and Procedures,  
International and Best Practice , 
Technology, Quality 
Management System 
 
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Compliance Focus, Technology 
in Use, New Technology,  Work 
Methods Change-Management 
 
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Work Design and Planning; 
Work Performance Monitoring 
and Review; Recordkeeping; 
Documented, Standard, Worker 
Training, Knowledge and 
Experience 
 
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Diagnostic Testing, Research, 
and Manufacturers’ Instructions 
 
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Available and Condition of 
Personal Protective Equipment, 
Tools, and Materials 
 
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Safety Barriers, Safety Culture, 
and Housekeeping 
 
Work Standards 
Solutions 
Equipment failure  
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Focus on Safety Legislation  
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Focus on Compliance, Work 
Methods, Procedures, Change 
 
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Culture; Organizational Culture; 
Safety Culture 
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Safety Management 
Solutions 
Quality of Regulator Inspections  
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Distraction, Individual 
Obligation to Inform, 
Procedures, Rules and 
Documented Standards 
 
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Compliance with Manufacturers 
Instructions 
 
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Safety Inspection, Workplace 
Inspections; Work Planning, 
Monitoring, and Review 
 
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Safety Oversight and Audits of 
Materials, Spares, Materials, 
Tools, and Personal Protective 
Equipment 
 
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Workplace Training; Safety 
Barriers; Housekeeping; Lock-
Out-Tag-Out, Permit to Work; 
Recordkeeping 
 
Safety Management 
Solutions 
Equipment Failure  
Workplace Training 
Solutions 
Training Philosophy, Company 
Core Values Training, and 
Workplace Training 
Arrangements (Cost, 
Availability, Management). 
 
Workplace Training 
Solutions 
Communication, Process, 
Procedures, Frequency, Quality, 
Methods, and Location 
 
Workplace Training 
Solutions 
Feedback (Management - 
Workers), Correct (Flaws) 
 
Workplace Training 
Solutions 
Manufacturers Instructions; 
Compliance 
 
Workplace Training 
Solutions 
Work Planning, Monitoring, and 
Review 
 
Workplace Training 
Solutions 
Material Science, Use, Testing, 
and Maintenance of Tools, Work 
Procedures, and Documented 
Standards 
 
Workplace Training 
Solutions 
Safety Rules, Procedures, and 
Barriers, Safety Culture 
 
Workplace Training 
Solutions 
Good Housekeeping  
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Workplace Training 
Solutions 
Prevention of Equipment Failure  
Management Solutions Focus and Assumptions  
Management Solutions Management Coaching /Support 
/ Priorities / Response 
Management and Arrangements 
 
Management Solutions Actions/Response  
Management Solutions Response of Regulator Findings 
/ Regulator Communication / 
Industry Stakeholders 
 
Management Solutions Quality of intake/ recruit/ HR 
Services 
 
Management Solutions Disciplinary Action/ Company-
Union collaboration 
 
Management Solutions Support for work planning/ 
monitoring/ review 
 
Management Solutions Support for work planning/ 
monitoring/ review 
 
Management Solutions Purchase of 
spares/materials/tools/Equipment 
Failure 
 
Management Solutions Work procedures, documented 
standards 
 
Management Solutions Safety Management and Safety 
Culture 
 
Supervision Supervisor support, interaction, 
confidence, knowledge, ability 
 
Supervision Involvement in job – work; work 
team selection   
 
Supervision Compliance demand; reporting  
Supervision Inspection, adherence with  
procedures, and documented 
standards 
 
Supervision Worker involvement   
Supervision Work planning, monitoring, 
review 
 
Supervision Arrangements for available 
spares, materials, and use of 
tools, personal protective 
equipment 
 
Supervision Safety and Safety Culture  
Supervision Permit to Work, Lock-out-tag-
out 
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Audit/Review solutions to prevent accidents where workers 
can become seriously injured or killed 
 
 
Solutions to Poor design  
Solutions to Safety management system flaw 
 
 
Solutions to Poor regulatory oversight  
Solutions to Poor workplace ethics, history of wrongdoing 
that went unaddressed 
 
Solutions to Incorrect labeling  
Solutions to Medical and other personal issues  
Solutions to Grounding, earthing failures/errors 
 
 
Solutions to Ineffective and inefficient Maintenance  
Solutions to Animals/ living organisms  
Solutions to Hazardous Worksite conditions 
 
 
Solutions to Unplanned events  
Solutions to Inappropriate work methods  
Solutions to Stakeholder demands  
Solutions to Poor judgment by individuals or work crews  
Solutions to Poor attitudes and or behavior by individuals or 
work crews 
 
 
Solutions to Ineffective or no workplace Training  
Solutions to Poor Supervision 
 
 
Solutions to Work planning  
Solutions to Management priorities 
 
 
Solutions to Poor team communication 
 
 
Solutions to Willful disregard for safety rules  
Solutions to Permit to work violations  
Solutions to Lock out tag out non-compliance  
Solutions to Organizational safety culture  
Solutions to Individual Risk taking and negligence  
Solutions to Equipment failure  
Solutions to Procedural error  
Solutions to Poor management oversight  
Solutions to Poor quality material  
Solutions to Non-use of personal protective equipment  
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Appendix I: Results of Qualitative Analysis  
Using NVivo 12 Plus Software 
Poor Design  
  
 Query: Poor DesignAutocodes vs Manual codes   Text Search Query: Poor Design Word Tree 
  
Poor Work Ethics  
  
Poor Work Ethics Word Cloud   Text Search Query: Poor Work Ethics Word Tree 
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Medical Issues 
  
Medical Issues Word Cloud     Group Query Vs all (including Medical) 
 
 
 
Group Query Frames Vs all (including Medical)  Text Query (Personal Issues & Medical) 
  
Grounding  
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Grounding Word Cloud   Text Query (Grounding) 
  Ineffective & Inefficient Maintenance (I&IM) 
  
I&IM Word Cloud    Text Query (Maintenance) 
 
Group Query I&IM  vs all (Frames)  Autocodes (I&IM) 
  
 
Animals & Living Organisms 
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Animals & Living Organisms Word Cloud  Text Query (Animals) 
   
 
Hazardous work-site conditions 
   
Hazardous work-site conditions Word Cloud        Group Query Hazardous work-site conditions vs People Issues 
    
 Inappropriate Work Methods 
   
Inappropriate Work Methods Word Cloud Text Query (Inappropriate Work Methods) 
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Text Query (Inappropriate Work Methods)    Autocodes (Inappropriate Work Methods) 
 
 
 
Poor Quality Material 
  
  
Group Queries (vs all)   Poor Quality Material   Autocodes 
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The word cloud developed for the question on non-use of personal protective equipment 
is shown in Fig 12.  The word cloud showed that the top five words used in the responses by 
participants to the Q30: Non-use of Personal Protective Equipment on the Round 1 questionnaire 
were ppe, non, use, expectations, and culture.  These words were used to generate the associated 
Word Trees from NVivo 12 Plus as the researcher used the text search query option available 
with on this software. 
 
Fig 12 Word Cloud: Q30: Non-use of Personal Protective Equipment 
 
Fig 13 shows that associated Word Tree: Q30: Non-use of Personal Protective Equipment (ppe, 
non, use, expectations, & culture). 
Fig 13  
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Fig 14 shows that associated Auto-Coding : Q30: Non-use of Personal Protective Equipment 
Fig. 14 
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The automatic coding resulted from the selection of the auto-code option on NVivo 12 
Plus.  It exacts improper use of personal protective equipment, a disregard for the personal 
protective equipment, and also safety issues that required further investigations.  The codes 
generated were from participants responses to Q30: Non-use of Personal Protective Equipment 
on the Round 1 questionnaire.  Table 10 shows the Researcher Manual Coding: Q30: Non-use of 
Personal Protective Equipment.  
The matrix entries represent the number of different links I identified as the researcher 
between the factors listed and based participants responses to the Round 1 questions.  For non-
use of personal protective equipment, there were participant responses that linked this item with 
equipment failure, poor design, work planning, ineffective or no workplace training among other 
factors.  This link-spread was almost even across the elements included in this table.  Table 11 
shows Researcher Manual Coding (Four-Frames): Q30: Non-use of Personal Protective 
Equipment. 
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Table 10 The Researcher Manual Coding: Q30 
 
Table 11 Researcher Manual Coding (Four-Frames): Q30 
 
A : Human 
Resources 
Frame 
C : 
Political 
F : 
Structural 
Frame 
H : 
Symbolic 
Frame 
B : 
Management 
Priorities 
D : Poor 
Management 
Oversight 
E : Safety 
Management 
Flaw 
G : 
Supervision 
1 : inappropriate 
work methods 
49 49 44 36 54 10 45 50 
2 : judgment 
individual crew 
67 82 74 62 107 20 75 89 
3 : non use of ppe 38 43 41 37 49 8 44 46 
4 : Organizational 
Safety Culture 
66 93 85 76 117 18 104 103 
5 : Poor attitude 
and behavior 
60 75 67 56 87 19 66 78 
6 : Poor Team 
Communication 
34 48 45 41 51 14 45 47 
7 : Poor Work 
Ethics 
41 56 50 44 63 15 47 54 
9 : Wilful Disregard 
For Safety Rules 
34 38 47 41 44 16 42 46 
 
The entries represent the number of different links identified by me as the researcher 
between the factors listed; the four-frame conceptual framework in this study, and based 
participants responses to the Round 1 questions.  The Bolman and Deal four-frames were as 
 
A : 
inappropri
ate work 
methods 
B : 
judgment 
individual 
crew 
C : non 
use of ppe 
D : Poor 
attitude 
and 
behavior 
E : Poor 
Team 
Communic
ation 
F : Poor 
Work 
Ethics 
G : Wilful 
Disregard 
For Safety 
Rules 
1 : Animal Guards 31 31 29 32 29 30 24 
2 : Equipment Failure 22 18 11 15 11 11 13 
3 : Grounding and earthing 42 49 30 43 30 32 25 
4 : Hazardous worksite conditions 48 54 30 48 31 35 25 
5 : Incorrect Labeling 41 40 28 37 28 29 24 
6 : ineffective maintenance 45 57 30 47 30 38 26 
7 : ineffective or no workplace 
training 
49 70 39 58 38 41 33 
8 : Organizational Safety Culture 48 82 43 80 50 59 47 
9 : Permit to Work 20 21 16 19 18 17 18 
10 : Poor Design 26 45 36 45 30 39 27 
11 : Work Planning 34 47 34 46 47 42 54 
12 : Positive 69 88 59 84 59 65 60 
13 : Negative 83 118 60 104 64 90 62 
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relevant as the other factors highlighted in this analysis.  Links existed between non-use of 
personal protective equipment at work, management priorities, management oversight, 
supervision, and each of the four frames as espoused in the Bolman and Deal model.  
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Appendix J: Actual Responses 
Actual Participants responses to question Q4 for poor work ethics: history of wrongdoing 
that went unaddressed: 
One way is to identify individuals who are prone to take safety risks. Coaching 
these individuals can improve their attitude towards risky behavior. 
Supervisors not knowledgeable about proper work practices or safety rules. 
Supervisors not wanting to get their guys in trouble 
The brother in law positions. Just moving trouble along instead of dealing with it 
Workers in the electric utility are expected to always check dead before touching 
conductor. Sometimes we've witnessed people getting lax and bypassing this step,which 
could be disasterous. 
Organizations need to create a "Safety First" culture. In this culture, poor or 
unsafe work ethic as well as a history of wrongdoing needs to be corrected. Set initial 
expectations that nothing is more important than getting the job done Safely and that 
unsatisfactory behavior will be addressed. Progressive discipline is oftentimes necessary. 
Set the initial expectations. If those expectations are not met, provide retraining. If 
expectations are still not met, then it is fair to remove personnel from the team if they 
cannot or are not willing to fit into a Safety First culture. 
Have work practices reviewed by an independent party. An independent party 
would more easily recognize poor work ethics; practices that may have been done for 
years. 
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Stop allowing these people to train apprentices. Poor work ethics is a continuous 
cycle until it it broken. A bad foreman creates bad journeyman, that creates bad 
apprentices and the cycle continues, because people do what they are taught to do. 
People with bad work ethics usually have the most experience which is why the issues go 
unaddressed. 
More training and oversight; structured process 
Workers not Trained in areas that the projects needs. I.E. apprentices working 
without Journeyman supervision., 
As previously stated, there is not enough disciplinary action for noncompliance at 
the company level. 
Tap root analysis and incident analysis of serious accidents are supposed to 
produce "lessons learned" to help prevent future accidents. If the analysis conclusions 
are incorrect, the lessons learned will be inaccurate. Poor work ethics are a product of 
poor accident investigation. Areas not investigated are in- attentional blindness, 
practical drift, the anatomy of "good judgement" including instinct, tuition and intuition. 
Poor work practices, such as taking short cuts, can result in serous injury. 
Supervision must constantly reinforce the importance of strictly adhering to procedures. 
I disagree that historical work practices contribute to accidents. 
Address wrong doing with firm and fair action 
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Not reporting and discussing near misses with the work crews is a leading 
indicator that an accident will happen sooner or later. 
Implement controls, I.e., knowledgable observers. 
Make "Integrity" one of your organization's core values. Set the expectation (both 
initial and reoccurring training) that the Work should be completed with Integrity and 
that Integrity violations (poor work ethic, wrongdoing, etc.) are grounds for immediate 
dismissal. 
Sometimes in this industry people who are found doing wrong do not belong in a 
hazardous work environment. Firing or harsh discipline sometimes is doing the offender 
a favor and may save their life. 
Training Safety awareness human factors PPE Job safety analysis equipment 
safety environment condition if any of above can affect , work , mainly human factors like 
emotional health , mood balance should be assessed as a part of Job safety analysis 
If a someone does something wrong and no one tells them it is wrong they can’t 
learn. In the same way if you tell them it is wrong and they don’t fix it and nothing 
happens to that person they will keep doing the same things. 
Can't get away from this. Only a certain pool of people and s transient workforce. 
Bad workers are around and you inherit on occasions. You learn from experience but the 
next guy has too 
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Dismissing all parties (management and workers) who contribute to this 
unacceptable situation 
Management and Worker Unions must not allow internal organizational politics 
and games to cloud their responsibility for keeping a safe operation and to positively 
reinforce full safety compliance. 
This is probably the number one reason for workplace accidents. Going up in the 
air without harness properly worn. Working hot secondary without gloves. One guy 
grabbing a phase and something else that is at a different potential even with gloves on. 
Most are human error. 
Work cultures that have a habit of taking "shortcuts", not providing proper 
training and/or not enforcing work standards are at a high risk for accidents. Workers 
need to: 1. Safety needs to be #1 priority and everyone needs to understand what that 
means 2. Workers need the right tools and PPEs to do the job 3. Get the right training 
and get refresher courses to stay current 4. Work standards/practices need to be enforced 
Challenge: Changing the way workers think about doing their job. Many think that "this 
is the way I was taught and it's good enough" 
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Appendix K: Frame Responses 
Solutions Provided by Participants 
For the problem of Poor Design include: 70.37% of participants believed that Poor 
Design issues could be solved.  In Round 2, 92% of participants indicated that the solutions to 
Poor Design were desirable; 100 % found them feasible.  In Round 3, 100% indicated that it was 
important to implement these solutions to prevent further and future accidents.  In Round 4, 
91.3% expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not 
become seriously injured or killed while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Poor Design include: 
Monitoring of individual performances to stop the action, review assumptions and 
strategies, and to change work plans if that is necessary: participants agreed that 
sometimes it was not always possible to spot poor design problems, but skilled 
and knowledgeable individuals can help to prevent accident-causing situations. 
Knowledgeable individuals know when to stop work activities to avoid accidents 
due to Poor Design. 
Incorporate safety by design into the engineering processes; involve safety 
professionals in the design phase of projects.  Engineering designers should gather 
feedback from all parties before final approvals.  Construction personnel should 
comment as to how to build the equipment, and Operations personnel should 
enlighten on how to operate the equipment safely. Likewise, Maintenance 
practitioners can offer advice on maintenance challenges expected with the 
design.   
Situations/equipment with Poor Design issues must be documented and readily 
available to those who need it regardless of how difficult an exercise that may be. 
Data saturation (solutions to Poor Design) occurred. These surrounded possible conflicts, 
assumptions, inspections, practices, maintenance, construction, procedures, training, 
consultation, work methods, managers, and supervisors. 
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Table:  Poor Design Participant Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
The challenge is to design electrical 
systems that don't need "tree wire." Better 
tree clearances mean a lighter wire with 
no insulation to skin 
Integrate the Environmental, Health, and 
Safety department into the planning and 
design phase of projects. 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
If personnel have to work within the "poor design", 
they should be trained in how to do it safely. If that is 
not possible, then whatever "poor design" is causing 
the problem should be taken out of service 
 
I disagree that poor design is a fatal accident 
cause. 
Accidents caused by poor design are prevented by 
correcting poor design. 
 
For the problem of Safety Management Flaw: 88.89% of participants believed that Safety 
Management Flaw issues could be solved.  In Round 2, 100% of participants indicated that the 
solutions to Safety Management Flaw were desirable; 100 % found them feasible.  In Round 3, 
100% indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and future 
accidents.  In Round 4, 91.3% expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power industry, 
workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Safety Management Flaw include:  
Periodic review of the Safety Management System can allow for the identification 
of flaws. Existing flaws should be addressed and corrected with alacrity and 
purpose.  If there is a flaw in the Safety Management System processes, then 
some risks can be overlooked. 
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A renewed emphasis on tailgate meetings, and job hazard analysis that is fully 
supported and facilitated by supervisors, general foremen, or foremen, is 
necessary. Their involvement is critical for full compliance.  Management, worker 
unions, and regulators must support periodic and jointly conduct Safety 
Management System reviews. 
Data saturation (solutions to Safety Management Flaw) occurred. These surrounded 
Safety Management System links with deficiencies in Lock-out Tag-out procedures, working 
knowledge and understanding of work activities. Issues surrounding worksite responsibilities and 
understanding of individual roles on job sites where different working parties are engaged. 
Inadequate and poor quality supervision. Workplace training and refresher training.  Job safety 
analysis and proper personal protective equipment. 
Table:  Participant Safety Management Flaw Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
(1) Management failure to enforce rules 
and to demand compliance. 
(2) Improper work procedures. 
 
(1) Individuals and work teams 
deliberately not adopting safety 
work measures because of a 
false thinking that the rules do 
not apply or are relevant to the 
work activities. 
(2) Have qualified people in the 
jobs who have hands on 
knowledge. 
 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
(1) I disagree that accidents are caused 
by safety management flaws 
(2) Time pressure given by management 
can be a cause. 
 
(1) leadership should always be 
evaluating management systems 
and making improvements. 
(2) Typical Safety Management 
Systems follow OHSAS 18001, 
OSHA, and State requirements 
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For the problem of Poor Regulatory Oversight include: 59.26% of participants believed 
that Poor Regulatory Oversight issues could be solved. This item was not taken further than 
Round 1. 
For the problem of Poor Work Ethics: History of wrongdoing that went unaddressed: 
92.59% of participants believed that Poor Work Ethics issues could be solved.  In Round 2, 96% 
of participants indicated that the solutions to Poor Work Ethics were desirable; 96 % found them 
feasible.  In Round 3, 100% indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to 
prevent further and future accidents.  In Round 4, 91.3% expressed confidence that if applied in 
the electric power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing 
work.  
Solutions identified for the problem of Poor Work Ethics: History of wrongdoing that 
went unaddressed include:  
Managers and supervisors must deliberately look for and identify individuals who are 
prone to take safety risks; coaching these individuals for improved attitudes towards the 
removal of risky behavior.  Managers and supervisors must set initial expectations that 
nothing is more important than for workers to complete job tasks safely. 
Management and Workers Unions must not allow internal organizational politics and 
games to cloud their responsibility for keeping a safe operation and to positively 
reinforce full safety compliance. 
Human (individual and personal) factors assessment like emotional health and mood 
balance must be part of job safety briefing and analysis. Train supervisors and managers 
so that they can be proven competent at doing this. 
Managers, supervisors, and workers must undergo workplace training to bolster 
organizational work cultures where individuals will not take shortcuts" in preference to 
work procedures and standards. A review of these standards and procedures must be done 
to determine practical difficulties in implementing. Any identified challenge must be 
effectively addressed and removed as a work challenge. 
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Managers and supervisors must set the expectation that integrity must guide work 
activities and that violations (poor work ethic, wrongdoing, etc.) are grounds for 
immediate dismissal.  Dismissing all parties (management, supervisors, and workers) 
who contribute to this unacceptable situation will address procedural deviation. 
Data saturation (solutions to Poor Work Ethics: History of wrongdoing that went 
unaddressed) occurred. These surrounded the need for leaders in the electric power industry 
organizations to create a safety first culture.  Progressive discipline and its frequency.  Managers 
and supervisors roles and responsibilities for setting initial expectations and providing training.  
Removal of errant individuals, including dismissal, if expectations are still not or if they cannot 
or are not willing to fit into a safety first culture.  Work standards/practices enforcement are 
necessary: near misses, reporting and investigations must be a positive paradigm and actively 
promoted.   
Table:  Participant Poor Work Ethics: History of Wrongdoing that went Unaddressed Responses: 
Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
Workers in the electric utility are 
expected to always check dead before 
touching conductor. Sometimes we've 
witnessed people getting lax and 
bypassing this step, which could be 
disastrous. 
Poor work ethics is a continuous cycle 
until it is broken. A bad foreman 
creates bad journeyman, that creates 
bad apprentices and the cycle 
continues, because people do what 
they are taught to do. 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
The brother in law positions. Just moving 
trouble along instead of dealing with it 
 
I disagree that historical work practices 
contribute to accidents. 
Have work practices reviewed by an 
independent party. An independent 
party would more easily recognize 
poor work ethics; practices that may 
have been done for years. 
 
Address wrong doing with firm and 
fair action 
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For the problem of Incorrect Labeling include: 66.67% of participants believed that 
Incorrect Labeling issues could be solved. This item was not taken further than Round 1. 
For the problem of Medical and Other Personal Issues: 85.19% of participants believed 
that Medical and Other Personal Issues could be solved.  In Round 2, 96% of participants 
indicated that the solutions to Medical and Other Personal Issues were desirable; 92 % found 
them feasible.  In Round 3, 91.67% indicated that it was important to implement these solutions 
to prevent further and future accidents.  In Round 4, 91.3% expressed confidence that if applied 
in the electric power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing 
work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Medical and Other Personal Issues include:  
Medications can lead to symptoms such as drowsiness which can pose a safety risk in 
dangerous work as exists in the electric power industry.  If a worker is on medication that 
can cause inattention to detail, or worse (passing out or drowsiness), they should not 
perform hazardous tasks.  Supervisors must explore all possible ways to assign workers 
with known medical or other health issues to non-high-risk activities.    
When non-high-risk work is not available, getting employees to speak up about issues 
they may be having can prove vital.  Specialist medical officers can provide employees 
with sufficient confidential guidance so that the employee and other co-workers will not 
be at risk of becoming injured as a result of this issue.   
Organizational leadership must support safety policies and programs that mandate fit-for-
duty-testing for safety-sensitive roles.   
Managers and supervisors must encourage workers to indicate when they have medical or 
personal issues that can affect job performance.  Employees with these issues should not 
do hazardous work.  Organizational leadership should ensure that organizational policies 
and procedures are sufficient for supervisors and managers to handle workers’ medical 
and other personal issues appropriately.   
Train supervisors and managers for this role, have a medical advisor to assist and can 
screen workers (especially those in safety-sensitive functions, and aging or previously 
injured workers) as fit for duty (mental, physical, emotional, drug and alcohol testing).  
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Train volunteer employees, with guaranteed periodic refresher training, on CPR and First 
Aid Techniques. 
Data saturation (solutions to Medical and Other Personal Issues) occurred. These 
surrounded medications, individual privacy, assumptions, procedures, training, consultation, 
work, managers, and supervisors. 
Table:  Medical and Other Personal Issues Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
Supervisors can recognize unfit 
workers during the tailboard meeting. 
Allowing more sick time and mental 
health days will help employees be able to 
stay home when they have medical and 
personal issues. 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
Health has no bearing on safety. 
 
Personal issues should be left outside of the work 
environment. 
Encourage a culture of self reporting 
 
For the problem of Grounding, Earthing Failures/Errors: 88.89% of participants 
believed that Grounding, Earthing Failures/Errors could be solved.  In Round 2, 100% of 
participants indicated that the solutions to Grounding, Earthing Failures/Errors were desirable; 
100 % found them feasible.  In Round 3, 95.83% indicated that it was important to implement 
these solutions to prevent further and future accidents.  In Round 4, 91.3% expressed confidence 
that if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed 
while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Grounding, Earthing Failures/Errors include:  
Work procedures and arrangements for proper Grounding and Earthing  must be 
outlined, clear, and detailed in every work-plan as work on de-energized overhead power 
lines or electrical systems can be done safely if electrical grounds are applied. 
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Managers and supervisors must demand non-compliance to this requirement by utilizing 
human performance improvement tools such as 3-way communication. In grounding and 
earthing exercises, work procedures must be for workers to repeat the instruction is back 
to the supervisor to confirm that information was understood.  Electrical switching 
operations, involving the application or removal of grounds, shall be double checked if 
not more frequently.  When preparing energized power lines or equipment for work, the 
process of making the lines or equipment safe will involve the grounding and earthing.  A 
competent worker must confirm and approve the earthing and grounding of electrical 
systems before workers can begin work tasks. 
Managers and supervisors must train workers on these requirements and procedures so 
that the workers can understand the electrical theory and reasons for grounding and for 
them to not just view it as a work requirement.  Not using equipotential grounding is a 
bad and incorrect decision: equipotential grounding is not always correctly taught, and 
many times it is not followed.  Equipotential grounding is one of the most misunderstood 
and hazardous situation linemen, and electrical workers can encounter.  Getting 
individuals at work to follow the rules rather than opt for short cuts is paramount in 
maintaining safe work conditions. 
Managers and supervisors must ensure that, in electrical substations, electrical ground 
grids are to be periodically tested to ensure that electrical grounds used for worker 
protection remain sufficient and capable providing the intended protection from 
inadvertent energization.  
Data saturation (solutions to Grounding, Earthing Failures/Errors) occurred. These 
surrounded equipotential grounding, poor judgment, managers and supervisors, workers, 
application or removal of grounds, worker training, communication, teamwork, competent 
worker, work procedures, discipline, and short-cuts. 
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Table:  Grounding, Earthing Failures/Errors Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
Conduct initial and reoccurring training on 
appropriate grounding. Conduct observations 
on ongoing work to make on the spot 
corrections and retraining. Apply progressive 
discipline up to and including removal from 
the team. 
 
Training! I have been aware of two serious 
injuries from improperly grounded lines: The 
employees were sure they had grounded 
correctly. 
 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
It is possible, but grounding errors are 
infrequent. 
 
Managers and supervisors shall manage the 
Organizational Safety Program and uphold the 
safety policy for effective controls of grounding 
and earthing hazards. The Program shall include 
provisions for worker training and periodic 
retraining, the conduct of periodic audits and 
management overview and review. 
 
 
For the problem of Ineffective and Inefficient Maintenance: 88.89% of participants 
believed that Ineffective and Inefficient Maintenance could be solved.  In Round 2, 100% of 
participants indicated that the solutions to Ineffective and Inefficient Maintenance were desirable; 
100 % found them feasible.  In Round 3, 95.83% indicated that it was important to implement 
these solutions to prevent further and future accidents.  In Round 4, 91.3% expressed confidence 
that if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed 
while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Ineffective and Inefficient Maintenance include:  
Managers, supervisors, and workers must keep electrical equipment maintained to 
prevent an accident by avoiding catastrophic failures of high energy equipment. 
Defective and faulty equipment and machinery are significant unsafe work conditions.  
Developing and keeping, as a top priority, a maintenance program with recurring 
intervals, in line with actual performance cycles, equipment manufacturers 
recommendation, industry standards, best practices, and other arrangements for 
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equipment and specialized tools maintenance will prevent premature equipment failure.  
If maintenance on the electrical system is inefficient and ineffectively managed, rotted 
poles, failing insulators, all with increasing amperage load, will lead to unsafe conditions 
and opportunities for the next employee tasked with repairing or operating that equipment 
with hazardous conditions and a higher risk of injury. 
Managers and supervisors must focus on workers' needs and organizational requirements.  
Managers and supervisors must support a safety program that mandates effective 
preventative maintenance.  Engineering/Asset Management/Operations/Safety should 
enforce effective maintenance procedures.  The program should also consist of 
organizational-set initial expectations, worker training, and periodic retraining.  Managers 
and supervisors shall conduct regular inspections and audits and periodically update and 
improve work rules and procedures.   
Organizations must adopt and implement a maintenance management system for 
managers and supervisors to track equipment maintenance.  The challenge is to ensure 
that any maintenance management system adopted is simple and sufficiently well 
organized enough for personnel to be able to use.  
Workers must maintain all tools in safe conditions, especially tools required for electrical 
work, for either live or de-energized environments, and grounding exercises. Supervisors 
shall audit these arrangements and practices.  Supervisors shall conduct random and 
periodic inspections of tools used by workers.  All defective tools shall be removed from 
use and destroyed according to organizational approved procedures.  
Data saturation (solutions to Ineffective and Inefficient Maintenance) occurred. These 
surrounded worker training, oversight, structured process, maintenance management system, 
management priorities, inspection, repairs, maintenance procedures, customer inconvenience, 
operating costs, discipline, and short-cuts. 
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Table:  Ineffective and Inefficient Maintenance Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
Careful inspection of tools and 
equipment prior to use can prevent 
such an accident. 
In my experience, workers are trained and 
fully aware of the need for additional 
maintenance and are prepared for and 
trained to perform proper assessments before 
working. 
 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
Lack of funding or placing funds in other 
places 
Managers and supervisors shall manage the 
Organizational Safety Program and uphold 
the safety policy for effective controls of 
grounding and earthing hazards. The 
Program shall include provisions for worker 
training and periodic retraining, the conduct 
of periodic audits and management overview 
and review. 
 
 
For the problem of Animals/Living Organisms: 70.37% of participants believed that 
Animals/Living Organisms could be solved.  In Round 2, 80% of participants indicated that the 
solutions to Animals/Living Organisms were desirable; 92 % found them feasible.  In Round 3, 
79.17% indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and future 
accidents.  In Round 4, 86.96% expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power 
industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Animals/Living Organisms include:  
The organizational safety policy and program shall reflect effective and adequate controls 
for any hazards associated with animals/living organisms.  The plan should also consist 
of initial expectations training and periodic retraining.  Managers and supervisors must 
conduct regular audits. Animal intrusion has caused catastrophic equipment failure, 
which can cause serious injury if workers are in the vicinity at the time of the failure 
event: This can also be true for the overgrowth of vegetation: Right-of-ways that are too 
narrow for the native trees is an example of increased risk of electrical contact.  
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Employees shall undergo proper training and have personal protective equipment to 
protect themselves from animal encounters.  Bears and snakes in remote locations or 
underground facilities are a prime example of a dangerous animal encounter.  Snake 
chaps can prevent strikes below the knee.  Poles hollowed out by carpenter ants.  Beavers 
cut trees; birds build nests that can knock out power, alligators, snakes in hand holes, and 
killer bees are a real concern.    
Management must ensure the installation of physical protection or guards to keep animals 
away from electrical equipment: This involves cost and the electrical outages that may be 
necessary for installation of the protective guards and physical protection devices. 
Adding more animal guards and insulating material on poles will help save animals and 
workers.   
Data saturation (solutions to Animals/Living Organisms) occurred. These surrounded 
animal guards, prevention measures, assumptions, procedures, training, consultation, work, 
personal protective equipment, managers, and supervisors. 
Table:  Animals/Living Organisms Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
Federal animal guard requirements. Employ both proactive and reactive 
controls to address the problem. 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
Linemen do not like installing animal guards, 
because animals cause lots of power outages, 
which give linemen lots of overtime pay. 
institute procedures to mitigate the impact of 
animals/living organisms on electric plant and 
systems 
 
For the problem of Hazardous Worksite Conditions: 92.59 % of participants believed that 
Hazardous Worksite Conditions could be solved.  In Round 2, 100 % of participants indicated 
that the solutions to Hazardous Worksite Conditions were desirable; 92 % found them feasible.  
In Round 3, 100 % indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further 
and future accidents.  In Round 4, 95.65 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric 
power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Hazardous Worksite Conditions include:  
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Managers and supervisors must continually enforce procedures to identify and control 
hazardous and dangerous worksite conditions both proactively and otherwise. Conduct 
pre-job briefing training.  Promote that as the job commences, the first activity will 
always be a job-briefing involving all workers at the job site.  Treat job briefings as a 
compliance activity before moving into the work.     
The organizational safety policy and program must reflect effective and adequate controls 
for any hazards associated with dangerous worksite conditions.  If this is not so, then 
organizational leadership must fix urgently.  The plan should also consist of initial 
expectations training and periodic retraining.  Managers and supervisors must conduct 
regular audits.   
Employees shall undergo proper training and have personal protective equipment to 
protect themselves from hazardous worksite conditions. Situational awareness is key to 
identifying and rectifying hazardous situations before commencing and during work 
exercises.  
Better project management arrangements, managing work programming to lessen 
multiple crafts working the same job site, with high consequence work, can mitigate 
dangerous worksite conditions.  The allowance of sufficient time in project schedules and 
a budget for hazard mitigation before construction commencement would prevent 
accidents and worker injuries.  
Workers must monitor and maintain good housekeeping so that the work site does not 
become cluttered with trip hazards: commonly identified as a cause in accident 
investigations.  These can sometimes be serious or fatal, depending on where the poor 
housekeeping is with high energy equipment, or if at an elevation. 
Data saturation(solutions to Hazardous Worksite Conditions) occurred. These surrounded 
job briefing, project management, unplanned events, work programming, animal guards, 
prevention measures, assumptions, procedures, training, consultation, proactive work, personal 
protective equipment, high energy equipment, managers, and supervisors. 
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Table:  Hazardous Worksite Conditions Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
Individuals are to make sure the area 
is safe before attempting to restore 
power. 
Managers must ensure workplace 
training on hazard recognition and 
hazard mitigation. 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
Employees know the hazards, but do not remove 
the hazard from the worksite — laziness and time 
constants. 
For weather related to ice/snow - issue non-slip 
footwear 
 
For the problem of Unplanned Events: 96.3 % of participants believed that Unplanned 
Events could be solved.  In Round 2, 92 % of participants indicated that the solutions to 
Unplanned Events were desirable; 88 % found them feasible.  In Round 3, 95.83 % indicated that 
it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and future accidents.  In Round 
4, 91.3 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not 
become seriously injured or killed while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Unplanned Events include:  
Conduct thorough job briefings and consider the worst case scenario in pre-job planning. 
Workers must receive training skills in situation awareness, better hazard assessment 
skills, and to understand that a deviation from the planned work requires another 
tailboard discussion before proceeding further. Supervisors must demand full compliance 
with this requirement.   
Workers must conduct a thorough site-specific risk analysis.  Through that arrangement 
and practice, workers will develop a culture of hazard identification and mitigation.  
Workers must anticipate that unexpected events can occur and cover these assumptions in 
the pre-job briefing.  Improper pre-job assessments and reviews can contribute to crews 
and individuals not adequately prepared for tasks to be completed.  
Workers and supervisors must check and confirm switching orders and update future 
switching plans as switching operations to accomplish switching exercises as expected.  
Organizational safety policies and procedures must sufficiently allow for workers to 
address the impact of unplanned events proactively and otherwise. Workers must realize 
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that unplanned events frequently occur due to an uncontrolled hazard and they must 
update the program to control these possible hazards.  Controlling the dangers are not 
possible (acts of God and natural disasters are examples), but workers updating the work 
program to reduce the effects of these hazards are necessary.  Work teams must have 
contingency plans in place for unplanned events, should that occur.  Not all unanticipated 
events can be recognized.  Workers shall contact the person in charge or the shift control 
personnel in the event of unplanned issues that can impact on the planned job.  
Communication is essential during unexpected events.  The supervisor or shift control 
personnel must expect that individuals experiencing the unplanned event may require 
immediate and active support.    
Data saturation (solutions to Unplanned Events ) occurred. These surrounded job 
briefing, mitigation, work programming, guards, prevention measures, assumptions, procedures, 
training, consultation, proactive work, personal protective equipment, high energy equipment, 
contingency, situation awareness, managers, and supervisors. 
Table:  Unplanned Events Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
Seat of the pants decisions by workers. Unplanned events require a regrouped 
new specific job brief and hazard 
assessment. Often this is not done. 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
The unexpected, if not identified and a plan 
developed to rectify, is a leading cause of injuries. 
Safeguard against the same type of failure if 
future or subsequent relocation of the work area 
is not possible. 
 
For the problem of Inappropriate Work Methods: 96.3 % of participants believed that 
Inappropriate Work Methods could be solved.  In Round 2, 100 % of participants indicated that 
the solutions to Inappropriate Work Methods were desirable; 100 % found them feasible.  In 
Round 3, 100 % indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further 
and future accidents.  In Round 4, 95.65 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric 
power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Inappropriate Work Methods include:  
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It is almost natural for humans to gravitate towards taking short-cuts.  It is akin to an 
"automatic" mode.  Teach workers to slow down when in their "automatic mode."  
Practical drift creates a sense that work methods are okay because individuals are lucky 
and have gotten away for a long time. The program should involve initial training and 
periodic retraining of all relevant workers and work teams including supervisors and 
managers.  It must be impossible for untrained workers to operate sophisticated and to 
use specialized tools.  
Managers and supervisors must conduct periodic audits to confirm compliance, 
periodically update the work procedures, and support continuous improvement.  Ensure 
that procedures for job tasks are optimal and simple to follow.  It may be very time 
consuming, and employees may still not follow the procedures, especially when 
supervisors and managers do not demand and enforce strict compliance.  Remove errant 
supervisors and managers as well as defaulting workers. 
Work teams must always be adequately staffed — with no instances of inexperienced 
individuals leading work-teams and supervising work: That may be an opportunity for 
supervisors to mentor, coach, and counsel other employees on inappropriate work 
methods. 
Data saturation (solutions to Inappropriate Work Methods) occurred. These surrounded 
untrained workers, worker training, expectation, knowledgeable employees, inappropriate work 
methods, inspection, inexperienced, maintenance procedures, supervisors, periodic audits, 
compliance, and short-cuts. 
Table:  Inappropriate Work Methods Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
Standardize work methods and 
activities, document procedures, train 
workers, and monitor work methods. 
 
 
Field auditing to ensure that workers are 
knowledgeable and using proper work 
procedures. Challenge - short cutting to save 
time, make job easier. 
 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
Avoid putting people in places of leadership 
that lets this type of behavior go on 
Ensure that personnel is trained in how to do 
a job; emphasize the importance of not taking 
"shortcuts." The challenge is to overcome the 
desire of people to get jobs done quickly. 
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For the problem of Stakeholder Demands: 81.48 % of participants believed that 
Stakeholder Demands could be solved.  In Round 2, 80 % of participants indicated that the 
solutions to Stakeholder Demands were desirable; 84 % found them feasible.  In Round 3, 75 % 
indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and future 
accidents.  In Round 4, 82.61 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power 
industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Stakeholder Demands include:  
Managers must actively keep individuals, including supervisors with responsibility for 
productivity, answerable and accountable for non-compliance with workplace safety 
provisions, worker protection, and decision making to preventing accidents: for 
production to occur only under safe conditions and when supervisors are actively 
monitoring work operations. Success means meeting stakeholder demands, but only if the 
job is safe.  If by meeting stakeholder demands, bypassing of safety practices and 
procedures occurred, then the individuals involved in doing the work and the 
organization has failed.  Safely doing work takes precedence over stakeholder demands; 
It is, however, no excuse to disregard stakeholder concerns and to perform work tasks in 
an inefficient and untimely fashion.  Sometimes a job scope is changed because of 
demanding stakeholders, but even this compromised work scope and arrangement must 
happen while maintaining the safety arrangements.  Managers and supervisors must 
explain to stakeholders the importance of maintenance, the prevention of equipment 
failure and unplanned outages. 
Data saturation (solutions to Stakeholder Demands) occurred. These surrounded work 
programming, equipment failure, prevention measures, assumptions, consultation, proactive 
work, high energy equipment, situation awareness, managers, and supervisors. 
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Table:  Stakeholder Demands Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
Facilities not being updated or tree 
trimming being done properly to save 
money to keep stakeholders happy. 
Ensure that stakeholders know that their 
demands are secondary to Safety. 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
Have buy-in from stakeholders. 
The challenge is that "time is money." 
Have discussions with stakeholders about setting 
realistic and attainable goals to ensure that they 
can be met safely. It is the responsibility of the 
highest level of leadership to ensure this happens. 
 
For the problem of Poor Judgment by Individuals or Work Crews: 96.30 % of 
participants believed that Poor Judgment by Individuals or Work Crews could be solved.  In 
Round 2, 96 % of participants indicated that the solutions to Poor Judgment by Individuals or 
Work Crews were desirable; 92 % found them feasible.  In Round 3, 100 % indicated that it was 
important to implement these solutions to prevent further and future accidents.  In Round 4, 
95.65 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not 
become seriously injured or killed while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Poor Judgment by Individuals or Work Crews 
include: 
Organizations must actively promote a safety-first culture that is intolerant to poor 
judgment and which supports its correction.  Managers and Supervisors must develop 
work procedures and ensure strict adherence by individuals at work.  Strict adherence to 
well-written procedures can avoid workers having to rely on their judgment.  Managing 
and enforcing these rules helps workers to focus and guide their actions based on work 
procedures and not by individual judgment and analysis.  Progressive discipline may 
often-times be necessary.  Managers and supervisors must set initial expectations if those 
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expectations are unmet; defaulters should undergo retraining.  If, after that intervention, 
expectations are still not met, then it is fair to remove personnel from the team if they are 
not willing or able to provide good judgment. 
Organizational leaders will encourage superior work performance by instituting a peer 
checking arrangement on all jobs with as many workers as possible.  For individuals 
working alone and an unwillingness of peers to correct each other may be difficult to 
manage but managers and supervisors must brainstorm how best to negotiate that 
challenge successfully.  In a trusting work environment, self-check and peer-check will 
result in safe work practice and an absence of accidents.  Managers and supervisors must 
set initial expectations that nothing is more important than getting the job done safely, 
that poor individual judgment is discouraged, and it will result in appropriate actions. 
Group decisions are to be encouraged once platformed on job briefing and full 
understanding of work tasks and sequence of activities.  Organizational leadership should 
require managers and supervisors to facilitate this work arrangement.  It must be that 
once any worker raises an issue and supervisors and management address it, work shall 
be in line with the revised arrangements. 
Managers and supervisors must do more competency testing of workers.  Years of 
experience as the primary factor promoting individuals must not be a criterion that 
augments proven competence, skills, knowledge, and consistency in decision making.  
Managers and supervisors must ensure that individuals at work do not become 
complacent in their work, or overconfident in their abilities.  These individuals must 
undergo retraining to prevent the tendency to disregard safety rules, policies, and 
procedures.  Managers must support supervisors doing crew audits identifying poor 
judgment and addressing it with coaching or counseling.  Mentoring programs can be 
suitable for this effort. 
Data saturation (solutions to Poor Judgment by Individuals or Work Crews) occurred. 
These surrounded self-check, peer-check, enforcing rules, written procedures, supervisors, 
coaching, overconfident, experienced, inexperienced, untrained workers, worker training, 
expectation, culture, attitudes, behavior, skilled, knowledgeable, inappropriate work methods, 
and employee unions. 
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Table:  Poor Judgment by Individuals or Work Crews Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
Conduct initial and reoccurring training 
on appropriate work methods. Conduct 
observations on ongoing work to make on 
the spot corrections and retraining. Apply 
progressive discipline up to and including 
removal from the team. 
 
Have a human performance 
improvement program to address 
human errors both proactively and 
reactively. 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
Recognize that humans are fallible and prone 
to error. 
You ever had a class in "good judgment". If 
you were to cite three qualities of good 
leadership, they would all be soft skills. We 
train our electrical workers in all hard skills 
and then make them supervisors and 
managers. We need to train our leaders of the 
industry in leadership skills and the 
mechanics of good judgment.. 
 
 
For the problem of Poor Attitude and Behavior by Individuals or Work Crews: 88.89 % 
of participants believed that Poor Attitude and Behavior by Individuals or Work Crews could be 
solved.  In Round 2, 100 % of participants indicated that the solutions to Poor Attitude and 
Behavior by Individuals or Work Crews were desirable; 96 % found them feasible.  In Round 3, 
95.83 % indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and 
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future accidents.  In Round 4, 95.65 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power 
industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Poor Attitude and Behavior by Individuals or Work 
Crews include: 
Managers and supervisors must have support from organizational leadership to improve 
morale and to address worker dissatisfaction. Organizational leadership and management 
can encourage performance improvement techniques and tools such as situational 
awareness to promote positive working arrangements.  Close oversight and supervisor 
presence can help mitigate poor attitude and behavior. More egregious examples would 
need to be handled using different methods to avoid these individuals affecting or 
influencing other workers. 
Organizational leadership must promote a safety first culture where poor attitude and 
behavior correction is unaccepted.  Managers and supervisors must set initial 
expectations that nothing is more important than getting the job done safely and that poor 
attitude and behavior are intolerable and can result in dismissal.  Progressive discipline 
may be necessary.  If initial expectations are unachieved, provide retraining.  If 
expectations are still not met, then remove personnel from the team if they cannot or are 
not willing to fit into a safety-first culture. 
Management and supervisors must recognize a poor attitude and not allow work to 
proceed until that attitude is corrected: despite other work-related pressures to get a 
certain amount of work done in a particular time to meet a goal. 
Proper management is key to good employee attitudes and behaviors: Make employees 
feel appreciated.  Manager and supervisor training must include segments to cover this 
need. 
Data saturation (solutions to Poor Attitude and Behavior by Individuals or Work Crews) 
occurred. These surrounded individuals working together, training, progressive discipline, 
enforcing rules, written procedures, managers,  supervisors, coaching, initial expectations, 
inexperienced, untrained workers, worker training, expectation, culture, situational awareness, 
inappropriate work methods, and employee unions. 
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Table:  Poor Attitude and Behavior by Individuals or Work Crews Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
More training and oversight; structured 
process; Workers hours Workers 
dissatisfaction 
Supervisors identifying and 
addressing poor attitudes must be 
management supported. Poor 
supervision breeds poor crew attitudes 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
If the promotion of individuals is not from 
within the organization, they are Engineers 
and studies show that engineers do not have 
the best people skills. 
Our brain uses 1 liter of blood per minute. 20 
% of the air we create and 25% of the food 
we eat is required to operate our brain. When 
we are distracted by poor behaviors and poor 
attitude we make mistakes. 
 
For the problem of Ineffective or no Workplace Training: 92.59 % of participants 
believed that Ineffective or no Workplace Training could be solved.  In Round 2, 100 % of 
participants indicated that the solutions to Ineffective or no Workplace Training were desirable; 
96 % found them feasible.  In Round 3, 100 % indicated that it was important to implement these 
solutions to prevent further and future accidents.  In Round 4, 91.3 % expressed confidence that 
if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed 
while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Ineffective or no Workplace Training include: 
 
Employees must receive training on how to execute tasks safely to prevent work induced 
failures such as accidents, injuries, and death.  Despite training costs, organizational 
leadership and management must communicate and champion the fact that well-trained 
employees are more productive and safer.  Management must support organizational 
policies, procedures, and resources (budget, time, materials, and staffing) while 
maintaining priority on worker training.   
Accurate training records and ease of access to those records is a way to ensure that only 
trained workers are assigned specific tasks. Engineering/Asset 
Management/Operations/Safety should create training programs.  Conduct periodic audits 
of training effectiveness.  Management must periodically review, continuously improve, 
and update the safety training program.  If hazard assessment conducted by work teams 
are not comprehensive, it is easy to miss dangerous conditions and situations, especially 
when not thought of or factored as likely to be present or to occur during the work 
exercise. 
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Trainers must be knowledgeable in the work function; the better the training program, the 
better the worker. Training should be ever changing for effectiveness, worker 
enlightenment, and where individuals will fully comply with work procedures and rules.  
Ineffective training programs can contribute to the workers becoming overconfident and 
complacent, and ultimately to possible injury or death.  
Data saturation (solutions to Ineffective or no Workplace Training) occurred. These 
surrounded hazard assessment, mentoring, knowledge, records, written procedures, managers,  
supervisors, overconfidence, initial expectations, inexperienced, untrained workers, culture, 
policies, procedures, and resources. 
Table:  Ineffective or no Workplace Training Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
Train workers and evaluate the 
effectiveness of training programs. 
 
How do we mitigate hazards involving 
the inherent risk humans bring to the 
table, if we don't teach it? 
Ensuring robust training and also 
refresher training can prevent 
accidents. 
Challenges - Lack of funding for 
training 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
Help train the people around you in a manner 
that will keep them safe. Training comes from 
your experienced people not from a book. 
 
Most training for lineman stops after their 
apprenticeship is completed. Training is 
costly and utilities are not willing to pay. 
Avoid assigning work to an individual who is 
not trained or familiar with a piece of 
equipment if it has a high energy hazard 
associated with it. 
 
For the problem of Poor Supervision: 92.59 % of participants believed that Poor 
Supervision could be solved.  In Round 2, 92 % of participants indicated that the solutions to 
Poor Supervision were desirable; 92 % found them feasible.  In Round 3, 95.83 % indicated that 
it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and future accidents.  In Round 
4, 91.3 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not 
become seriously injured or killed while doing work. 
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Solutions identified for the problem of Poor Supervision include: 
The way that supervisors conduct job site safety exchanges with and how often they 
witness employees performing a task can help in preventing accidents. The more often a 
supervisor oversees workers’ performing tasks, the less likelihood of errors and 
accidents. 
Organizational leadership must support a supervisor training program that emphasizes, 
technical and supervisory skills competence regardless of sizeable cost and time 
commitment.  Supervisors are organizational representatives who have important 
opportunities to recognize if or when workers encroach into dangerous work zones and 
arrangements.  Supervisors can, therefore, identify instances and situations where the 
possibility of preventing accidents, worker injuries or death is real and active. 
Management must set initial expectations with supervisors, emphasizing that nothing is 
more important than getting the job done safely and that they need to set the same 
expectations with their teams.  If those expectations are unmet, management should 
provide retraining to the supervisor. If expectations are still not achieved, then remove 
supervisors from leading workers and work-teams: especially if they cannot or are not 
willing to fit into a safety-first culture. 
Supervisors must be empowered to act and to correct violations with impunity, and 
without fear of reprisal: especially if disciplinary action is necessary and immediately 
administered:  A safety-serious management should be willing to support a supervisor 
who makes tough decisions against defaulting employees on workplace safety issues and 
violations. 
Supervisors must master the human relations skills necessary to convince others to do 
work in an accident-free environment and without worker injuries or death. Supervisors 
are champions of organizational core-values and future leaders; leadership training is an 
essential investment.  Front line supervisors must to have field experience: It is necessary 
for the electric power industry.   
Data saturation (solutions to Poor Supervision) occurred. This surrounded leadership, 
core values, champions, field experience, certification, knowledge, understanding, maturity, 
work together, progressive discipline, enforcing rules, written procedures, coaching, worker 
training, expectation, culture, situational awareness, and work methods. 
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Table:  Poor Supervision Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
Supervisors need to be technically 
proficient in work tasks and receive 
appropriate training. 
 
Supervisors must be well qualified and 
experienced in work at hand. 
Supervisors also need to practice 
good leadership and need to receive 
appropriate training. 
 
Managers must set and detail 
expectations for supervisors. 
 
Supervisors must be well qualified and 
experienced in work at hand. 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
Keeping poor supervisors under scrutiny by 
management individuals, and providing 
frequent feedback, can help guide these 
individuals from creating an environment 
where accidents can occur. 
 
Most training for lineman stops after their 
apprenticeship is completed. Training is 
costly and utilities are not willing to pay. 
Promote integrity. 
Organizations need to create a "Safety First" 
culture. Supervisors play an integral role in 
creating/maintaining that culture. 
 
For the problem of Work Planning: 96.3 % of participants believed that Work Planning 
could be solved.  In Round 2, 100 % of participants indicated that the solutions to Work Planning 
were desirable; 100 % found them feasible.  In Round 3, 100 % indicated that it was important to 
implement these solutions to prevent further and future accidents.  In Round 4, 95.65 % 
expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not become 
seriously injured or killed while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Work Planning include: 
Managers and supervisors must ensure robust job planning and job briefing to prevent 
accidents. Job packages must include job aids such as procedures, job safety analysis 
identifying hazards, and information on prior incidents, if available, can help avoid 
accidents.  A properly planned job includes safety consideration such as correct fall 
protection, personal protective equipment, proper isolation, and grounding.  Often, these 
340 
 
items are left to the workers to arrange and decide when they arrive on site.  It is 
imperative to consider safety when creating a work plan. All parties should provide 
feedback about how to best organize the project safely and carefully, given their areas of 
expertise.  Front line supervision and workers must recognize bad work planning and 
provide effective, practical, and useful feedback to supervisors and managers.  Managers 
and supervisors must then take appropriate action to prevent recurrence of sub-standard 
work planning. 
Managers, supervisors, and workers must coordinate work planning with work going on 
concurrently and which might have an impact on the job activities.  Personnel must be 
aware when conditions and situations change and require work reassessment strategies 
due to the unplanned changes.  These must be a deliberate, proactive pre-disposition: 
Improper pre-work assessments and reviews contribute to crews and individuals being 
improperly prepared for tasks and accident events. 
Data saturation (solutions to Work Planning) occurred. This surrounded job planning, job 
briefing, safety consideration, actively involve,  coordinate, worker training, expectation, culture, 
situational awareness, work methods, recognize, field experience, certification, knowledge, 
understanding, enforcing rules, written procedures, coaching, managers, and supervisors. 
Table:  Work Planning Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
OSHA required pre-job briefings. 
 
Knowing the hazards is one thing, but 
removing the hazard from the worksite 
should be part of the work planning. 
Involve crew leader in work planning. 
Challenge - time commitment and working 
logistics. 
 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
I never allowed a lousy plan to affect my work 
as a lineman. I just would not do it until there 
was a better idea. That said, I became a 
foreman after 14 years as a lineman. Now 
lineman becomes foreman after 3 years 
because of the worker shortage. Less likely to 
stand up to or even recognize a bad plan. 
None at the start and none on time 
 
Rushing, budget and bonus money. 
 
Profit over safety 
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For the problem of Management Priorities: 85.19 % of participants believed that 
Management Priorities could be solved.  In Round 2, 100 % of participants indicated that the 
solutions to Management Priorities were desirable; 100 % found them feasible.  In Round 2, 
95.83 % indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and 
future accidents.  In Round 2, 91.3 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power 
industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Management Priorities include: 
Management must create and encourage a safety first culture where nothing is more 
important than getting the job done safely: Management must make safety the number 
one priority of the organization.  Management must genuinely, actively, and repeatedly 
communicate this so that workers do not lose focus.  Managers must recognize the 
challenge of keeping safety as a top priority even in situations where the acute pressure to 
get things done is overwhelming, and not to feel pressured to meet other work-related 
goals and to compromise safety. 
Supervisors must demand strict adherence to procedures to prevent accidents: It is a point 
of hypocrisy when supervisors and managers preach that safety practices are foremost, 
but then blatantly disregard safety to meet scheduling, production quotas, or alleviate 
budgetary concerns. 
Managers must be exposed to the fieldwork regularly so they will have a detailed idea 
about what they are managing and the individuals doing that work.  They must be up-to-
date or aware of the work activities on projects or jobs, have a full understanding of the 
actual work plan, the strategy for getting it done, and HOW best to do it. 
Data saturation (solutions to Management Priorities) occurred. This surrounded culture, 
priority, safe work, cost,  coordinate, customers, stakeholders, situational awareness, work 
methods, field experience, knowledge, understanding, enforcing rules, written procedures, 
coaching, managers, and supervisors. 
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Table:  Management Priorities Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
When a Manager steps into a process and 
wants to accelerate a job, or change 
priorities, a worker can ensure his safety 
by strictly adhering to work procedures, 
with no "fade." 
Being rushed. 
Get rid of managers that are not on board 
with the company’s safety culture. 
 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
Production is rewarded more than safety and 
workers know that as a fact. Some workers 
even choose shortcuts just to get ahead of the 
competition and for promotion. 
Slow down and keep employees motivated 
 
Adopt a true safety first value 
 
For the problem of Poor Team Communication: 92.59 % of participants believed that 
Poor Team Communication could be solved.  In Round 2, 96 % of participants indicated that the 
solutions to Poor Team Communication were desirable; 96 % found them feasible.  In Round 3, 
100 % indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and future 
accidents.  In Round 4, 91.3 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power 
industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Poor Team Communication include: 
The person in charge of a job must be trained in good communication and know the 
importance of excellent interpersonal and group communication.   Before a job starts, and 
while a job is in progress, arrange planned meetings where everyone can be aware of the 
actual work progress and planned changes.  These meetings must be factored as part of 
the job and time must be added to overall job times. 
Managers and supervisors must recognize the benefits of and use strategies aimed at 
improving human performances by genuinely and meaningfully communicating with 
workers on accident prevention efforts.  Implement thorough and complete job briefings 
before and during the work processes and exercises.  Recognize that a common challenge 
is that job briefings are not always well conducted: Use effective communication to 
prevent misunderstandings.  
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Workers mindful of what other workers are doing will help prevent accidents: Managers 
and supervisors must facilitate this.  By precisely knowing what coworkers are doing, and 
when, can avoid an accident caused by actions that interfere with other groups.  
Sometimes this can be best handled by having one person/entity in charge of all tasks on 
a particular job. 
It is imperative that individuals at work and work teams practice effective communication 
to drive safe, superior team performance, and work outcomes.  Managers and supervisors 
must set expectations on effective communication and provide appropriate training to 
individuals at work.  Managers must also ensure that supervisors are fostering a culture 
that supports good communication.  
Supervisors must be mindful that by forming work teams, individuals who work well 
together is extremely important.  If interpersonal issues exist among team members, 
managers and supervisors must diagnose and address this issue decisively, even if it 
means removing an individual or individuals from the employ altogether or in showing 
workers where they may be contributing to the problem or problems.  Managers and 
employee unions must work together to alleviate possible accidents and worker injuries 
that can result from sub-standard conditions due primarily to poor interpersonal 
communication. 
Data saturation (solutions to Poor Team Communication) occurred. This surrounded 
strategies, culture, human performances, tailgate meetings, sub-standard conditions,  
complacency, confusion, job briefings, situational awareness, work methods, recognize, 
performance, understanding, misunderstandings, written procedures, coaching, managers, and 
supervisors. 
Table:  Poor Team Communication Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
Communication deficiencies have been 
identified to be a potential cause of 
injuries, especially during the 
administration of operating orders 
Good pre-job briefings: Sometimes a 
challenge is language barriers can exist. 
 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
If there is bad chemistry on the crew, there 
will be poor communication. 
Communication is a training topic for all 
persons at work. 
Establish communication protocols 
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For the problem of Willful Disregard for Safety Rules: 81.48 % of participants believed 
that Willful Disregard for Safety Rules could be solved.  In Round 2, 100 % of participants 
indicated that the solutions to Willful Disregard for Safety Rules were desirable; 96 % found 
them feasible.  In Round 3, 95.83 % indicated that it was important to implement these solutions 
to prevent further and future accidents.  In Round 4, 95.65 % expressed confidence that if 
applied in the electric power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while 
doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Willful Disregard for Safety Rules include: 
Managers and supervisors must recognize possible individual or individuals who may 
exhibit a tendency to disregard workplace rules, and get appropriate counseling, or to 
keep the errant individual off the job: despite possibly but not deliberately invading the 
person's right to privacy.  
Managers and supervisors must follow a firm, consistent approach to handing willful 
violations – discipline: It is prudent to train supervisors and workers before the working 
arrangements get to that point where individuals will willfully disregard safety rules. 
Managers must discipline individuals who willfully disregard safety rules.  If the 
defaulting individual cannot recover, then the only recourse would be that the manager 
must remove the person from that job function and all hazardous work tasks.  This 
removal can mean dismissal from the company. 
Supervisors must remain vigilant and seek out workers who take short cuts when 
performing work; mostly the result of overconfidence and complacency.  Individuals who 
are affected by either or both, have a higher tendency to disregard safety in the belief that 
nothing will occur since they may have done the same or similar work tasks before 
without implementing safety procedures. This removal will save errant individuals from 
making mistakes and possibly injuring themselves or others at work. 
One reason for willful disregard for safety rules is the quality of accident investigations 
where the main focus usually is on determining errors committed by the last individual 
before the accident event. To prevent this, organizational leaders must require full 
compliance with accident investigation guidelines where human-error would be just one 
aspect of the investigation. 
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Data saturation (solutions to Willful Disregard for Safety Rules) occurred. This 
surrounded focus, strategies, culture, errors, human performances, counseling, tailgate meetings, 
sub-standard conditions,  complacency, overconfidence, job briefings, situational awareness, 
work methods, recognize, performance, understanding, misunderstandings, written procedures, 
coaching, managers, and supervisors. 
Table:  Willful Disregard for Safety Rules Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
Willful disregard for safety rules needs to 
be corrected. 
 
Set initial expectations that nothing is 
more important than getting the job done 
Safely and that unsatisfactory behavior 
will be addressed. 
Progressive discipline is often necessary. 
Set the initial expectations. If those 
expectations are not met, provide retraining. 
If expectations are still not met, then it is fair 
to remove personnel from the team if they 
cannot or are not willing to fit into a Safety 
First culture. 
 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
Linemen have big egos and enjoy living on 
the edge. This ego makes them willingly 
disregard safety rule. 
Investigations often produce phrases like, 
"total disregard for safety rules, ignoring 
PPE requirements etc". Last year in the 
United States 45 children died after being 
forgotten in the back seat on a hot day. It's 
easy to blame the worker by saying "Willful 
disregard." The truth is there is always 
something more complex at work. If we don't 
ask the right questions, we won't find the 
answer. Worse we can't change outcomes. 
Culture change is needed to develop a 
workforce that resists the urge to make willful 
violations of safety rules 
 
For the problem of Permit to Work Violations: 81.48 % of participants believed that 
Permit to Work Violations could be solved.  In Round 2, 100 % of participants indicated that the 
solutions to Permit to Work Violations were desirable; 92 % found them feasible.  In Round 3, 
346 
 
91.67 % indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and 
future accidents.  In Round 4, 91.3 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power 
industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Permit to Work Violations include: 
Managers and supervisors must frequently remind all individuals at work that proper job 
briefings at the start of every job, will help prevent permit to work violations. That 
reminder must also explain that if an individual chooses to work outside of the scope of 
their permit, then that would be an individual responsibility. Managers must stress that a 
permit to work is specific where workers have detailed job information, an indication of 
the danger in the job activities, and the consequences of work permit violations. 
Managers and supervisors must set initial expectations that nothing is more important 
than getting the job done safely and that permit to work violations will attract progressive 
discipline. 
Instructions must be that workers do not work until verification of safe work is possible 
after the issuance and acceptance of a permit to work. This arrangement must hold even 
at locations where the supervisor is not present in person. The workers at remote 
locations must exercise self-discipline and not begin work until permits are received: 
Workers must always be reminded that accident victims are usually the individuals at the 
front-line. A failure to secure permits can result in improper testing, verification of 
conditions, lock out/tag out violations, or other dangerous possibilities that could result in 
serious injury, illness, or death.  Closed loop communication, clearance, and control 
communication, which are necessary, is not known to all front line workers.  Working 
within the defined scope of an operating order or permit to work is crucial to avoid 
injury. 
Training in the permit to work processes and procedures shall include hazard analysis and 
mitigation techniques and legal provisions on violations to this requirement. 
Data saturation (solutions to Permit to Work Violations) occurred. It surrounded focus, 
strategies, culture, errors, incompetence, distraction, tailgate meetings, human error,  
complacency, overconfidence, job briefings, situational awareness, work methods, testing, 
verification, understanding, misunderstandings, written procedures, coaching, discipline, 
managers, and supervisors. 
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Table:  Permit to Work Violations Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
Have more accountability for these 
permits. They are usually just boxes to 
check on a paper. More staff is needed to 
ensure rules are followed. 
 
 
Supervisors are KEY 
 
Train all frontline workers and 
document process 
 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
Organizations need to create a train and 
document culture. 
In a "Safety First" culture, permit to work 
violations needs to be corrected. 
 
For the problem of Lock-Out-Tag-Out-non-Compliance: 96.3 % of participants believed 
that Lock-Out-Tag-Out-non-Compliance could be solved.  In Round 2, 100 % of participants 
indicated that the solutions to Lock-Out-Tag-Out-non-Compliance were desirable; 100 % found 
them feasible.  In Round 3, 100 % indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to 
prevent further and future accidents.  In Round 4, 91.3 % expressed confidence that if applied in 
the electric power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing 
work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Lock-Out-Tag-Out-non-Compliance include: 
Managers and supervisors must encourage peer check, and effective communication as 
that will alleviate problems regarding instances of lock out tag out violations.  In a safety-
first culture, supported by managers and supervisors, lock-out-tag-out training will set the 
initial expectations and, provide a detailed description of why this is necessary and what 
will occur if there are procedural violations.  Locks with combinations can be handy.  
These combinations should be changed periodically, so employees do not memorize 
codes to locks.  Not complying lock-out-tag-out or not using a lock-out-tag-out procedure 
is rooted in a cultural problem and a heuristic trap.  Removing the wrong tags can 
introduce hazardous conditions. 
Remove personnel from work functions where Lock-Out-Tag-Out-non-Compliance 
occurs if they cannot or are not willing to maintain the stringent requirements and 
responsibilities that accompany this task.  The likelihood of individuals becoming injured 
or even killed because of lock-out-tag-out violations are significant.  Non-compliance can 
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lead to accidental energization of circuits, by others, unaware of what is occurring with 
regards to the circuit. 
Progressive discipline is often necessary in cases of indifferent lock-out-tag-out behavior. 
Managers and supervisors must ensure multiple levels of checking of lock-out-tag-out 
arrangements.  Sometimes it is that supervising the personnel performing this function is 
not always possible because of the geographically spatial electric power network and the 
location where lock-out-tag-out operations occur.  Technology can assist through 
pictures, and existing supervisory control and data acquisition signals. If these are not 
available or possible at all lock-out positions, a combination of safe work strategies can 
be employed to maintain full compliance. 
Data saturation (solutions to Lock-Out-Tag-Out-non-Compliance) occurred. It surrounded 
peer check, unskilled, communication, expectations, training, recognize, focus, strategies, 
culture, errors, incompetence, distraction, tailgate meetings, human error,  complacency, 
overconfidence, job briefings, situational awareness, work methods, recognize, verification, 
understanding, written procedures, discipline, managers, and supervisors. 
Table :  Lock-Out-Tag-Out-non-Compliance Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
Non-compliance is often due to a work 
plan that is too restrictive or not 
workable. 
Having a detailed and proper review 
of a lock-out tag-out plan can help 
ensure that it is feasible and workable, 
therefore avoiding the need for 
workers to feel they need to work 
outside of a lock-out tag-out plan. 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
Safety is a must. 
If no one observing, workers will take 
chances. 
Should have field experience and 
understanding of circuits and voltages. 
More accountability is required. A safety 
check should confirm and verify lock-out tag 
out arrangements after installation and 
before work can begin. 
 
For the problem of Organizational Safety Culture: 92.59 % of participants believed that 
Organizational Safety Culture could be solved.  In Round 2, 100 % of participants indicated that 
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the solutions to Organizational Safety Culture were desirable; 100 % found them feasible.  In 
Round 3, 100 % indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further 
and future accidents.  In Round 4, 95.65 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric 
power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Organizational Safety Culture include: 
Managers and supervisors must review work procedures and practices that fall under the 
banner of That's the way we've always done it..., measure them for continued relevance 
and determine if they can reveal that work practices have drifted from accepted 
organizational procedures and best safety practices.  This drift would fall under a safety 
culture that has gone off track.  Reigning these practices when discovered can lead to the 
reduction of accidents.  Safety culture maintenance must be a top priority and 
management should ensure that it stays that way.  Organizational leadership must support 
this direction, not just middle management. 
Company leaders must consider work safety issues as equal to profit, system reliability 
and production.  That push for profit or production must never be over safety: a point of 
hypocrisy when company leaders preach that safety practices are foremost, but then 
blatantly disregard safety to meet scheduling, production quotas, or alleviate budgetary 
concerns.  The saying practice what you preach must be an emphasis amongst 
management and company executives in all business concerns. 
Organizational safety culture begins at the very top.  Top management must be safety 
trained, communicate safe work expectations and support from those under their 
influence. 
Data saturation (solutions to Organizational Safety Culture) occurred. It surrounded 
communication, expectations, training, recognize, strategies, incompetence, distraction, 
human error,  situational awareness, work methods, verification, understanding, leaders, 
managers, and supervisors. 
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Table:  Organizational Safety Culture Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
It is important to note that an 
organizational safety culture requires 
constant maintenance. 
Accidents can be prevented by 
ensuring that 100% of the workforce 
is appropriately trained. 
 
The challenge is to ensure that all are 
trained. 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
This one is a joke. 
 
Electric Utilities brag about their safety 
cultures, but numbers lie and liars figure. 
Creating a "Safety First" culture needs to be 
a collaboration between leadership, 
management, and all employees. 
 
Every single Employee needs to buy in. 
 
 
For the problem of Individual Risk-Taking and Negligence: 92.59 % of participants 
believed that Individual Risk-Taking and Negligence could be solved.  In Round 2, 100 % of 
participants indicated that the solutions to Individual Risk-Taking and Negligence were desirable; 
100 % found them feasible.  In Round 3, 95.83 % indicated that it was important to implement 
these solutions to prevent further and future accidents.  In Round 4, 95.65 % expressed 
confidence that if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not become seriously 
injured or killed while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Individual Risk-Taking and Negligence include: 
Organizational leaders must support safety culture reinforcement and a zero tolerance for 
reckless risk-taking and negligence.  Management and supervisors must enforce strict 
adherence to rules and procedures, by conducting sufficient and timely audits, which can 
help guide workers away from taking risks and being negligent.  Sound control is the key 
to avoiding risk taking and negligence.  
Management and supervisors must encourage workers to follow all steps of an 
assignment and abhor a tendency for individuals to want to get things over with, and the 
perception of getting things done, quickly, will reap the most significant rewards. 
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Managers and supervisors must maintain cognizance that human behavior is 
consequence-influenced: When an individual knows the result of personal actions, then it 
is conceivable that the individual may be more likely to avoid danger.  Front line 
supervision and action must always aim at correcting safety-errant behavior. 
Data saturation (solutions to Individual Risk-Taking and Negligence) occurred. It 
surrounded culture, personal actions, consequence, behavior, understand, communication, 
expectations, training, recognize, strategies, incompetence, human error, situational awareness, 
work methods, managers, and supervisors. 
Table:  Individual Risk-Taking and Negligence Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
This type of person is very attracted to 
line work, but these people are also the 
most accident-prone. 
Result of overconfidence, 
complacency, laziness, or possibly 
poor training. 
 
Evaluate and coach 
 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
Terminate employee contracts when individuals 
willfully violate workplace safety arrangements, 
procedures, and rules. 
 
Fire employees who do not do what’s required. 
Pre-employment testing should be done to 
understand the type of people utilities hire 
and inextricably are putting into harm's way. 
 
For the problem of Equipment Failure: 92.59 % of participants believed that Equipment 
Failure could be solved.  In Round 2, 96 % of participants indicated that the solutions to 
Equipment Failure were desirable; 96 % found them feasible.  In Round 3, 100 % indicated that 
it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and future accidents.  In Round 
4, 86.96 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not 
become seriously injured or killed while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Equipment Failure include: 
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Engineering/Asset Management/Operations/Safety must create procedures for 
inspections, effective maintenance, and replacement of outdated equipment.  The 
program should also consist of initial expectations training and periodic retraining.  
Managers and supervisors must conduct audits regularly.  
A robust preventative maintenance program will help reduce worker injuries and death 
due to equipment failures. Electric power utilities perform more energized work to 
eliminate service interruptions. With more re-closers installed on the electricity 
transmission and distribution systems, enablement of circuit flexibility with re-closer 
scenarios occurs.  Improperly maintained in-service equipment, inadequate quality 
control, poor handling, and shipping conditions for materials and spares are significant 
factors that contribute to equipment failure.   
Managers, supervisors, and workers must remain mindful that knowing the operating 
limits of in-service equipment is essential in the safe management of the electric system.  
Understanding how practical drift allows for a stretch of the operating limits of the 
material, device or equipment, can provide an understanding of why in-service equipment 
fails. 
Preventing equipment failure occurs through proper device operation, and adequate 
maintenance conducted by following technical standards, manufacturers 
recommendation, and within the appropriate period.    
Managers must ensure training for employees on new systems, equipment or products 
and that the knowledge is practiced and effective.    
Data saturation (solutions to Equipment Failure) occurred. It surrounded inspection, 
maintenance, work programming, equipment failure, prevention measures, assumptions, 
procedures, training, consultation, proactive work, personal protective equipment, high energy 
equipment, contingency, practical drift, situation awareness, managers, and supervisors. 
Table:  Equipment Failure Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
Develop and implement work 
procedures that protect workers from 
failures. Challenge - workers do not 
follow procedures 
Available preventative maintenance 
Proper and effective maintenance can 
help prevent the failure of equipment, 
which can cause harm to individuals in 
the vicinity.. 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
Certification training is expensive and time-
consuming. 
Developing a robust preventative maintenance 
program can help with equipment failure. 
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For the problem of Procedural Error: 88.89 % of participants believed that Procedural 
Error could be solved.  In Round 2, 100 % of participants indicated that the solutions to 
Procedural Error were desirable; 100 % found them feasible.  In Round 3, 100 % indicated that 
it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and future accidents.  In Round 
4, 95.65 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not 
become seriously injured or killed while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Procedural Error include: 
Managers and supervisors must effectively train employees to use procedures and audit 
the use of workplace procedures.  Write clear procedures.  Use a step policy and review 
before it is too late: A periodic and documented analysis of procedures will help avoid a 
sub-processes in a process or method which may not be the best way to perform a task.  If 
there are errors in a work process, method, or procedure, and the procedure remains 
unchanged, the mistake will recur until it is.  That usually happens after an accident 
where employees were seriously injured or even killed.    
Management and supervisors must enforce strict adherence to rules and procedures, by 
conducting sufficient and regular audits, to help guide workers away from procedural 
errors.  Sound control is necessary.  Engineering/Asset Management/Operations/Safety 
must create procedures emphasizing proper techniques and practices.  The program 
should also consist of initial expectations training and periodic retraining.  Conduct 
periodic assessments and continually improve.  Examination of procedures must be 
through a series of what if questions.    
Supervisors must identify and correct all instances of improper training and poor 
communication which can cause confusion, misinformation, worker failure to implement 
new procedures, and workers’ inability to communicate critical information. 
Data saturation (solutions to Procedural Error) occurred. It surrounded culture, audits, 
practices, understand, communication, procedures, training, recognize, incompetence, human 
error, situational awareness, work methods, managers, and supervisors. 
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Table:  Procedural Error Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
Procedures should be written by experts 
in the field and not by procedure writers. 
Have a Safety Program that 
incorporates human performance 
improvement tools and strategies. For 
example, require that all procedures 
be executed by two Employees who 
can verify with each other that 
procedures are being implemented 
without error. 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
Management inspection can happen with an 
unexpected change in the work. 
 
Experienced supervisors monitoring crews 
and holding them accountable. 
Recognize that humans are fallible and prone 
to error. Have a human performance 
improvement program to address human 
errors both proactively and reactively. 
 
For the problem of Poor Management Oversight: 88.89 % of participants believed that 
Poor Management Oversight could be solved.  In Round two, 100 % of participants indicated 
that the solutions to Poor Management Oversight were desirable; 100 % found them feasible.  In 
Round three, 100 % indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent 
further and future accidents.  In Round four, 95.65 % expressed confidence that if applied in the 
electric power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Poor Management Oversight include: 
Management must provide employee oversight.  A program in place requiring field visits 
by managers and others by supervisors will help to prevent serious accidents.  Training 
for managers must include techniques for measuring effective compliance and how to 
perform job oversight activities.  Ensure manager training and appropriate resources 
(budget, time, materials, staffing).  
Holding individual managers accountable for their actions will prevent accidents caused 
by poor management oversight.  Individual managers must know that they are 
responsible for the work outcome, regardless of whether they supervise the work 
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activities directly or through other individuals. Poor management oversight can attract 
personal fines and federal sanctions. 
Managers must be familiar with what is required to accomplish the work they assign: The 
challenge is for managers to be familiar with the work they ascribe to others. Unengaged 
supervision, inexperienced supervisors, and management personnel unwilling to call out 
safety violators, are significant contributors to this issue and must be removed if that poor 
practice continues. 
Data saturation (solutions to Poor Management Oversight) occurred. It surrounded 
conflicts, inexperienced, accountable, audits, practices, fines, unengaged, procedures, training, 
incompetence, work methods, and supervisors. 
 
Table:  Procedural Error Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
Procedures should be written by experts 
in the field and not by procedure writers. 
Have a Safety Program that 
incorporates human performance 
improvement tools and strategies. For 
example, require that all procedures 
be executed by two Employees who 
can verify with each other that 
procedures are being implemented 
without error. 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
Management inspection can happen with an 
unexpected change in the work. 
 
Experienced supervisors monitoring crews 
and holding them accountable. 
Recognize that humans are fallible and prone 
to error. Have a human performance 
improvement program to address human 
errors both proactively and reactively. 
 
For the problem of Poor Quality Material: 70.37 % of participants believed that Poor 
Quality Material could be solved.  In Round two, 92 % of participants indicated that the 
solutions to Poor Quality Material were desirable; 92 % found them feasible.  In Round three, 
79.17 % indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and 
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future accidents.  In Round four, 91.3 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric 
power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Poor Quality Material include: 
Organizational leadership and management must demand that purchasing requirements 
are fully complied with and there is a good quality assurance program to help prevent 
issues caused by poor quality material.  When poor quality material gets to the workplace 
and discovered, workers and frontline managers and supervisors must provide details to 
procurement or purchasing personnel.  That feedback is critical to ensure that inferior 
quality materials do not end up causing an accident.   
It is imperative for engineers and designers to use superior quality materials when 
constructing, operating and maintaining equipment to drive actual safety performance.  
Purchasing officers must examine reviews which may be available to buyers before 
making decisions on purchasing items or materials.   
Organizational policies and procedures must always be sufficient to address the impact of 
inferior quality materials with both a proactive focus and otherwise.  Managers must 
maintain a good QA/QC program to ensure the use of high-quality materials and 
equipment. 
Data saturation (solutions to Poor Quality Material ) occurred. It surrounded assurance, 
proactive, purchasing, equipment failure, cost, assumptions, training, consultation, contingency, 
situation awareness, managers, and supervisors. 
Table:  Poor Quality Material Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
Getting any history on the manufacturer of and 
the materials used. A challenge is to buy 
something that might be within the budget. 
 
Buy quality not quantity 
 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
Materials generally have not been the cause 
of accidents I know about. Usually, the issues 
occur due to improper installation and 
workmanship. 
A national registry for defective material. 
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For the problem of Non-use of Personal Protective Equipment: 92.59 % of participants 
believed that Non-use of Personal Protective Equipment could be solved.  In Round two, 100 % 
of participants indicated that the solutions to Non-use of Personal Protective Equipment were 
desirable; 100 % found them feasible.  In Round three, 95.83 % indicated that it was important to 
implement these solutions to prevent further and future accidents.  In Round four, 91.3 % 
expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not become 
seriously injured or killed while doing work. 
Solutions identified for the problem of Non-use of Personal Protective Equipment include: 
Organizational leaders must create and encourage a safety first culture where non-use of 
personal protective equipment is corrected.  Managers and supervisors must ensure 
personnel training in the use of personal protective equipment; Provide periodic 
retraining.  The only way to prevent accidents caused by non-use of personal protective 
equipment is to enforce the safety rules.    
  Managers and supervisors must set initial expectations that nothing is more important 
than getting the job done safely and that not using personal protective equipment 
appropriately are not tolerated:  Dismiss defaulters who willfully disregard this 
requirement. 
Managers and supervisors must enforce work procedures that highlight the consequence 
of not wearing personal protective equipment as this can cause a fatal injury. Non-use of 
personal protective equipment can be due to complacency and overconfidence.  
Inadequate training or non-issuance of personal protective equipment can be a possible 
cause. Occasionally workers make excuses for personal protective equipment violations, 
usually in regards to working constraints in tight places.  Practical drift can occur and are 
dangerous: Especially if the worker has gotten away with non-use of personal protective 
equipment, or before the teaching or the inadequate application of equipotential 
grounding.   
Managers and supervisors must enforce full and strict compliance with the use of 
personal protective equipment at all times: Personal protective equipment, even if it is 
uncomfortable and sometimes restricts natural movement and mobility, is the last line of 
defense.  Not using it means that the employee is defenseless and this is very likely to 
leave the individual susceptible to injury.  Supervisors identifying poor behaviors must 
hold defaulting individuals accountable. 
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Data saturation (solutions to Non-use of Personal Protective Equipment) occurred. It 
surrounded conflicts, good fit, accountable, inspections, practices, careless, unengaged, 
procedures, training, negligence, work methods, managers, and supervisors. 
Table:  Non-use of Personal Protective Equipment Responses: Four-Frames 
Structural Frame Human Resources Frame 
Safety not followed 
More visits by the safety inspector. 
Teaching about lessons learned from past 
incidents is an effective way of showing 
individuals at work the risks of not 
complying with safety rules. 
Political Frame Symbolic Frame 
Severe discipline for individuals who choose to 
not comply with personal protective equipment 
rules will send the message that these rules are 
not optional. 
Good education is the pre-emptive way of 
preventing non-compliance. 
 
The design of this study was for a selection of a 3, 4, or a 5 on a 5-point Likert-type Scale 
for each item in each of the Delphi rounds resulted in 28 out of the 30 items originally identified 
and included in the Round 1 questionnaire remaining relevant throughout the Study. That made 
the data analysis and study management much more complex and complicated than originally 
anticipated. In the following Table, a comparison of the possible results if the acceptance criteria 
was set as a 4 or 5 only for each item in the different questionnaires in this study. Instead of 
participants’ responses to 28 items moving from Round 1 to Round 2 as actually occurred in this 
study, solutions to 20 items would have remained relevant for later consideration. The reduction 
may or may not have impacted on the overall conduct of the study, but this was not assessed in 
its entirety. 
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Round 2 Delphi 
Considertation 
% Response >2 on 5-point Likert-type 
Scale 
 % Response >3 on 5-point Likert-type Scale 
Des Feas Y/N Total 
   
Des Feas Y/N Total 
  
Imp Conf % 
D 
%F  %D %F 
1 Poor Design D F Y 1 92 100  D NF N 0 84 68 XXX XXX 
2 Management System Flaw D F Y 1 100 100  D F Y 1 92 84 IMP CONF 
3 Poor Regulatory Oversight ND NF N 0 68 64  ND NF N 0 24 24 XXX XXX 
4 
Poor work ethics; history of 
wrongdoing that went 
unaddressed 
D F Y 1 96 96  D F Y 1 88 76 IMP CONF 
5 Incorrect labeling  ND F N 0 62 100  ND NF N 0 56 64 XXX XXX 
6 
Medical and other personal 
issues  
D F Y 1 96 92  D NF N 0 80 56 XXX XXX 
7 
Grounding, earthing 
failures/errors  
D F Y 1 100 100  D F Y 1 96 92 IMP CONF 
8 
Ineffective and inefficient 
maintenance 
D F Y 1 100 100  D F Y 1 92 76 IMP CONF 
9 Animals/living organisms  D F Y 1 80 92  ND NF N 0 56 44 XXX XXX 
10 
Hazardous work-site 
conditions 
D F Y 1 100 92  D NF N 0 88 68 XXX XXX 
11 Unplanned events D F Y 1 92 88  D NF N 0 84 56 XXX XXX 
12 Inappropriate work methods D F Y 1 100 100  D F Y 1 92 84 IMP CONF 
13 Stakeholder demands  D F Y 1 80 84  D NF N 0 72 60 XXX XXX 
14 
Poor judgment by 
individuals or work crews 
D F Y 1 96 92  D F Y 1 92 84 IMP CONF 
15 
Poor attitude and or 
behavior by individuals or 
work crews  
D F Y 1 100 96  D F Y 1 92 80 IMP CONF 
16 
Ineffective or no workplace 
training  
D F Y 1 100 96  D F Y 1 88 84 IMP CONF 
17 Poor supervision  D F Y 1 92 92  D F Y 1 92 88 IMP CONF 
18 Work planning D F Y 1 100 100  D F Y 1 92 88 IMP CONF 
19 Management priorities  D F Y 1 100 100  D F Y 1 88 72 IMP CONF 
20 Poor team communication  D F Y 1 96 96  D F Y 1 92 88 IMP CONF 
21 
Willful disregard for safety 
rules  
D F Y 1 100 96  D F Y 1 88 80 IMP CONF 
22 Permit to work violations  D F Y 1 100 92  D F Y 1 92 80 IMP CONF 
23 
Lock-out tag-out 
noncompliance 
D F Y 1 100 100  D F Y 1 96 92 IMP CONF 
24 Organizational safety culture  D F Y 1 100 100  D F Y 1 96 88 IMP CONF 
25 
Individual risk-taking and 
negligence 
D F Y 1 100 100  D F Y 1 92 76 IMP CONF 
26 Equipment failure  D F Y 1 96 96  D NF N 0 84 68 XXX XXX 
27 Procedural error  D F Y 1 100 100  D F Y 1 88 84 IMP CONF 
28 Poor management oversight D F Y 1 100 96  D F Y 1 92 80 IMP CONF 
29 Poor quality material D F Y 1 92 92  ND NF N 0 64 52 XXX XXX 
30 
Non-use or personal 
protective equipment 
D F Y 1 100 100  D F Y 1 96 96 IMP CONF 
    Total 28      Total 20     
 
